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The title of this thesis What makes Constitutions Legitimate? A Legal Analysis of Constitutions and 
Legitimacy: the Example of Fiji gives an indication of its subject matter and its significance to 
understanding the relationship between legitimacy and legality in constitutional theory. In light of 
early studies of constitutionalism and case law from the first constitutional case to the most recent in 
Fiji after a revolution or regime change has occurred the common understanding was that legitimacy 
and legality were two different theoretical concepts. Legality was obtained through effectiveness and 
success while legitimacy's attributes were justice and morality. It seemed that legality was more 
important than legitimacy in any declaration of a successful regime change.  
 
However, recent scholarship suggests that a deficit in legitimacy is also necessarily a failure of 
legality. Without justice and morality there is no legality in any constitutional order and thus, 
following John Locke and specific constitutional provisions appearing in modern constitutions, the 
lack of legitimacy, precisely because it also indicates absence of legality, gives the citizenry the right 
to revolt. The question is whether there is a common understanding of the meaning of justice and 
morality. Morality now refers to rights represented by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Justice, on the other hand, is more complex- it incorporates a series of qualities which developed 
incrementally through the centuries of human progress. Each of these qualities is relevant for a 
particular time and socio-economic and political space. But, above all, the main quality of justice that 
seems to be consistent over time are the concepts of fair and independent delivery of law and free 
access to the mechanisms of justice.  
 
The application of these concepts to the Fijian context reveals that in most Fijian constitutional 
instruments from 1865 to date both fair and independent delivery of justice and access to the 
mechanisms of justice were assured. The two exceptions were the 1990 Constitution and the 2013 
Constitution. In both these documents fair and independent delivery of justice and access to the courts 
were limited by ouster clauses. In the case of the 2013 Constitution the ouster provisions are so serious 
as to dislodge the fundamental grundnorm of Fiji established by the first Constitution of 1865, 
reinforced by the 1970 Constitution, where people's rights were considered to be free and unfettered. 
The 21st century constitutional situation thus triggers the right to rebel should the citizens of Fiji feel 
so inclined. To fend off the risk of violence in the community in response to the unlawful and 
illegitimate 2013 Constitution what is proposed in this thesis is a new Constitution, based on the last 
consensus based instruments, namely the 1997 Constitution fortified by the 2008 People's Charter. 
The innovative methodology of autopoiesis is used to draft the framework and principles of a justice-
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A The Thesis Question 
 
What makes Constitutions Legitimate? In light of the principles of legitimacy 
established by constitutional writers and international case law, is the 2013 
Constitution of Fiji legitimate? 
 
My formulation of the thesis question was inspired by Professor Frederick 
Brookfield's seminal constitutional text, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, 
Law and Legitimation.
1





 I think one must accept that the test of success and effectiveness, 
necessarily a limited test, is generally sufficient for revolutionary legality. 
Success and effectiveness will, it is likely, also provide a minimal measure 
of legitimacy, in that some justice according to law will be done. But 
'considerations of morality' and justice' may still deny full legitimacy to a 
regime that is judicially recognised as legal because it passes that limited 
but sufficient test. 
 
Then it remains possible that, in some extreme circumstances in a 
particular legal order, considerations of morality and justice may provide a 
basis for legal challenge to the validity of particular laws of an oppressive 
regime, whether the regime is long established or is the creation of a more 
or less recent revolution that satisfies the test of success and effectiveness. 
But in relation to the status of a regime of the latter sort, and the order of 
which it is a part, the considerations of morality and justice generally go to 
its legitimacy rather than its legality. 
 
I first read Brookfield's text in early 2000, at the time that the Fijian Parliament had 
been overrun by the George Speight group who were holding the Prime Minister 
Mahendra Chaudhry and his government hostage within the parliamentary precincts 
in Suva. Professor Brookfield's two paragraphs above influenced my ideas thereafter 
                                                          
1
 Frederick Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (2nd ed, 
Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2006).  
2
 At 34. 
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and triggered the planning of the Prasad v Republic of Fiji case which restored the 




Initially appearing in the first edition of Professor Brookfield's book,
4
 the paragraphs 
also launched my 14 year enquiry into the subject of 'legitimacy' of a constitutional or 
legal order.   
 
My investigation into the conditions of legitimacy of a legal order led me into the 
history of legal versus legitimate orders from ancient times to the contemporary 
Fijian constitutional framework. It ended with the query: is the 2013 Fijian 
Constitution legitimate in light of the principles developed on legitimacy?  
 
The background of research and writing for the thesis arose out of my position in Fiji, 
initially as a student and, subsequently, a journalist, High School teacher, social 
activist, Sociology and Social Anthropology Lecturer, film maker, lawyer 
specialising in Human Rights law, United Nations Expert on Mercenaries and Private 
Military Companies and, from 2016, Professor and Dean of the University of Fiji 
School of Law. In my various activities from youth to later life, I was witness to, and 
sometimes active participant in, a number of political and constitutional events and 
crises that confronted Fiji. These events, which took place in 1987, 2000, 2006, and  
2009, revealed Fiji to be constitutionally fragile notwithstanding its former position 
as a seemingly stable British colony from 1874–1970.  
 
Like Brookfield I found that the difference between legality and legitimacy appeared 
to be the presence or absence of 'morality' and 'justice'. Morality and justice appear to 
be linked in the literature though 'morality' is troubling for those not inclined towards 
its religious connotations. More attractive is the connection between 'morality' and 




Moral sentiment theory – the theory of judgment and deliberation found in 
a range of 18th-century thinkers but articulated most powerfully by David 
Hume – offers some valuable resources in this regard. It can be developed 
to suggest a non-foundationalist basis for international human rights today, 
                                                          
3
 Prasad v Republic of Fiji (No 5) [2000] FJHC 273, [2000] 2 FLR 115; and upheld by the Court of 
Appeal in 2001 in The Republic of Fiji v Prasad [2001] FJCA 2. 
4
 Frederick Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1999). 
5
 Sharon Krause "Moral Sentiment and the Politics of Human Rights" (October 2010) Jason Swadley 
(ed) The Art of Theory: Conversations in Political Philosophy <www.artoftheory.com> at 1.  
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one that justifies human rights with reference to the faculty of empathy and 
the fact of interdependence.  
 




Recall that as the concept human right  is understood in the UDHR and in 
every international human rights treaty, a right is a human right if the 
rationale for establishing and protecting the right is, in part, that conduct 
that violates the right violates the ―act towards all human beings in a spirit 
of brotherhood‖ imperative. Given that understanding of human right and 
assuming that the category moral right includes whatever else it includes, 
rights whose fundamental rationale is that conduct that violates the right 
violates the ―act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood‖ 






For better or worse, the language of rights—especially the language of 
human rights—is now a common feature of moral discourse throughout the 
world and is likely to remain so. Indeed, the language of human rights has 
become the moral lingua franca. 
 
Thus 'human rights' is grounded in morality and, in the past, was defined as the moral 
imperative. So Brookfield‘s point that legitimacy involves both morality and justice is 
clearly significant if legitimacy of a legal order takes into account ‗rights‘.  
 
For those inclined towards 'legality' rather than 'legitimacy' of a legal order the term 
'justice' appears equally problematic. In much constitutional case law 'justice' is 
mostly ignored. However, for many revolutionaries, particularly from the left, the 
word justice has been both a rallying cry for social transformation as well as a legal 
expression denoting something above and beyond ordinary codes, rules or laws.  
 
Since the notion of 'justice' in the Fijian legal order, both past and present, is the core 
of the analysis on legitimacy in the thesis, it concentrates on this idea in some detail 
in Chapter 2, with a brief survey below for the purposes of this Introduction. 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Michael Perry ―The Morality of Human Rights‖ (2013) 50 San Diego L Rev 775 at 781 (footnote 
omitted) (original emphasis). 
7
 At 784. 
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B The Literature on Justice and Law 
 
Justice as a legal term is usually linked to the theory of Natural Law. Represented 
first by the ancient Greek philosophers, Natural Law was adopted by a number of 





And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving 
themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even of their 
legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and 
carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject … 
 
The Lockean perspective harked back to the origins of Natural Law theory where 
'morality and justice' were established as the benchmarks of a legal system.  
 
Brookfield had made his intriguingly brief comment in Waitangi and Indigenous 
Rights in reference to the Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions case that 
"[i]njustice in a legal order is necessarily a deficiency in legitimacy."
9
 In this case 
Haynes P had stated that in order to achieve legitimacy a revolutionary government 
must show (inter alia) that it was "not oppressive and undemocratic" and that it "must 




The Mitchell case, based on some significant principles of Natural Law, at the same 
time, referred to its nemesis, Positivist Law. This attempt to cover both theories 
possibly reflected the continuing influence of the Positivist legal theorist Hans Kelsen 




The validity of a legal norm cannot be questioned on the ground that its 
contents are incompatible with some moral or political value. A norm is a 
valid legal norm by virtue of the fact that it has been created according to a 
definite rule and by virtue thereof only. 
 
                                                          
8
 John Locke Two Treatises of Civil Government (JM Dent and Sons Ltd, London, 1924) at 192.  
9
 Brookfield, above n 1, at 42; and Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions [1986] LRC (Const) 35 
(Grenada CA). 
10
 Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer Public Law in New Zealand: Cases, Materials, Commentary and 
Questions (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) at 118. 
11
 Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1945) at 113 
as cited in Miriam Theresa Rooney "Law Without Justice?—The Kelsen and Hall Theories 
Compared" (1948) 23 Notre Dame L Rev 140 at 148. 
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In contrast to Mitchell, the Kelsenian theory had been applied in two earlier Pakistani 
constitutional cases, those of State v Dosso and Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff.
12
 In 
both cases the courts had decided that effectualness of the new [revolutionary regime] 
provides its own legality. In other words a valid legal order was one that was 
effective. There was no reason to consider 'justice' or 'morality' in questions of 
legality. The Mitchell and the Dosso cases therefore represented the two ends of the 
Natural Law/Positive Law (or legitimacy/legality) spectrum in constitutional law. 
These cases will be discussed again in Chapter 1. 
 
In the New Zealand context, Brookfield had concluded, since his book was about the 
relevance of the Treaty of Waitangi to the New Zealand constitutional order, that the 
presence or absence of injustice would identify whether there was legitimacy in that 
order. This was only an observation in the first edition of his book but in an Epilogue 
in the second edition, in an allusion to his own assistance in the planning of the 
Chandrika Prasad case, Brookfield said: "I hold to [that] view, adding only that, of 
course democratic majoritarianism in Fiji, as in New Zealand and elsewhere, does not 




However, neither Brookfield nor any of the cases referred to above went so far as to 
say whether an absence of legitimacy or 'justice' would inevitably render a particular 
regime unlawful or illegal, although this would be a natural conclusion. 
 
In this regard, the obvious question with respect to Fiji is whether lack of 'legitimacy' 
in a legal order would also be considered as lack of 'legality'. In other words, if there 
was no legitimacy of a constitutional order, could people happily and safely (without 
any penalty) disobey the laws or the legal system. Neither the Mitchell case nor 
Brookfield himself had reached this conclusion. On the contrary it was assumed that 
legality of any new regime would depend on effectiveness which would indicate its 
'success'. This showed the continuing influence of Hans Kelsen even as the theories 
and cases considered the important differences between the conditions of legality and 
legitimacy.  
 
My view in this thesis, that an absence of 'justice' in the law meant there was no law, 
was influenced by Aristotle who had outlined both psychological and political 
                                                          
12
 State v Dosso [1958] PLD 533 (SC); and Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff [1977] PLD 657 (SC).  
13
 Brookfield, above n 1, at 187.  
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reasons for revolution; the main political one being discontent with those in power 




This was fortified by a modern article called "When to Overthrow your Government: 
The Right to Resist in the World's Constitutions" in which the authors survey the 
world's constitutions for the provisions on the right to rebellion.
15
 The preconditions 
of the right are stated as being the "trinity" of (i) Natural Law; (ii) Constitutional 
Defence and (iii) Self-defence.
16
 Thus the right to rebel is a legitimate constitutional 
power. 
 
The first substantive chapter of the thesis explores the methodologies of the study, 
first in relation to the overarching feminist theory to which I am committed as it 
encourages diversity of viewpoints. Secondly, I use the 'right to resist' or 'Legal 
Praxis' methodology as it developed in relation to the legitimacy/legality or Natural 
Law/Positive Law conundrum. Thirdly, I explore Systems Theory which includes 
autopoiesis and, as an extension, the New Perspectives including that of drafting a 
constitution with a Natural Law identity. In this regard the drafting technique that is 
considered, against all others, is autopoiesis which is considered as a part of Systems 
Theory with an infusion of Legal Praxis. It is my contention that the concept of 
'justice' can be autopoietically drafted into a constitution once a historically robust 
definition of justice has been identified. 
 
What is' justice'?  Brookfield showed that the term is not synonymous with what we 
know as 'law'. If it was the same there would be no need for him and other 
constitutional theorists, or indeed judges, to explore the difference between 
'legitimacy' and 'legality'. 
 
From a purely layperson's perspective, 'justice' is an important concept which was as 
significant in ancient times, when written records were rarely kept, as it is today. It 
never lost its allure even when societies became more complex. Chapter 2 of the 
thesis considers 'justice' as a concept of law in history from earliest times until the 
20th century. Since 'justice' has been used to identify the disjunction between legality 
and legitimacy of a social order, I find it critically important to see whether this 
                                                          
14
 TA Sinclair (translator) Aristotle The Politics (Penguin Books, London, 1962) at Book V. 
15
 Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez and Mila Versteeg "When to Overthrow your 
Government: The Right to Resist in the World's Constitutions" (2013) 60 UCLA L Rev 1184. 
16
 At 1221–1224. 
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concept retained the same meaning over the centuries of human political and social 
activity.  
 
'Justice' and 'law' have been used synonymously in societies, sometimes innocently, 
at other times by design. Despots have often used the term 'justice' to explain and 
justify what is, in actual fact, the enactment of an oppressive law or the imposition of 
an absolutist or arbitrary regime.  
 
At the same time, the existence of a democratic parliamentary structure does not 
necessarily illustrate evidence of 'justice' in a political order as Brookfield has said. 
Justice is a complex term for both revolutionaries and lawyers. This complexity is 
investigated in the next chapter for its relevance to constitutional theory and drafting. 
If one is to embed the notion of 'justice' in a constitution to ensure its legitimacy it is 
obvious that its meaning must be clear and unequivocal.  
 
To be sure, the question of whether a regime is 'legitimate' has only arisen in the 
context of revolutionary change, that is, in its aftermath. The challenge in the thesis 
was to be able to recommend how a constitution, or legal order represented by a 
constitution, would be purposefully 'legitimate' rather than just 'legal'. The related 
question is whether it matters whether a constitution or legal order is legal or 
legitimate. Furthermore, at what point could a 'legitimate' constitution fall back into 
being just 'legal'?  
 
The last question above has arisen recently in the context of the proposed 
amendment, passed by a parliamentary majority, to s 25 of the South African 
Constitution.
17
 The deprivation of property without compensation that the proposed 
amendment represents will breach all human rights laws, from the Magna Carta to the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
18
 It highlights Brookfield's notion that 
democratic majoritarianism is not the sole criterion of legitimacy. The proposed 
amendment may be legal because it had majority approval in parliament but would 
not be 'legitimate' if the Magna Carta and relevant European Court of Human Rights 
decisions
19
 are to be taken into account. The South African situation highlights the 
importance of seeing a Constitution within the legitimacy/legality framework. Could 
                                                          
17
 Section 25 states that land can be expropriated with compensation. The proposed provision will 
allow expropriation without compensation. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 25. 
18
 See Jelena Ristik "Right to Property: From the Magna Carta to the European Convention on Human 
Rights" (2015) 11(1) SEEU Review Special Ed Magna Carta 800th 145. 
19




the absence of legitimacy as far as the new s 25 of the South African Constitution is 
concerned trigger a 'right to rebel' among those deprived of their property without 
compensation? 
 
Chapter 3 of the thesis considers the Fijian political and constitutional framework 
from the legality/legitimacy divide. The question is whether the Fijian constitutions 
from the 1800s to the present promised justice or law. The answer to this question 
may well determine whether or not Fijians can expect their political crises, such as in 
1987, 2000, 2006 and 2009, to abate with the enactment of the 2013 Constitution. 
 
The final chapter considers the principles of a proposed new Constitution, 
Constitution 20XX, as one that embeds justice, at its core.  
 
From beginning to end the thesis contemplates three essential philosophical 
questions: (i) whether an absence of legitimacy, and therefore, as I see it, an absence 
of legality, in a constitutional order gives citizens the right to rebel; (ii) whether, and 
to what extent, has the presence or absence of justice in the Fijian legal order served 
as a reason or justification for constitutional crises and transformation; and (iii) 
whether, and how, embedding justice as part of the basic structure of a (Fijian) 
constitution is likely to make a constitutional order more sustainable.  
 
In terms of (ii) in the above paragraph it is important to make the point that the 
definition of what the concept of 'justice' may be is not easy. The next chapter comes 
to some definitions that have emerged time and again in history. But there is one 
condition that seems to be very important as a precursor to the definition, universally, 
and that is, access to the courts or to the mechanisms of justice. It will be shown in 
the final substantive chapter that the ouster clauses represented by s 174 of the 2013 
Constitution of Fiji deny access to the courts in constitutional challenges. This then 
represents the unlawfulness of that Constitution if seen from the perspective of the 












II Chapter 1  
Legal Methodology: Standpoint, Theories and Focus 
 
This chapter addresses the legal methodologies to be employed to provide answers to 
all the questions posed in the Introduction of the thesis and subsequent questions in 
the body of the thesis as they arise. It will be seen that application of a diverse range 
of methodologies is relevant to determine thoughtful responses to these questions. 
 
A Methodological Standpoint 
 
The thesis employs multiple methodologies for the purpose of arriving at answers, 
similar to Gestel, who said that legal theory or methodology should not be pursued as 




… methodology should not be seen as something that is imposed upon 
legal scholars by others but as a voluntarily chosen modus operandi that 
can make one‘s research more challenging, more valid, and more credible.  
 
Conventional studies of constitutions normally consider structure, function and, in the 
more advanced sense, the anatomy of a legal document that has higher value than 
ordinary law. Due to my subject matter and interdisciplinary perspective the analysis 
of constitutions that I offer may be more experimental in nature based on various 
philosophical ideas that pre-determine constitutional structure.  
 
This approach finds particular resonance with a series of methodologies beginning 
with the feminist methodology and then moving onto Legal Praxis, Natural 
Law/Positivist Law theories, Systems Theory and New Perspectives. 
 
Why is a multiplicity of methodologies necessary to find some answers to the thesis 
questions? It is necessary because constitutional theory is not just a meta-theory 
uniformly applicable in a range of different contexts and situations. In conventional 
analysis of constitutions, pure structure (the way provisions are developed and 
included) and function (the need for certain provisions, for example supremacy of the 
constitution or supremacy of parliament, and remedies for breach) are two elements 
that are required for understanding both the purpose and place of a particular 
                                                          
20
 Rob van Gestel, Hans-W Micklitz and Miguel Poiaires Maduro EUI Working Papers-Law 2012/13-
Department of Law: Methodology in the New Legal World (European University Institute, Florence, 
2012) at 6. 
10 
 
constitution within a legal system. That would normally be sufficient. However, the 
Fijian context, in my view, demands a much more philosophical attitude towards 
formation of a constitution due to the struggles Fiji has had with constitutional 
government since 1863 and the methods by which the people and institutions of Fiji 
have tried to either maintain or dislodge stability in the constitutional landscape. Thus 
a straightforward mere description of constitutional structure, devices and content 
cannot properly answer the hard questions of constitutional meaning in Fiji. A 
broader sociological interpretation of constitutions would be more useful, hence a 
variety of methodologies is considered here, not only to find meaningful answers to 
the thesis questions but also to recommend the kind of amendments needed for any 
new constitution to have legitimate effect and thus less likely to be deposed. My 
survey of relevant methodologies below is not prioritised in any way. However it can 
be said that they range from the more general to the particular. 
 
1 The feminist methodology 
 
I begin with the Feminist Methodology and, specifically, the Feminist Legal Method 
expressed as "the manner in which feminist scholars attempt to answer the 




Feminist Methodology is not merely woman-oriented in subject matter. It can be 
described better as a way of de-bunking traditional methodologies. In her Feminist 
Legal Theory, Weisberg says that feminist theory does not have a single methodology 
but has been characterised as being "eclectic, discouraging artificial separations of 
related ideas and promoting cross-disciplinary thinking that furthers its animating 
values".
22
 She says that feminist research has also been described as "contextual, 
inclusive, experiential, involved, socially relevant, multi-methodological, complete 





Feminist methodology, however, is usually considered to be relevant only to research 
that concerns women, for example equality and discrimination, patriarchy, domestic 
violence, and criminality towards or by women. The methodology is not normally 
employed by all legal theorists as a useful tool to research the mainstream legal 
                                                          
21
 D Kelly Weisberg (ed) Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1993) at 529. 
22
 At 529. 
23
 At 530. 
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world. They seem to be accepted only as a feminist critique of mainstream 
(objectified) methodology but not as a general methodology that can be used by 
everyone, including male legal theorists, for their analyses. There is a paradigm 
deficit in the way in which both old and new legal theory and methodology sidestep 
the value of seeing the legal world in another, less exclusive, way. 
 
In terms of Feminist Methodology the concept is used here as a framework of 'seeing 
differently' or, as I have often said when describing it, it is like 'putting on a pair of 
spectacles which makes one less short-sighted'. The thesis thus employs, as an 
underlying consciousness or sub-text, the eclectic, experiential, contextual, inclusive, 
involved, socially relevant, and multi-methodological knowledge (that define the 
feminist methodology) to validly investigate questions to which we, in Fiji, need 
good answers because, without them, we cannot look forward to a reasonably secure 
future. These answers do not have to be relevant to any other constitutional 
framework or schema apart from Fiji but they may be useful, in certain specific 
circumstances, to others.  
 
The methodologies utilized to investigate the issues for answers to the question are 
multi-dimensional, multi-faceted and non-binary. All of them explore the nature of 
justice and the application of it to constitutional theory and drafting. Feminist 
Methodology was itself developed as an aspect of justice, as was Praxis and Legal 
Praxis which is discussed next. 
 
2 Praxis and legal praxis 
 
Due to my specific personal and professional experiences and qualifications, the 
thesis question is inevitably set against a specific type of legal practice which comes 
from my experience as a human rights lawyer in Fiji and internationally. My personal 
perspective is that ‗the personal is political and the political, personal’.
24
 The 
‗personal is political’ catchphrase originated with the second wave of feminists who 
aimed to demolish the public/private dichotomy in relation to the status of women in 
                                                          
24
 As a Marxist-feminist theorist of colour I adopted the feminist standpoint of ‗the personal is 
political‘ from the early feminist and student movements of the 1960s. My inclusion of ‗the political‘ 
being also ‗personal‘ comes from my own lived experiences as a justice and human rights advocate in 
my writing, teaching, practice of law and activism in Fiji where political decisions with profound 
personal effects due to our unique, less individualistic, experiences of rights violations, needed to be 





 As a Fijian (Indian) feminist of colour and in terms of my 
own legend, I also added the phrase ‗the political is personal’ because I accepted the 
Marxian political theory of class struggle and the need for me personally to assist 
with the elimination of all forms of exploitation of labour power, including female 
labour power in the family. The agenda was to facilitate societal transformation for 
the better as a personal duty.  
 
Karl Marx had said that the desired outcome of class struggle was fundamental 
transformation of all society. The concept of praxis
26
 made the transformation 
possible. Marxists now commonly use praxis to describe the unique combination of 
theory and action required to move societies towards egalitarianism.  
 
In her paper "What is Praxis? Discussed in relation to Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and 
Sartre", Natalie Cowley states the definition of praxis as "the synthesis of theory and 








Praxis incorporates philosophy but, in closing the gap between human 
agency and the social world, develops it into an activist conception of 
knowledge. Praxis is the central category of the philosophy which is not 
merely an interpretation of the world, but is an integral part of its 
transformation. 
 
This general perspective on 'praxis' is related to Karl Marx's comment that 
"philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is 
to change it."
29
 The point is to ask why one would want to change the world. The 
                                                          
25




 century, were women who fought for a woman‘s 
right to vote and to work. The second wave of feminists, of the 1950s to 1970s referenced patriarchy, 
especially in the family and equal pay. 
26
 From Karl Marx ―Theses on Feuerbach‖ in Robert C Tucker (ed) The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd ed, 
WW Norton & Co Inc, New York, 1978) 143 at 145 where he stated, as a definition of the practical-
critical perspective, later termed ‗praxis‘: "philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various 
ways; the point, however, is to change it". (emphasis added). 
27
 Natalie Cowley "What is Praxis? Discussed in relation to Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre" (2008) 
4 Te Kura Kete Aronui Graduate and Postgraduate E-Journal - Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at 
1.  
28
 Peter Critchley "The Philosophy of Praxis-The Democratisation of Philosophy, Politics and Power" 
in Beyond Modernity and Post-Modernity (1997) <www.academia.edu> vol 2 at 2. 
29
 Marx, above n 26, at 145 (emphasis added). 
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answer is that exploitation of one set of people by another, whether this is the ruling 
class, however defined, the coloniser or, indeed, men in patriarchy, needs to be 
eliminated.  
  
The core value that is often expressed as a rallying cry against exploitation is 'justice'. 
While Marx analysed exploitation as a scientific term, this was used mainly to 
reference political transformation. Marx and Engels' text On Colonialism is where 




It is often overlooked that Karl Marx, whose ideas of praxis were influenced by 
Hegel, among others, had trained as a lawyer, though he preferred to study 




 Marx considered the way in which law functions in 
society, not merely as part of the "superstructure"
32
 subject to the economic base, but 
in a more complex way since laws often transformed the economic base as did Lex 
Mercatoria in medieval times,
33
 facilitating early capitalism.  
 
Despite Marx himself seeing that law could not just be a slave to the property 
relations rhythm,
34
 Marxists have rarely considered praxis from a legal viewpoint. A 
search of the available legal literature reveals very few articles from the Marxist 
viewpoint on conceptualising legal praxis as a valid methodology besides those that 
deal with specific topics, for example racial or gender discrimination in the American 
context. 
  
The one exception to this is what is known colloquially as 'guerrilla lawyering' which 
is used synonymously and pertinently as 'social justice lawyering'. Praxis in legal 
practice is also known as ‗rebellious‘ lawyering or ‗lawyering for social justice and 
human dignity‘. Guerrilla lawyering or lawyering for social justice
35
 is useful in 
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 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels On Colonialism (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1959). 
31
 Karl Marx "The German Ideology: Part I" in Robert C Tucker (ed) The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd 
ed, WW Norton & Co Inc, New York, 1978) 146 at 187. 
32
 At 3–6.  ―Foundation‖ refers generally to the economic foundation of a society and ―superstructure‖ 
to politics, law and arts normally influenced by the economic foundation though not automatically. 
33
 See references to Lex Mercatoria, for example, Ralf Michaels "The True Lex Mercatoria: Law 
Beyond the State" (2007) 14 Ind J of Global Legal Stud 447. 
34
 In "The German Ideology" Marx says: "The very first town which carried on an extensive maritime 
trade in the Middle Ages, Amalfi, also developed maritime law." Marx, above n 31, at 186–187. 
35
 See generally SA de Smith ―Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations‖ (1968) 7 W 
Ontario L Rev 93; Ashly Hinmon ―Achieving Justice through Rebellious Lawyering: Restructuring 
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contexts where a disjunction between law and justice is apparent. Its value in the 
world of ‗real-politik‘, lies in the domain of expressing defiance.
36
 Notwithstanding 
an unstable legal context, compromise of the judiciary,
37
 or abrogation of 
conventional legal redress mechanisms,
38
 many in the legal profession may practise 
guerrilla lawyering by providing legal redress ‗in the public interest‘ to protect 
vulnerable members of society.  
 
In cases where the executive or other (say military) removes a constitution, guerrilla 
lawyering has taken the form of a constitutional challenge.
39
 It can also include 
publication of a strong or 'subversive' legal opinion articulating dissent and rebellion, 
somewhat reminiscent of the "pen is mightier than the sword" concept.
40
 Much has 
also been said of the significance of armed struggle in the past, for example in Third 
World places such as Cuba and Algeria; this, though, is usually seen, even by those 
advocating this form of legal praxis, as a last resort. We cannot ignore the fact in 
relation to armed struggle that at least two of the most admired constitutions in the 
world, the American and French Constitutions, were birthed in violence as a reaction 
to perceived injustice.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Systems of Law and Power for Social Change‖ (2010) 6(1) The Modern American 15; Karen L Loewy 
―Lawyering for Social Change‖ (2000) 27 Fordham Urb LJ 1869; Faith Rivers James ―Leadership and 
Social Justice Lawyering‖ (2012) 52 Santa Clara L Rev 971; and Martha Minow ―Lawyering for 
Human Dignity‖ (2002) 11 Am U J Gender Soc Pol'y & L 143. 
36
 Guerrilla lawyering in the legal literature is an expression of social justice, not social injustice. Thus 
the lawyers drafting the anti-Indian (Indo-Fijian) decrees after George Speight‘s takeover in Fiji in 
2000 or drafting the 1990 Fijian Constitution cannot be considered as ‗guerrilla lawyers‘ in the sense 
that SA de Smith or Martha Minow and others defined it. Similarly, the 2013 Constitution was drafted 
by government lawyers without proper and informed public consent and thus they also cannot be 
described as ‗guerrilla lawyers‘. 
37
 Much as lawyers would like to think of all courts in all contexts as ‗independent‘ of political or other 
influence, the Re Pinochet decision showed the apparent reality, even in the highest of courts in the 
British legal system, to be somewhat different. See Re Pinochet HL Oral Judgment 17 December 1998 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990115/pino01.htm>.  
38
 For example when constitutions have purportedly been abrogated and constitutional officers 
removed. 
39
 As in the Prasad v Republic of Fiji and The Republic of Fiji v Prasad cases in 2000 and 2001 in Fiji. 
Prasad v Republic of Fiji, above n 3; and The Republic of Fiji v Prasad, above n 3. 
40
 The "pen is mightier than the sword" coined by Edward Bulwer-Lytton in 1839, in his historical play 
Richelieu: Or the Conspiracy (Harper, New York, 1839) at Act II Scene II. 
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Guerrilla lawyers often face threats, danger, imprisonment or worse and there is no 
recipe for success in this mode of operation.
41
 Nevertheless, guerrilla lawyering, for 
those who engage in it, exemplifies the social responsibility bestowed by the legal 
qualification on its professionals irrespective of the hazards. Legal Praxis also 
involves thinking and acting outside conventional ways. For example the Legal 
Praxis methodology may provide a better understanding of the constitutional issues 
facing citizens and may be used to formulate a background to why guerrilla lawyering 
may be needed. 
 
However Legal Praxis, to be meaningful, requires a lawyer or jurist to place 
herself/himself in the philosophy of law spectrum. The jurisprudential question, 
'What is law?' is the significant precursor to the type of legal praxis that may be 
contemplated by a constitutional lawyer.  
 
The connection between this jurisprudential enquiry and legitimacy/legality of a legal 
order is an important one. The question is whether 'law' and 'justice' are the same 
thing. This will be considered in more depth in the next chapter as a historical survey 
but is articulated here in terms of jurisprudence only.  
 
3 Law and justice in legal philosophy 
 
 (a) Natural law and justice 
 
In their seminal text Introduction to Jurisprudence, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead and 
MD Freeman say that the origins of natural law theory lie in Greek thought.
42
 Ancient 
Greeks were much more concerned with exploring law's philosophical foundations 
than with technical development of the law. Thus Plato's The Republic was about a 
"philosopher-king who could attain 'absolute justice' by consulting the mystery 
locked in his own heart of divine wisdom which remained uncommunicable to lesser 
mortals".
43
 Aristotle made only a "passing reference to the distinction between natural 
and conventional justice … immediately qualifying this by pointing out that, among 
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 In my experience there are far more failures because resources and legal weight are inevitably on the 
side of the state. 
42
 Lord Lloyd of Hampstead and MDA Freeman Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence (5th ed, 
Stevens and Sons, London, 1985). 
43
 At 107. 
44
 At 107. 
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It is only with the rise of Alexander the Great and  imperial Greece, that natural law 
as a "universal system" became known, for which the Stoic philosophers were 
responsible.
45
 Until the Stoics "nature had meant the order of things" being 
"identified as reason", that is, when man lived according to "reason" he was living 
"naturally".
46
 For the Stoics, however, precepts of reason had universal force.
47
 They 
stressed the ideas of individual worth, moral duty and universal brotherhood, from 




It was in this form, say Lloyd and Freeman, that Stoicism passed over from Greek 
thought into Roman thought, particularly with Cicero whose definition of natural 
(true) law as "right reason in agreement with nature" was highly influential even in 
later centuries, particularly during the Enlightenment.
49
 Cicero advocated the 
possibility of striking down positive or 'man-made' laws which contravened natural 
law. While Cicero lived before the Christian era (106-46 BCE) his influence was still 





That law which a people establishes for itself is peculiar to it, and is called 
jus civile (civil  law) as  being a special law of the civitas (state), while the 
law that natural reason establishes among all mankind is followed by all 
people alike, and is called jus gentium (law of nations or law of the world) 
as being the law observed by all mankind. 
 
By the Middle Ages jus gentium had influenced the Catholic Church. But it was 
Aquinas (1224-74) in the 13th century who rejected the idea, current at the time, ''that 
civil government was necessarily tainted with original sin''. He argued "for the 
existence of a hierarchy of law derived ultimately from God in which human or 




During the periods of Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-reformation there 
emerged an emphasis on the individual, free will, human liberty and rejection of the 
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idea of a collective European society. This coincided with, and influenced, the 




By this time, Machiavelli's secular' formulations, including the "naked expediency" of 
human institutions, was beginning to eclipse natural law ideas.
53
 However, Vitoria 
and Suarez (called Thomists and followers of Aquinas) countered Machiavellian 
influence with the idea that it was impossible, as Luther stated, for even a "just man 
to follow God".
54
 It was not possible to neglect the law of nature since "all men from 




Subsequently, Aquinas' distinction between natural law (jus gentium) and positive 
law began to be rejected, with Suarez stating that jus gentium differed in an 
"absolute" sense from natural law and was, instead, "straightforwardly a case of 
human positive law".
56
 Once it was accepted that jus gentium was an aspect of 
positive law it was also accepted that it could be formulated into a code of law to 
govern relationships between nations.
57
 Suarez said that the idea of political authority 
could be brought into existence by a general act of consent performed by men in a 
state of nature.
58
 He said that people were able to conceive of themselves as a 
universitas and so participate univocally in corporate legal acts.  
 
Grotius moved the debate away from its link with religion to the idea that natural law 
would exist "even if God did not",
59
 thus re-locating it towards the "natural reason of 
man".
60
 Grotius saw government as resting on a social contract, with the people 
surrendering their freedom for security. Nevertheless, said Grotius, the 'sovereign' to 
which the people surrender cannot be repudiated no matter how unjust his laws may 
be. But he also stated, seemingly paradoxically, that sovereigns are bound by natural 
law. The link between natural law and social contract in Grotius is perhaps the most 
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Following this development, however, social contract theorists such as Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778) introduced the concept of "consent" to show how it was possible for a free 
individual to become the subject of a state and by such consent grant that state 
legitimacy.
62
 For Hobbes "social contract" was to be used in defence of absolutism, 
for Locke it was to be used to support "limited constitutionalism", and in Rousseau it 
is a "mystical construct by which the individual merges into the community and 




It is only in the debates about social contract that the purported differences between 
natural law and positive law became more refined and therefore now becomes more 
useful for this thesis. For Hobbes natural law was not that significant; it only 
exhibited a man's (I assume he meant a 'person's') right to self-preservation rather 
than, as the earlier thinkers saw it, as a duty to conform conferred on 'mankind'. For 
Hobbes natural law explained that man could make certain legitimate demands on his 
fellow men.  
 
Locke, on the other hand, described the state of nature that preceded the social 
contract as a golden age (unlike Hobbes who saw it as a state of brutality) except for 
the fact that property was insecure. Thus, said Locke, 'man' gave up part of his liberty 
in the golden age to a sovereign. It was the need for protection of social entitlements 
that allowed men to consider forming a government. And, if that government became 
unjust, Locke said it was the duty of those who had placed it there in the first place to 
rebel and resist.  
 
Locke's promotion of rebellion as resistance to unjust rule can be linked to legal 
praxis discussed in the previous section of this chapter. In his Two Treatises of 
Government Locke said that "reason" separated man from beast and "reason" 
supplied answers where God's will is not clear.
64
 Thus reason enabled man to grasp 
the content of the law of nature which is the right to hold men responsible for each 




There were obvious weaknesses in Locke's ideas of how the social contract was 
historically devised and how each member of society would consent to give up their 
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salient independent power (expressly or tacitly), which perhaps only constitutional 
theorists could answer much later. Nevertheless Locke's work is invaluable for its 
proclamation of a "right of revolution"
66
 (only with just cause) and its central idea of 
"trust"
67
 which could be defined as part of the social contract, pointing also to the 
fiduciary obligation of a government towards the people. Government of the people 
for the public good is Locke's central theme for the purposes of considering the role 
of a government. Locke's two elements of contract and trust conjoin the rulers and 




Furthermore, Locke saw the tyrants as the true rebels, not those who rebel against 
them. From this perspective, the definition of treason becomes an interesting legal 
concept (especially as observed in the Fijian context) as Locke defines tyrants as 





Locke's idea of property is also relevant to the focus in this thesis. Locke's influential 
idea is that it was God (not a sovereign) who had given men a title to the fruits of 
their labour. Locke thought that God himself had bestowed on mankind the obligation 
to protect rights. Thus rulers could not depose of their subjects' property for the 
public good without their consent (and with compensation for any deprivation, which 




The 'Social Contract' was taken in a somewhat different direction by Rousseau but he 
was closer to Locke than Hobbes in this respect. Rousseau believed that human 
beings should indeed govern themselves but since they could not practically spend all 
their time in public affairs, there needed to be an 'elective aristocracy' reflecting the 
'general will'. He thought that the law was the register of the general will and that 
government would be tolerated as long as it accurately reflects the general will; those 
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However, Rousseau refused to draw a distinction between law and morality. He 
defined the general will as the "moral will"
72
 of each citizen. He also thought that 
elections indicated not freedom of the people but "slavery"
73
 as soon as the members 
of parliament were elected. Instead, he said, direct citizen participation was a 
necessary condition for establishing the moral basis of obedience to law. In Rousseau 
the general will seems to replace the higher law standard of natural law. He appears 
to conflate the elements of natural law with positive law by not seeing any difference 




From the 18th to the 20th centuries natural law principles firstly came under attack
75
 
and then were restored from a different perspective. In the 18th century, the assault 
came from the 'age of reason' non social contractual thinkers such as Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) who saw the human being as merely the instrument of historical 
change,
76
 and Hume (1711-1776) who said it was government that made promises 
possible.
77
 Hume, however, is said to have developed a "modern theory of natural 
law" which empirically set out the fundamental principles of natural law as being 
those related to justice.
78
 He called the rules of justice "natural laws" which were 
prior to government and positive law.
79
 Yet, despite his adherence to natural law, 
Hume's work was later thought to be the basis upon which the eminent positivist 
Hans Kelsen derived his theory of law.
80
 In the 19th century, came Hegel who, 
following Rousseau, saw the state as an end in itself and absolutely sovereign but not 
subject to any external laws of nature.
81
 Karl Marx (1818-1883) developed a concept 




… a juridical notion that is dependent upon the mode of production, "the 
conceptions of right and justice which express this point of view are 
rationally comprehensible only when seen in their proper connection with 
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other determinations of social life and grasped in terms of their role within 
the prevailing productive mode" … .  
 
Thus, Marx linked it with the mode of production in which it was exercised. 
 
The 20th century saw the development of the concept of a higher truth and justice (as 
opposed to laws that were man-made) that could not be suppressed. It was mainly 
because of the calamitous events of that century that the notion of natural law again 
received attention. These concepts were expressed by Finnis, who revived the 
Aquinas version of natural law and wrote not only of "natural law" but also of 
"natural rights".
83
 Finnis started his proposition by stating that there were certain 
basic goods for human beings such as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, 
sociability or friendship, practical reasonableness and religion. He said the reason 
these basic goods were 'good' was because they were self-evident. They could not be 
denied as otherwise those denying this idea would 'cut the ground from under their 
own feet'. He said that the common good required a legal system and, if a legal 
system worked against a common good, the stipulations it made lacked the authority 




Lon Fuller (1902-1978) is famous for his Harvard Law Review debate on this issue 
with H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992). Fuller moved away from seeing natural law as tied to 
Christian doctrines and from the 17th and 18th century proponents of doctrinal 
natural law rationalists. This sets him apart from the rest of the thinkers surveyed 
here. As LLoyd and Freeman said "[t]o Fuller the most fundamental tenet of natural 
law is an affirmation of the role of reason in legal ordering."
85
 Fuller described 
communication between men as the one indisputable principle of "substantive natural 
law".
86
 Connection between law and morality was necessary and a legal system, 
whatever its other purposes, had an "internal morality"
87
 of law which set up 
standards for evaluating official conduct. Fuller said that the legal system rested on a 
tacit reciprocity between lawgiver and subject with the subject being given fair 
opportunity. He called 'legitimacy' a moral value and the law giver who violates 
principles of legality forfeits some government legitimacy. Extensive violation would 
remove all legitimacy and moral basis of government.
88
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Hart possibly represents the most significant attempt to bring together natural law and 
its opposite and will be considered more closely after the section on positive law 
below. Hart, mainly a positivist, did attempt to restate the position by acknowledging 
that human survival was a principal human goal.
89
 He postulated a minimum content 
of natural law arising from the fact of the human condition such as human 
vulnerability, approximate equality, limited altruism, limited resources, and limited 
understanding and strength of will.
90
 In light of these there is a need for some 
protection for persons, property and promises. But Hart does not make any effort to 




The end of the Second World War saw a higher principle than just 'effectiveness' in 
law which was established through the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights.
92
 The Nuremburg trials revealed that the positive laws of Germany which 
permitted genocide had to be held up against some higher law that emphasised 
morality and justice, as in natural law, against human constructed law.  
 
However this historical reality and emphasis on natural law did not mean that the 
philosophy of positive law was abandoned. Positive law's practical attribute, that 
effectiveness was the measure of a success of a law, revealed the scientific or 
'cartesian'
93
 nature of lawmaking.  
 
 (b) Positive law and justice 
 
Positive law did not receive specific attention until the emergence of what Lloyd and 
Freeman call the "modern doctrine of sovereignty" appearing from the end of the 
medieval period.
94
 The doctrine was influenced by the rise of nation states, the advent 
of the industrial and scientific revolution and the gradual demise of the feudal mode 
of production as the main socio-economic and political system.  
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This development did not, however, hark back to mere codification of customary law. 
On the contrary, positive law was seen as being the law of the state that was 
ascertainable and valid. It did not deny subjective considerations but was separate 
from morality. The main proponents of the doctrine were Bentham, Austin and, later, 




Bentham's utilitarian approach is seen as the 'newtonian' perspective of the legal 
world.
96
 His approach relied on "standards based on human advantages, pleasures and 
satisfactions" and the "science of legislations".
97
 But in this 'science' Bentham 
distinguished between private and public morals.  He believed that no reform of the 
substantive law could be made without a reform of its form and structure. In his work 
the key concepts were sovereignty and command. Sovereignty could be divided and 
partial.  
 
Bentham rejected any idea of 'natural' rights but he still included the values of 
equality, liberty and property into his analysis of the law because his focus was "the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number". This allowed him to advocate for a wall 





Following Bentham came Austin, also a lawyer, who sought to show what "law really 
is" as opposed to natural or moral notions of what it "ought to be.
99
 The pertinent 
difference between Austin and Bentham was Austin's idea of the illimitable and 
indivisible nature of sovereignty. Austin saw legal rules as imperative statements. His 
ideas of sovereignty were somewhat rigid and closed, not taking into account realities 
such as federalism, entrenched clauses, revolutions and take-overs. In this sense his 
concept of habitual obedience to the command of a sovereign could not be sustained. 
Austin, recognising that law must be based "outside of the law", located it in 
"habitual obedience" of the mass of the population. He also rigidly separated law 
from morals. He noted that sanctions were a mark of law, indicating that he saw law 
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In the 20th century, the development of positive law took a more detailed and refined 
turn. Hart, already mentioned above, saw a legal system as a "system of social 
rules"
101
 an idea that is firmly located in the positivist school. Hart proposed the idea 
of two types of rules- primary and secondary. Primary rules were obligations and 
secondary rules specified the way in which primary rules could be ascertained, 
introduced and varied, and penalties imposed for violations of them.
102
 For Hart it 
was the combination of primary and secondary rules that constituted the heart of the 
legal system. But Hart did not discuss validity of any law except to say that it did not 




Nevertheless, due to his influence on the debates defining legality and legitimacy, 
Hart's work deserves more discussion. He described rules as being 'social' in that they 
regulated the conduct of members of society and were derived from human social 
practices. Hart said that a legal system can only exist if it is effectively in force, and 
the preconditions are that it represents (i) valid rules of behaviour and must be obeyed 
and (ii) its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common 




Importantly, however, Hart thought natural law was relevant, though he did not 
believe that law was derived from morality because he saw no higher order from 
which law took its authority. He considered the reasons for people continuing to obey 
the law and the persistence of law. He saw legal limitations as legal disabilities and 
put forward the notion of the 'rule of recognition', defining it as the authoritative 
criteria for identifying valid law within a legal system and having it accepted by those 
who operate the system. 
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So long as the laws which are valid by the system's tests of validity are 
obeyed by the bulk of the population this surely is all the evidence we need 
in order to establish that a given legal system exists.  
 
There is no concept of 'justice' in this view. On the other hand, in this view, 
presumably a 'test of validity' could include elements of natural law. 
 
Hans Kelsen is defined as the "positivist of positivists"
106
 Natural Law, said Kelsen, 
is nothing but an illusion; it is an attempt to justify existing law and sanctify the 
property system that it enshrined. Instead, Kelsen proposed  a "pure theory of law",
107
 
a concept of positive law which identifies a structure and physical forms, excluding 
all elements foreign to it such as justice or sociology. 
 
Despite this, Kelsen does not abandon 'justice'. For him the concept of 'justice' is the 
collective happiness as regulated in a social order.
108
 However, he says, the basic 
norm of the legal order as a whole must rest on efficacy, that is, on an assumption 
that in the main people by and large conform to that legal order. Kelsen did not think 
there was any value in considering 'the state' or 'rights' and 'duties' but said that every 
legal system rested on some kind of sanction as every norm, to be legal, must have a 
sanction.  
 
While the other legal theories remained at the level of philosophy, Kelsen's edicts 
were used by judges considering revolutionary change. They were applied in a 
number of influential court decisions determining the parameters of legality of a 
constitutional order, thus pitting natural law and positive law against each other, as 
the legitimacy/legality divide, more than might have been intended by the legal 
theorists to which they referred. 
 
 (c) Case law: Natural law v Positive law 
 
From the very first 20th century decision in State v Dosso,
109
 to the most recent 21st 
century (Fijian) decision in Prasad v Republic of Fiji/The Republic of Fiji v 
Prasad,
110
 Kelsen's principles of efficacy, rather than any reference to justice or rights 
                                                          
106
 At 321. 
107
 At 322. 
108
 At 321. This is where Kant's influence is possibly ideally located. Hans Kelsen "Law, State and 
Justice in the Pure Theory of Law" (1948) 57 Yale LJ 377 at 381.  
109
 State v Dosso, above n 12.  
110
 Prasad v Republic of Fiji, above n 3; and The Republic of Fiji v Prasad, above n 3. 
26 
 
and duties, have been used in judicial reasoning in constitutional petitions. Thus the 
positivism of Kelsen was not confined merely to academic legal theory but has been 
used practically by courts to declare revolutionary regimes as being either 'lawful or 
'unlawful' (that is, declaring 'legality' or its opposite). 
 
 In opposition, those who support the 'natural law' perspective offer the notion of 
'legitimacy' instead of legality as being the basis on which the success or otherwise of 
a new legal regime is to be established by the courts. In one specific constitutional 
case in Grenada, in Mitchell already mentioned in reference to Brookfield's text, the 
Court (Haynes P) surveyed the issue from the perspective of Kelsen's theory of legal 
validity. The significance of this case lay not in the decision itself but in the 
opportunity that Haynes P took to survey previous judicial decisions that set natural 
law against Kelsenian positive law. 
 
In Mitchell Haynes P began his analysis with the Pakistani case of State v Dosso 
which was a challenge to the President of Pakistan's abrogation of the 1956 
Constitution and declaration of martial law. The Pakistani court had to decide on the 
validity of a writ of habeas corpus to establish whether the appellant Dosso would be 
released due to the violation of his rights pursuant to the 1956 Constitution. The 
Chief Justice of Pakistan considered whether the abrogation of the Constitution was 
lawful. Applying Kelsen's principles he declared that the 'revolution' by the President 
was valid because it was effective. The fundamental rights in the abrogated 
Constitution, on which the applicant was relying for his writ, were no longer the law 




In his analysis Haynes P also considered what is known in short form as the Matovu 
case. Another habeas corpus application, the case of Uganda v Commissioner of 
Prisons ex parte Matovu arose as a consequence of the abrogation of the 1961 
Ugandan Constitution by the Prime Minister, Milton Obote.
112
 Referring to the 
"positivist school  of jurisprudence represented by the famous Professor Kelsen",
113
 
the Chief Justice of Uganda said the abrogation of the Constitution was effective and 
therefore lawful; thus the application could not rely on the rights contained in it. 
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The next Kelsenian case surveyed by Haynes P was the Rhodesian Madzimbamuto v 
Lardner Burke.
114
 This case was a challenge to the legality of the post-unilateral 
declaration of independence in Rhodesia and the 1965 Constitution passed 
simultaneously. Stella Madzimbamuto challenged her husband's detention under the 
new emergency regulations as being unlawful. The court (Goldin J) also accepted the 
Kelsenian doctrine by stating that what is "destroyed no longer exists".
115
 Stella 
Madzimbamuto's husband was not released. On appeal Beadle CJ, quoting from 
Dosso and Matovu, said that Kelsen had stated that "success alone was the 
determining factor" and that the new government was so firmly established as to have 
become a 'de jure' government; thus its laws were binding.
116
 This decision was 
appealed to the Privy Council where Mrs Madzimbamuto's application was successful 
by a majority decision of the court. Lord Reid, speaking for the majority, decided on 
the side of "rigid constitutionalism" stating that the sovereign power was still trying 
to re-establish its control in Rhodesia despite the usurpers appearing to be effective. 
He said that since there could not be two governments co-existing de jure, the appeal 
would be allowed.
117
 In another case soon after, Ndholovu v the Queen, the 
Rhodesian court  rejected the Privy Council's decision in Madzimbamuto, ostensibly 
because the Privy Council, despite allowing Stella Madzimbamuto's appeal, had also 




But, as Haynes P's analysis showed, the tide against Kelsen turned in another military 
coup case, Sallah v The Attorney General of Ghana.
119
 In Sallah the Court of Appeal 
overruled Kelsen's principle as being 'irrelevant' on the grounds that the court had 
difficulty in locating any new basic norm after the coup. The court pointedly 
remarked that foreign jurists did not have a role to play in court decisions which 
considered matters on the ground. Sallah was followed by another Pakistani case, that 
of Jilani v The Government of Punjab.
120
 In it the court determined that Dosso had 
been wrongly decided and that Kelsen's doctrine should not be accepted by the courts 
as a rule or principle of law; it was a legal theory and "a controverted one at that".
121
 
Jilani decided that it was the courts that had to determine legitimacy and no one else. 
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Haynes P then considered, with approval, another Pakistani case, that of Bhutto v The 
Chief of Army Staff,
122
 also regarding a military takeover. In his decision, the Chief 
Justice had referred to Kelsen's proposition that the "effectualness of the regime 
determines it own legality".
123
 However the Chief Justice said it was not just 
effectiveness that determined legality but questions of 'justice and morality' which 
contribute to the effectiveness of the new legal order. Thus he linked Kelsenian 
positivist effectiveness with 'justice and morality'. In this way the Bhutto case not 
only introduced the natural law concept of justice but also added another dimension 
of 'necessity'. The imposition of martial law was a necessary transitional measure to 
restore, peace, order and good government. Thus Bhutto's petition was dismissed.  
 
After surveying all these cases in his Mitchell ruling, Haynes P said there were two 
main conditions for a regime to be seen as successful and effective by the courts: (i) 
necessity in the interest of peace and order (and the usurper must not be responsible 
for creating that necessity); and (ii) it must not impair the just rights of citizens under 
the Constitution. Thus the case of Mitchell by (ii) above consolidated the element of 
natural law ('just rights') introduced in Jilani and Bhutto and dismissed claims to pure 
efficacy for lawfulness (or legality) of a regime or legal order as decided in Dosso, 




The most recent case, that of the Fijian Prasad v Republic of Fiji and The Republic of 
Fiji v Prasad,
125
 was once again decided on Kelsenian principles of 'efficacy' (against 
the usurper). Despite Mitchell and submissions made by counsel for the applicant 
Prasad, no references were made by the High Court or the Court of Appeal to rights 
and justice that Prasad expected as a citizen from the Constitution. Instead, Kelsen's 
strict positivist principles were used to remove the Fijian usurper since the court said 
that the new regime had not proved that it was necessary to remove the Fijian 
Constitution permanently. Nor had its rule been effective as the people had said by 
way of affidavits that they did not agree with the removal of the 1997 Constitution of 
Fiji. 
 
In the constitutional cases surveyed by Haynes P, it becomes obvious that the 
positivist concept of 'legality' was mitigated by some courts' tentative reference to 
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'justice and morality', not just as an issue of 'legitimacy' but also as a condition of 
'legality'. Brookfield has also highlighted this interesting connection. In his text he 
had said that 'legitimacy' and 'legality' had been used inter-changeably in relation to 




Success and effectiveness is necessarily sufficient for legality and will 
provide a limited measure of legitimacy in that some justice according to 
law will be done. But considerations of morality and justice may still deny 
full legitimacy to a regime that is judicially recognised as legal because it 
passes that limited but sufficient test. 
 
And, as earlier said, that "the considerations of morality and justice generally go to its 




It appears to be the case from the above survey of the theories and case law that 
'legality' of a constitutional order exists in the realm of positivist effectiveness while 
'legitimacy' rests on the principles of natural law though, as Brookfield says, legality 
does contain within it aspects of legitimacy.  
 
My contention is, instead, to draw in the Lockean idea and state that, if there is no 
justice in a constitutional order, that order is not only illegitimate, it is also unlawful. 
It is this situation that allows praxis to become relevant. As Locke stated, lack of the 
existence of 'legitimacy'  would permit the citizens of a state to consider rebellion and 
resistance against tyrants as 'noxious beasts' and that act of rebellion against the 
tyrants would then be seen as an act of 'restoration'. It is in this realisation that the 
importance of legal praxis as a device to restore legality in a social system is 
revealed.  
 
To consider the significance of Legal Praxis in restoring legality one needs to refer to 
another proposition, Systems Theory. We need to consider how law (and the legal 
'system') actually functions in society and how it is constructed and de-constructed, 
not merely as a social entity but also as a communication device. Such an enquiry is 
helpful because, through it, we will be able to see how the notion of 'justice' can be 
embedded in the very structure of a law, for example a Constitution and thus the legal 
system, to form its identity within which legal praxis as a device, allowing the right to 
rebel, can function as a remedy in the event of attempts to either breach the 
constitution or to dislodge it by any means. 
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 4 Systems theory 
 
Systems Theory is not specifically a legal conjecture; it is more broadly a theory of 
society. While eminent Sociologist Talcott Parsons initiated the discussion on a 
different way of analysing society (that social systems are related either to the internal 
environment of other social systems or to external non-social environments - psychic, 
biological, cultural environments), it is Niklas Luhmann who is regarded as the father 
of Systems Theory.
128
 The subject matter of the theory is social evolution and social 
differentiation, as well as the concept of  'autopoiesis'. The last concept, autopoiesis, 
became a central aspect of Luhmann's theory of law and was later developed in 
greater detail by legal theorist Gunther Teubner. Its practical relevance to the thesis 
questions will be considered in more detail below.  
 
An article by Aldo Mascareno titled "Ethics of contingency beyond the praxis of 
reflexive law"
129
 provides a critique of Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory as applied 




The obvious problem that is raised by a first reading of Mascareno's article, noted 
above, is that Systems Theory and Legal Praxis Theory appear to be poles apart. 
Luhmann's Systems Theory is a theory of stability. It shows how societal  
'perturbations' or disruptions within a 'closed system' (for example law) are repaired 
by 'communication with other closed systems' to minimise these disruptions in order 
to maintain stability. Legal Praxis, in contrast, intends to create transformations of 
existing systems for radical change. Thus these two ideas do not seem to have 
anything in common as systems will work to preserve themselves and legal praxis 
will work to transform them. They seem to always be on different methodological 
planets.  
 
However, Mascareno attempts to bring the two together by calling the process of 
conjoining the two apparent opposites, "an ethic of contingency", that is, a "systemic 
praxis which regulates the consequences of the operative closure by reinforcing the 
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commitment of the participants with that closure",
131
 quoting Helmut Wilke's strategy 




Moreover, referring to Teubner's idea of "reflexive law"
133
 Mascareno says that 
"reflexive law" "must take into account the function of the involved systems, its 
procedural rules and the normative expectations of the participants" and (thus) "the 
affected units (alter and ego) are able to accept an external guidance and are 
cognitively open to change the setting of goals without abandoning their normative 
expectations".
134
 Mascareno explains Teubner's idea of reflexivity simply as: "the 
legal framework [which] becomes binding for the participants if the participants 
decide to bind themselves to law".
135
 An example of how this may work for a 









Find a form of law which leaves the autonomy of social discourses 
undisturbed but which simultaneously encourages them reciprocally to take 
heed of the basic assumptions upon which each is based.  
 
To explain this further, Blanke says, ideas of the "good", "conceptions of justice" or 
even "utopian thoughts"
138
 can be considered along with "expertise, knowledge, 
efficiency [and] viability" required, and "pragmatic advantages can motivate 
[participants] to get into negotiations with each other" on all these matters.
139
 This 
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approach clearly presents an active method involving participants' input and, 
therefore, has the potential to bridge the obvious intellectual and practical gap 
between the systems approach in law and legal praxis. It is akin to establishing the 
third dimension in legal work, beyond formalism/substantive and reflexive 
methodologies towards the conceptualisation of justice as being applicable for both 
legal praxis and the structure of systems. 
 
In an interview in December 2010 when journalist Mauro Zamboni asked Gunther 





Which was my most painful piece of work? If I consider which piece made 
me suffer most from self-doubts, these were the articles I wrote on justice 
… because it opens a space for the non-rational in law, which is anathema 
to self-confident legal scholarship. … Rejecting Habermas and Rawls in 
their optimistic rationalism we need to [think] of justice as the contingency 
formula of law. 
 
Teubner's article, "Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of 
Law" makes the point more clearly.
141
 He says there is "no socio-legal theory of 
justice" and that "legal sociology has no idea of justice".
142
 He asks: "is justice itself, 
the most profound expectation that people have of the law, the blind spot in the 




New perspectives in legal theory which have a bearing on constitutional theorising 
and drafting have developed the notion of 'justice' in law more broadly.  
 
5 New perspectives: Legitimacy/legality in constitutionalism 
 
Recent work in political theory and theoretical sociology consolidate the links 
between legality/legitimacy and constitutional law. Two examples of the new 
perspectives are represented by Chris Thornhill and Samantha Ashenden's 
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"Introduction: Legality and Legitimacy- between political theory and theoretical 




Thornhill and Ashenden make the point that the relation between legality and 
legitimacy is, to quote Niklas Luhmann, both the "basic question" of modern legal 
and political philosophy and one of the most "deeply constitutive conceptual 
problems in the history of sociological theory".
145
 They reinforce the idea of the 
significance of legitimacy by stating that "purely" coercive laws are unlikely to be 
perceived as "legitimate".
146
 They add that it is the common position that "legitimate 




Loughlin takes these ideas further and into the practical realm of constitution-making 
by re-engaging Locke through Thomas Paine.
148
 He says that "a constitutional mode 
of thinking found its legitimacy on some notion of consent".
149




The question now to be asked is whether, in making the transition to 
modernity, we have been able to jettison such tropes [as a ruler's will or a 
community's identity] and commit ourselves to Paine's conviction that 
constitutional government, established through the drafting of a 
constitutional text, now rests its authority purely on the power of reason. 
 
This question, says Loughlin, can be simplified by first focusing on the relationship 
between thought and text. The two concepts he uses to make this possible are 
"ideology" and "utopia" in order to fashion what he calls the "constitutional 
imagination".
151
 He draws the distinction between drafting a constitution that bolsters 
either authoritarian or bourgeois interests (negative constitutionalism) and one that is 
'aspirational' or 'utopian' in perspective (positive constitutionalism). He says that 
modern government now derives its rights not from a theory of sovereignty but from 
an idea of public service.
152
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However, Loughlin says, even this positive transition does not grasp the essence of 
utopianism of the "general will" (the ideal expression of equal liberty).
153
 In his 
"juridical revolution"
154
 he displaced even the separation of powers doctrine, 
replacing it with a pervasive commitment by all government agencies to engage in a 
form of deliberation and dialogue for public service. This type of positive 
constitutionalism's objective is not emancipation but integration. He says it shows the 
operation of the dialectic of ideology and utopia which avoids the 




In their new 21st century perspective Thornhill and Ashenden thus offer the notion of 
social freedoms as being indispensible to legitimacy without which there is no 
legality. These are offered in answer to the same ancient questions that the Greeks 
explored, the Romans avoided and the Enlightenment thinkers uneasily grappled with 
against the background of monotheistic religion, industrialisation, scientific and 'new 
world' discoveries and the emergence of a parliament against the monarchy. They are 
also offered against 20th century legal theorists' ideas, for example those of Kelsen, 
which the courts then attempted to apply 'on the ground'.  
 
The new perspective is consolidated and advanced in a more practical way by 
Loughlin who says that (social) integration and not authoritarianism can be drafted 
into a constitution to express a new way of seeing a government and its people as 
being in a relationship of continuing deliberation and dialogue. He proposes the 
methodology of 'constitutional imagination' to make this possible. 
 
In the next and final methodological section I discuss how the concept of 'autopoiesis' 
as a drafting tool can assist to take the new perspectives even further forward to draft 
a 'justice-defined' constitution.  
 
 (a) Autopoiesis 
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… distinguished social autopoiesis from its biological origins by 
identifying communication as the basic element of social systems and by 
defining social systems, not as groups of people, … but as systems of 
meaning.  
 




… as networks of communication [which] produce their own meaning. In 
Luhmann's version of the theory they do not, as many other theorists have 
proposed, perform operations of interpretation and selectivity upon 'facts' 
gleaned from the social environment. Rather, they construct that 
environment and perform their operations upon the environment that they 
themselves have constructed. A defining criterion of an autopoietic social 
system is that it should contain and constitutes 'a representation of society 
within society'. Different social systems are distinguished from one another 
by the meaning each gives to relationships and events in the social world. 
 
Luhmann‘s application of autopoiesis to the social sciences has been criticized as a 
"construction of a 'super-theory".
158




Luhmann's intentions were far more ambitious. They were to provide a 
total theory in the European tradition of grand theories, which extended to 
the whole of society and to all social systems. 
 
Legal theorists employing autopoiesis in their analysis of legal systems do not seem 
to have attracted as much opprobrium as Luhmann, possibly because they have been 
less meta-theoretical in their approach. Furthermore, those who applied autopoiesis to 
the legal domain improved on Luhmann‘s conceptualization by moving away from its 
foundation in Parsonian Systems Theory towards the direction of Weber and 
Habermas.
160
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 (b) Autopoiesis and law 
 
King says that the "hypercycle of circularity" which identifies the legal autopoietic 
system asks the question: "How do we know that the law's decision is lawful or 
unlawful?" He says the answer must be "'because the law says so'",
162
 confirming the 
self-referential nature of the law. 
 
However, clearly, a legal system includes not just law in the strict sense of a code or 
legal text, but also its development or location in a social domain. In his "Law as an 
Autopoietic System",
163
 Gunther Teubner has said that " … the nature of modern 
society is determined by the highly intensive and explosive mixture of law, politics, 
economics and other social domains".
164
 He said the value of autopoiesis to legal 
theory lies in what it says about the conditions, mechanisms and consequences of 
mutual interference between law and (these) other domains. 
 
Teubner‘s adaption of autopoiesis builds on two main concepts of the relationship or 




1. The law is defined as an autonomous system whose legal operations 
form a closed network. … but law is not more or less dependent on society 
… the main question is to determine empirically the precise balance 




2. Heteronomy is treated as ‗structural coupling‘. This view … involves the 







Autopoietic operational closure creates a "meaning world" of its own that 
does not exclude outside influences. It recognizes the steady stream of 
                                                          
162
 At 225. 
163
 Malcolm Peltu (ed) Gunther Teubner ―Law as an Autopoietic System‖ (reports on presentations at 
LSE Complexity Study Group Meeting No 3 ―Can Social Systems be Viewed as Autopoietic‖, 
London, 18 June 1997). 
164
 At 1. 
165
 At 2. 
166
 At 6. 
37 
 
external influences on the communication systems and world views of 
lawyers, which are so important in the creation of a legal system. However 
the really important factor in this autopoietic process is ‗reconstruction‘. 
Reconstruction translates and re-signifies social meaning in the legal 
world. … Each autopoietic system could be seen as a unique ongoing 
dynamic that cannot be controlled from elsewhere. Such systems cannot 
participate directly in each other‘s worlds, yet an ongoing process of 
structural coupling between worlds creates zones of contact between them. 
 
It appears that ‗communication‘ is key even in the legal dynamic- not a linear 
communication, but one that is, as Teubner says:
167
   
 
… a very artificial type of communication [that] specializes itself and 
begins to operate recursively on different types of its own kind, thereby 
beginning the development of a chain of distinctions that propels itself into 
the future. The dynamic game consists of recursively linked moves in a 






A legal system is constituted whenever legal acts emerge as a set of 
operations that go back recursively to earlier acts of its own kind, in order 




   
 
Legal acts driving the dynamics of this network include the making of a 
judgment in a court, the passing of a law by parliament or the concluding 
of a contract agreement by the parties to it. These are defining ‗magic 
moments‘ when validity is conferred to a new norm or rule.  
 
Teubner also considers the ‗validity‘ of law autopoietically constructed. He says:
170
    
 
… there is a special class of communications which carry authority in 
making a statement about the validity of certain legal rules. This would 
include a pronouncement on the law by a legal authority, for example the 
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judge, the legislator or the law professor, but not other general comments 
by that professor or other observers, such as journalists.  
 
In his "Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg" Teubner 
confirms that he adopted autopoiesis as a "heuristic device" in an "experimental 





   
 
If the legal system is organized autopoietically … it does not directly 
regulate social behavior. Rather, it formulates rules and decisions with 
reference to an internal legal representation of social reality. It is for this 
reason that legal models of the social world are crucial. … the quality of 
the legalization process may change if the legal system becomes aware of 
the autopoietic character of its surrounding social systems and adapts its 
normative structures to it. 
 
It is clear that the relationship between a legal code and a legal system or a legal 
system and the social environment is not a linear one, but is based on what Teubner, 
as referred to earlier, called "structural coupling" which "involves the multiple 
membership of legal communications in other autonomous domains".
173
 This is well 
understood as part of the social reality of the legal subject matter.  
 
Nevertheless, in reference to the questions asked in this thesis it is clear that Luhmann 
and Teubner's descriptions needed deeper exploration. They had shown how 
communications occurred within the legal system in relation to its social domain but 
had not, however, considered whether transformations, either to legal system or legal 
context, may be desirable at all times, especially if they are ‗perturbations‘. And, the 
related question that, rather than just observing them, could legal theorists intervene, 
that is, does legal praxis have a role to play?  
 
Physicist Hugo Urrestarazu, in relation to "the conditions of emergence of long-
lasting self-organised dynamic systems", makes the point that one of the threats to the 
persistence of a stabilized configuration of relations resulting in reducing a system‘s 
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lifespan was "unpredictable disrupting effects produced by environmental 
encounters".
174




… homeostatic dynamic structures [are those] in which some self-sustained 
structure determined mechanisms are always available to compensate for 
disruptive external interactions. … We need to search for a describable 
feature of the dynamic system that remains invariant throughout all the 
history of state transitions affecting its components. 
 
Apart from constructing robust "boundaries", the technique of  "self-healing"
176
 can 
be used also as a more accurate expression of the way in which any autopoietic 





In his critique of Luhmann, Matej Makarovič asks whether modern society can be 
defined, as Luhmann does, "on the basis of … functional differentiation".
178
 He sees 
Luhmann's view as being quite different from the hierarchical theorists like Marx and 
the feminists who consider society as class-based or gender-based emanating from the 
role divisions in society. The weakness in Luhmann's theory is that he does not 





Andreas Fischer-Lescano takes the criticism of Luhmann a step further by referring to 
Critical Systems Theory.
180
 He says that Critical Systems Theory does combine other 
developments which bring Luhmann's perspective "'right-side up'".
181
 Using the 
Frankfurt School as his basis for the analysis, Fischer Lescano says that the 
proponents of this School attempt a detailed analysis of society as a system and look 
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for strategies for de-reification, its common starting point being social differentiation. 
He points out that Luhmann, in his "introduction of the concept of self-reference, 
avows to preserve the Marxian notion of society as 'self-abstracting categorizing, 
thematizing social systems'".
182
 Quoting Marx he says that "[n]ot only is the 
individual the 'ensemble of … social relations'" but "society is also the ensemble of 
societal subsystems", and that "[u]ltimately, this makes it impossible to understand 








With polycontexturality understood as the emergence of highly fragmented 
intermediary social structures based on binary distinctions, society can no 
longer be thought of as directly resulting from individual interactions, and 
justice can no longer be plausibly based on universalizing the principle of 
reciprocity between individuals. 
 
Fischer-Lescano adds that "'[c]apitalism' then does not delineate a scheme of 
determination in the interplay between base and superstructure, but a specific form of 
system arrangement in a differentiated world society."
185
 In reference to legal 
systems, he says that critical systems theory pleads "against an administrative science 
of justice".
186
 In order to make "societal struggles in law" recognizable it has to 
establish "the preconditions for the mutual safeguarding of spaces of autonomy and 










By generalizing and respecifying the function of constitution as an 
evolutionary achievement, societal processes of constitutionalization are 
meant to be supported, stabilized and made permanent. Their core concern 
is to keep societal institutions socially responsive … be it through the 
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immediate commitment of private actors to human and fundamental rights 
… , through the commitment to environmental rights … . 
 
What this means is that one must be involved in the "opening-up of societal structural 
decisions about the democratic process through the development of world societal 





However, how is all this to be achieved in reality and in the practical sphere of 
constitutionalism? In a relevant paper, Zvonimir Lauc,
190
 in relation to the Republic 
of Croatia, said that in terms of utilization of a theoretical basis for drafting a 







The true local and regional self-government in the autopoietic concept has 
the crucial place and role on this path. Furthermore, we proceed from the 
hypothesis that the alopoietic institutions have dominated in the past 
development, and that there was neither conception nor place for the 
autopoietic institutions. In other words, in today's information society, 
which is horizontally netted, the autopoietic system should be dominant, 
where one starts from the self-organization, the conception (the system 
theory) of which is holistic and which is based on a cause-teleological 
interpretation. In such an atmosphere there is a higher chance for the 
constitutional engineering, when we can choose the best (the theory of 
choice), with an adequate evaluation of the components and the whole. 
 
It is obvious that, in any context, the existence of a constitution indicates the 
existence of a 'legal system'. That in itself draws a legal researcher into the realm of a 
particular perspective in order to explain how a legal system may need a 
constitutional document to solidify or manage relationships within that system.  
 
However, recent scholarship shows that the traditional formats of constitutions which 
normatively establish separation of powers and a hierarchical structure of duties and 
obligations, even within a 'rights framework', may no longer be satisfactory for a 
situation where the nation state idea is not only threatened from within but also from 
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the effects of globalisation which include development of transnational laws, such as 
commercial law or human rights law.  
 
In new work on constitution making in societies which did not have a formal 
constitution previously, this deficiency in philosophical foundations is evident.  
 
In her "Written Constitutions: Principles and Problems" Dawn Oliver, in reference to 
a proposed United Kingdom written Constitution, and taking several options into 
account,
193
 states that it should contain the following:  
 
(i) assuring the legitimacy of constitutions; (ii) extent of justiciability of 
constitutions; (iii) extent of detail provided in constitutions; (iv) the extent 
of entrenchment and hierarchy of laws; and (v) extent of political neutrality 
desirable in constitutions. 
 
Stating that the constitutions should assure 'legitimacy' it is clear that what Oliver 
means by this is the 'will of the people'. However Brookfield has shown that 
democratic majoritarianism is not automatically evidence of legitimacy. In Oliver's 
work there is no mention of 'justice' as a core feature of a proposed UK Constitution. 
Robert Blackburn, also in relation to a UK Constitution, expresses more of a 
principle-based approach. In "Enacting a Written Constitution for the United 
Kingdom" he says the Magna Carta has imported the principles of "rule of law", 




A written Constitution would first identify the boundaries of what is considered to be 
'constitutional' in scope and thus would include the core principles and values 
underlying the UK's political and legal culture in the Preamble or component parts for 
example, the method of protecting civil liberties and human rights in the UK. 
 
In our region of the world the norm has moved towards a more conventionally 
structured and hierarchical constitution. In A Constitution for Aotearoa, New 
Zealand, Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler deal exclusively with constructing a 
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written constitution for New Zealand without extrapolating general principles.
195
 
While it would reference the "sound elements of our past",
196
 they say, it would also 
anchor structure and function to place New Zealand on a firmer constitutional 
foundation. However the draft constitution that the authors offer places the Bill of 
Rights (a Natural Law phenomenon) at the end of the document with Parliament 
having a final say. Thus Palmer and Butler's constitution would be placed on the list 
of positivist constitutions. 
 
In countries which already have written constitutions judges have taken the 
opportunity (sometimes in a crisis) to interpret certain provisions and even to decide 
whether to strike down purportedly inconsistent legislation in cases before them. One 
such case is the 675 page decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Bharati v State of 




By a narrow majority (7-6) the Court established what is called the Basic Structure 
Doctrine of the (Indian) Constitution. The court said that while parliament could 
abridge and amend the Constitution of India it could not do so outside the broad 
contours and structure of the Preamble and, while Parliament had broad powers, it did 
not have the power to emasculate or destroy the fundamental features or basic 
structure of the Constitution which it listed as including fundamental rights and 
freedoms, separation of powers and judicial review of amendments to the 
Constitution or any law that would have that effect. Parliament had unfettered rights 
but could only limit fundamental rights in the public interest. 
 
In reaching this conclusion with the slight majority of others on the bench, Chief 
Justice Sikri surveyed the work of philosophical theorists such as Bentham and 
Austin, other eminent jurists, and decisions from the courts of the United States, 
Australia and Canada.  
 
The relevance of this decision is perhaps only for countries, like Fiji, which have 
experienced a long, somewhat turbulent, history of written constitutions. The 
centrality of rights has been a matter of much discussion. Sir Robin Cooke (as he was 
then) of New Zealand expressed it in these terms in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry 
Board: ―Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could 
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 In an important speech, titled ―Fundamentals: A Constitutional 
Conversation‖, the Chief Justice of New Zealand, Dame Sian Elias, also made similar 





The philosophical question of 'legitimacy/legality of a Constitution' does not rest 
merely on 'consultation' and the "will of the people"
200
 but also on "framework",
201
 as 
Oliver states in her article reviewed above. However, the question of 
'legitimacy/legality' can also be considered from different perspectives depending on 
whether one is embarked on writing a brand new Constitution where none existed 
before, or whether one has to consider how amendments to a Constitution, which has 
already been through the process of public consultation previously, should be treated, 
as the Indian Supreme Court did.  
 
Hence, in drafting a new Constitution, what is required is Loughlin's "Constitutional 
Imagination" to centre the notion of integration and public service into a 
constitutional document. The framework of a constitution would then base itself on 
the assumption of 'legitimacy', the core value of which arose in the natural law 
principles of 'justice' (and morality)
202
 as well as legal praxis.  
 
B Drafting a Fijian Constitution through Autopoiesis 
 
Autopoiesis is the strategy of showing how a system survives. Despite changes or 
'perturbations' if a system's identity survives it will also survive. The Indian Supreme 
Court had identified, through its development of the Basic Structure Doctrine, how 
the courts would ensure that the Indian Constitution would survive amendments by 
Parliament which normally had unfettered power over legislation.  
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In an article entitled ―Physical Basis for the Emergence of Autopoiesis, Cognition 
and Knowledge‖
203
 William Hall says that ―autopoiesis increases the fitness of the 
environment to support (itself)‖.
204





Stabilised autopoietic systems are those complex entities whose tentative 
solutions embodied in self-regulatory feedback enable them to persist 
indefinitely in the face of at least some system disturbances, thereby 
establishing lineages through historic time. At this stage survival 
knowledge is embodied in the fitness of the component subsystems and 
their networking to participate in self-regulation and self-production of 
processes within the entity. Those entities that fail to solve new problems 
dis-integrate and lose the historical successes of their embodied solutions. 
Successfully stabilized autopoietic systems may grow to the point where 
physical perturbations such as turbulent sheering cause fragmentation. If 
the network of processes producing autopoiesis is distributed, fragments 
may retain enough components of the necessary processes to continue 
autopoiesis – thus multiplying the number of entities sharing ―inherited‖ 
knowledge that survives fragmentation.  
 
Hall goes on to describe dispositional autopoiesis as that which carries survival 




[This] refers to the state where autopoiesis lineages perpetuate historically 
successful solutions for survival into their self-produced processes and 
material structure as tested compositional inheritance (i.e. structural or 
dispositional knowledge … ). Where self reproduction becomes common, 
competition is inevitable for limiting environmental resources of exergy 
and material components required for self-production, growth and 
replication such that lineages begin to be starved for energy and resources 
and disintegrate.  
 
                                                          
203
 William P Hall ―Kororoit Institute Working Paper No 2: Physical Basis for the Emergence of 
Autopoiesis, Cognition and Knowledge‖ (24 November 2011) Kororoit Institute Proponents and 
Supporters Assoc Inc <http://kororoit.org>. Hall is an Evolutionary Biologist and Organizational 
Theorist at the Melbourne School of Engineering. His article is quite detailed on the different 
formulations of autopoietic content, mainly in science; however, I have used only those aspects of his 
work which would assist in identifying the elements of an autopoietic constitution. 
204
 At 23. This is clearly to avoid disintegration. 
205
 At 24.  
206







It follows that coalescent entities with favourable structures will ‗live‘ for 
increasingly long stretches of time, until lineages are formed that do not 
readily dis-integrate. These surviving lineages establish continuous 
historical heritages. Survival knowledge continues to accumulate in an 
organized state with an unbroken history (i.e. heritage). 
 





… with historical continuity, re-production begins to play a role. In its 
simplest form (i.e. requiring the least knowledge beyond the state of flux 
close to equilibrium), reproduction would probably involve nothing more 
than incorporating additional components in favourable ratios and 
structural locations to grow larger until the assemblage becomes physically 
unstable and fragments into pieces. If at least some of the fragments 
retained enough of the favourable structural organization to maintain an 
autopoietic existence, those histories would be preserved and added to. 
Even this nearly chaotic form of replication would serve to multiply the 






… as long as some lineages survive, those that do survive will continue to 
accumulate more and more survival knowledge … . Also, in the early days 
of this process when autopoietic systems do not survive for long, 
disintegrating systems will return their once functional components to the 
medium, thus maintaining or even improving favourable conditions for 
them.  
 
Physicist Hugo Urrestarazu goes deeper into the survival techniques of autopoietic 
lineages by stating that at the heart of the theory of autopoiesis is ―organizational 
variance‖ which is ―a general dynamic … following a path of structural changes and, 
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The particular way in which self-organisation manifests itself is structure 
determined. … [i]n the most general case, any component of the system 
could interact with dynamic objects existing in the environment, provided 
that they reach states compatible with the occurrence of such interactions 
(which depend on the nature of the underlying interaction mechanisms). 
These interactions may either lead the composite unity to disintegrate or to 
evolve into new steady state configurations. 
 
Urrestarazu says that one of the threats to the persistence of a stabilized configuration 
of relations, resulting in reducing a system‘s lifespan is the ―unpredictable disrupting 
effects produced by environmental encounters‖.
212





The first approach is to think about homeostatic dynamic structures in 
which some self-sustained structure determined mechanisms are always 
available to compensate for disruptive external interactions. … We need to 
search for a describable feature of the dynamic system that remains 
invariant throughout all the history of state transitions affecting its 
components. 
 




We can imagine some possible ways by which a system may achieve long-
lasting stability. One way could be, for example, to limit the impact of 
external interactions by reducing somehow the scope of the propagation of 
triggered transitions within the interaction network so that their causal 
effects produce only minor perturbations to the dynamic structure. A minor 
perturbation is an interaction that modifies the topology of the network of 
relations only locally, leaving the rest of the structure unchanged. This 
consideration has led many authors to focus on the role that a protecting 
―boundary‖ could play in limiting the effects of external potentially 
disruptive interactions with the environment. 
 
Urrestarazu says the boundary would be like a ‗frontier‘ which can prevent  
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A dynamic system can achieve a global state in which some of the 
components reach states in which they do not interact with environmental 
dynamic objects and some of the components reach states in which they 
interact with environmental dynamic objects only through ―local‖ 






Thus, we can say that this ―specialized‖ substructure constitutes an 
instantaneous ―frontier‖ between the system and the environment. 
Furthermore, if these ―local frontier‖ interactions do not induce disruptive 
causation propagation within the whole dynamic structure, we can say that 
the ―frontier‖ components act as a shield for the whole causation network 
with respect to cause-effect couplings originated by triggering transitions 
undergone by ―external‖ dynamic objects. 
 
Thus, he says, the ‗boundaries‘ are also invoked as a ‗mediating structure‘ for the 
interaction of the system with its environment. Simply put, a boundary can do three 
things- (i) it can interact with one core component either directly or indirectly via 
another boundary component; (ii) it can absorb an external interaction if, after the 
occurrence of the interaction it reaches a state in which it interacts only locally with 
neighbour core components but may induce the propagation of chained interactions in 
the boundary so that the propagation does not reach core components; and (iii) it can 
transmit an external interaction if, after the occurrence of the interaction, it reaches a 
state in which it provokes the propagation of internal chained interactions to the core 
of the dynamic structure.  
 
What is apparent from Urrestarazu‘s physical science-based analysis is that one could 
devise a series of protections that maximize the opportunity of survival and 
reproduction rather than fragmentation (without (re)production in the fragmented 
components) or disintegration.  
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The capability of a system to compensate for disruptions provoked by 
successive external interactions by maintaining an interrupted succession 
of steady states is a conservative property of the system. … it [only] means 
that the flow of interactions continuously produces new topological 
arrangements of the network of relations in such a way that all global states 
reached are steady states, whatever the configuration may be at a given 
time.  
 
When a composite unity shows this kind of behaviour and is also capable 
of producing a structure determined compensating mechanism that is 
repeatedly available after each graph rearrangement then we can say that 
the composite unity conserves a particular kind of configuration of 
relations, namely its organization (for a specific type of interaction with the 
medium).  
 
The maintenance of the configuration of relations that define the system as 
pertaining to a specific class of systems means conservation of its 
organization. Here, the class of system being considered is composed of all 
those systems that, due to their internal dynamics, evolve, moment by 
moment, by reaching successive global steady states, and are provided with 
compensating mechanisms repeatedly available after each graph 
rearrangement provoked by external perturbations. This is the invariant 
feature that we were searching for. The system behaves as an autonomous 
homeostatic ―device‖, where the ―self-controlled‖ variable is its own 
organization. Everything can change: structure, component membership, 
medium objects; but the organization is preserved as long as a 
compensating mechanism is available after each encounter with the 
medium. 
 
Clearly, given the technical description above, one can see why the natural sciences' 




The origins of autopoiesis within the biological sciences has, not 
surprisingly, given rise to much critical comment. For some social 
scientists any theory which draws upon biological models smacks of social 
Darwinism, and for that reason alone must be suspect. Such sweeping 
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criticisms tend to be made by people who have decided to dismiss the 
theory out-of-hand. 
 
However, obviously, if social scientists had moved beyond considering autopoiesis 
for interpreting only the external relationship or communication between different 
(autonomous) systems,
219
 they might not have dismissed it as merely a socio-
biological theory. The significance and relevance of the biological and physical 
sciences analysis of autopoiesis to the internal dynamics of a socio/legal construct 
such as a constitution, has not, so far, been comprehensively considered by social 
science theorists.   
 
Thus for drafting a Fijian Constitution the strategy of using autopoiesis as a drafting 
methodology is useful. Autopoiesis does not abandon structure or organisation of a 
constitution (or legal system). It identifies, however, a core identity that employs 
survival techniques to withstand perturbations that may come to destroy the 
constitutional organism.  
 
My contention is that 'justice' forms the identity of a legitimate constitution.  
 
In this chapter I make the point that only a variety of methodologies, in combination, 
can fruitfully be employed to answer the thesis questions of whether there could be a 
single idea that can be identified as being the best principle on which a constitution 
can sustainably rest or depend and through which it can survive despite interferences 
or 'perturbations'. This would grant that constitution legitimacy which, in fact, would 
fulfil the requirements of legality also. In the minds of those of us who have had to 
face and resist constant political upheavals due to constitutional crises there can be no 
disjunction between natural law and positive law, between legitimacy and legality, 
between theory and praxis and between constitutional structure/function and content. 
Constitutional formation is not just a theoretical perspective. It also arises out of lived 
experience of injustice and a decided social and legal movement towards realising 
justice, the core concept of which, though understood in a personal sense, is not 
appreciated as one that drives history towards its logical destination, namely 
legitimacy of a legal order, as the next chapter on the 'concept' of justice will show.  
 
While these methodologies have been considered here in discrete sections due to the 
autonomous legal philosophies they bring to bear on the thesis question, it is clear 
that there are fewer substantive boundaries or demarcations between them than were 
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originally thought. The internal contradiction between Legal Praxis and Systems 
Theory can be resolved through the legal contingency perspective and the distinction 
between Natural Law and Positive Law can be narrowed through use of certain 
drafting techniques in law making and decisions of the judges in constitutional cases 
for example in Mitchell.  While legality and legitimacy in the literature and case law 
appear to be quite separate, in fact it is obvious that courts have also determined that 
Kelsenian positivist effectiveness (defining legality) was affected by questions of 
'justice and morality' which normally define 'legitimacy'.  
 
Finally, the 'constitutional imagination' required to draft a different type of 
constitution with justice as its core, that is, one that is not hierarchical or vertical, but 
still structured, would include applying the technique of autopoiesis, originating in 
the science of organisms where closed and open systems are in a constant inter-play 
for the purposes of survival and by identifying a core invariant element or identity 
that the system constantly moves to protect against disintegration.  
 
It will be obvious by now that all the writers and thinkers surveyed in this chapter 
have used the word 'justice' without any real explanation or detail of what this word 
might mean. From a subjective point of view, 'justice' means different things to 
different people. This difference is particularly stark in law and legal systems where 
the concept is riddled with political influences and is used loosely or carelessly to 
mean 'the rule of law' or where despots use the idea of justice to enact oppressive law. 
 
The centrality of the notion of justice in the methodological spheres explored in this 
chapter shows that one can now consider whether there is a definition of 'justice' that 
is consistent throughout time, space and ethnic or cultural variations. If such a core 
principle of justice is identified common to all humankind, it may pave the way to 
considering how it may be autopoietically structured into a legal framework and be 
maintained by consent as the 'invariant feature' in any constitution, in this case the 
Fijian Constitution. 
 











III Chapter 2 
The Concept of Justice 
 
Legal sociology needs to develop a concept of justice which is specific to 
the law, that is, juridical justice. This does not mean, of course, that law 
monopolizes justice. Rather, that in contemporary society, different 
concepts of justice co-exist in different contexts, with no meta-principle 




While, at a glance, Gunther Teubner's words may illustrate that the concept of justice 
is culturally specific, in fact the proposition that he puts forward is a little more 
complex. He sees justice as law's contingent side, that is, that law needs justice to 
improve itself. This perspective requires more discussion, alongside another view, 
though linked, expressed by Surendra Bhandari, that justice is law. 
 
(i) Justice and law 
 
Gunther Teubner's reference to 'juridical justice' above takes as its starting point 
Niklas Luhmann's sociological concept of justice as ―law's contingency formula‖.
221
 
Teubner says that:  
 
Justice as contingency formula is not justice immanent to the law but a 
justice that transcends the law. Internal consistency plus responsiveness to 
ecological demands- that is the double requirement of juridical justice. 
 
In his ―Alienating Justice: On the Social Surplus Value of the Twelfth Camel‖ 





In long lasting political fights, constitutional rights emerge as social 
counter-institutions protecting social differentiation against its inherent 
self-destructive tendencies. Individual conflicts between private citizens 
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and administrative bureaucracies are transformed in legal institutional 
support of political self restraint. 
 
Debates about the quality and conditions of justice have been influencing social 
theories for some time. In ―The Ancient and Modern Thinking about Justice: An 
Appraisal of the Positive Paradigm and the Influence of International Law‖ Surendra 
Bhandari begins with Gautama Buddha's idea that law is the law of justice.
223
 It 
means "fair reward' and proper punishment". It also includes defying the law if the 
law is ―evil‖.
224
 According to Bhandari, Confucius, on the other hand, saw justice in 
the form of a justified duty that would lead to the welfare of both individual and the 
state. It was the standard of governance for Confucius but in all other respects his 
idea was similar to that of Buddha. Bhandari says that Confucius also "connected the 




For Plato, says Bhandari, a constitution could be a source of justice or injustice. If 
laws legitimize unjust, discriminatory, or exploitative provisions, they may serve 
injustice. Referring to Aristotle, Bhandari says that he had powerfully argued that all 
lawful and fair acts are just and all unlawful and unjust acts are unfair. The problem 
is, as Bhandari states: ―In this sense, the idea that law in itself is justice has been 




Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, says Bhandari, show that justice is meant to 
obey law and if the law is bad, there should be an endeavour for the alteration of the 
offending law so that human relationships are conducted purely on the basis of law 
and rights. Unlike Bentham, says Bhandari, Kant, for whom morality is what the 
positive law dictates, instead offers the idea of the supremacy of moral laws (laws of 
reason) over positive laws. 
 
Bhandari then goes on to analyse John Rawls' Theory of Justice. He says that  Rawls 
departs from the Kantian conception of justice by claiming that justice as fairness is 
not a metaphysical conception (a categorical imperative) but a political conception of 
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a liberal democracy. As a metaphysical concept the idea of justice always placed 
priority on the laws of reason (moral laws) over the positive laws. At the end, says 
Bhandari, Rawls argued that in debating justice and rights, we should set aside our 
personal, moral and religious convictions and argue from the standpoint of a political 
conception of the person, independent of any particular loyalties, attachments, or 
conception of the good life. The demand that we separate our identity as citizens from 
our moral and religious convictions means that when engaging in public discourse 
about justice and rights, we must abide by the limits of liberal public reason. 
 
Bhandari says that, unlike Rawls, Michael Sandel considers justice as relative to 
social good and not independent of it.
227
 He asks: ―Why should we not base the 
principles of justice that govern the basic structure of society on our best 




Bhandari then considers the work of Indian economist Amartya Sen whose book The 
Idea of Justice was considered to be the best theory since that of John Rawls.
229
 Sen 
considers reasoning as a central instrument to understanding justice. This is 
particularly important, he says, in a world of unreason. Sen says that with reason, 
justice can be promoted and injustice contained.  
 
Having surveyed the main propositions of justice in the literature of the philosophers 
and theorists, Bhandari then goes on to propose that law is justice or that what is 
meant by justice is law. This proposition broadly identifies justice as the facts and 
processes of the creation, protection, promotion, and enforcement of rights, duties, 
and institutional responsibilities. Accordingly, he says, the idea of justice cannot be 
conceived beyond the positive domain of law. But, he also asks, what about justice if 
the law itself is undemocratic, oppressive, treacherous, and unjust? In other words, 
should laws be good to ensure justice? 
 
Bhandari uses the example of the case of Brown v Board of Education in the United 
States prior to which racial discrimination in schools was both ethical and legal.
230
 He 
asks, ―[h]ow would the justice theories that [he] has canvassed address the issue of 
good law, especially when the law itself is contested?‖
231
 For Buddha this required a 
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transformation of the individual, in Confucius a good ruler, in Socrates it was 
considered a virtue to obey a law unto death, and in Aristotle it was reason. 
 





The dynamics of justice thus need to be examined in encompassing three 
important processes for good laws: demands, arrangements, and 
realization. … demands imply creation or recognition of rights, duties, and 
institutional responsibilities … [a]rrangements are those institutional 
aspects that take responsibilities in realizing or enforcing the demands, 
[and] [r]ealization is an end, i.e., symbolically the supply side that fulfills 
all necessary conditions for the full enjoyment of rights, duties, and 
institutional responsibilities. 
 
He says that this process (above) ―thoughtfully demands a critical role for legitimacy, 




However, Teubner's ―Self-subversive Justice‖ takes the notion of legality and justice 
a little further than Bhandari which is descriptive and serves as something of a 
critique, as well as being prescriptive. Teubner says that the:
234
   
 
… ecological orientation of the law in the broadest sense is probably the 
most important aspect that systems theory, with its insistence on the 
system/environment distinction, adds to the debate on justice. Justice 
redirects law's attention to the problematic question of its adequacy to the 
outside world.  
 
He says that justice is confronted with the primary closure of law as identified by 
recursive chains of court judgments, legislative and contractual acts. Such operative 
closure of law has become in itself a major source of injustice. But, as Teubner says, 
the discourse of justice has the capacity of transcending the boundaries of law 




Whenever the distinction between legal and non-legal (in the sense of 
extra-legal, not of illegal!) re-enters the sequence of legal operations, legal 
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argumentation gains the capacity to create an 'enacted' environment, by 
distinguishing between norms and facts, between internal legal acts and 
external social acts, between legal concepts and social interests, between 






That is the moment in which the discourse on justice confers judgement on 
these distinctions and raises the question of whether legal decisions are 






At this point, a theory of justice is directly subsidised by social theory. … 
While the justitia mediatrix of the middle ages mediated in a vertical-
hierarchical mode between divine, natural and human law, the justice of 
modernity mediates in a horizontal-heterarchical mode between the proper 
normativity of the law and the proper normativity of its social, human and 
natural ecologies.  
 
Teubner then asks whether this is a new natural law which replaces god, nature and 
reason by differentiation of principles of society, a sociological concept of natural 




… this concept of justice undercuts the distinction between positivism and 
natural law and declares them both right and wrong. It shares with natural 
law the impulse that justice searches for an extra-legal orientation, but with 
positivism it has in common that the search for justice can only be done by 
the law itself, not by external authorities whether god, nature or natural 
reason. Justice turns against natural law when it refutes the idea that 
outside authorities will furnish substantive criteria of  justice. But it 
turns also against positivism insofar as justice is not something that can be 
produced by a legal decision. 
 
He says that, ―[i]nstead, justice is sabotaging legal decisions. … Justice works as a 
subversive force with which the law protests against itself. … 
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 Subversive justice stirs up the law‖.
239
 As he says at the end, ―[i]t is law itself that 








Law's search for justice cannot externalise its criteria, cannot put its hope 
in either democracy or morality, not to speak of rational choice, but is 
thrown back onto itself. By enacting its ecologies, law alone bears 
responsibility for its criteria of justice. 
 
Referring to Derrida's work on ―transcendence‖ of the knowledge world into spheres 
beyond their boundaries, Teubner says that ―[j]ustice begins where law ends.‖
242
 
Furthermore, he says, ―[i]n short, justice would be a process of transformation of law 




Teubner then goes on to say that: ―In aspiring to justice, law does not have at its 
disposal much power or influence. It has comparatively impoverished operations and 
structures – legal acts and legal rules.‖
 244
 But the constraints that justice places on the 
law places the law ―under enormous pressure to innovate‖ says Teubner.
245
 That 
means chances of improvement.  
 
Yet, at the same time, ―[g]eneral and generous principles can be inverted in their 
application. Every generous thought is threatened by its own Stalinism.‖
246
 He 
dismisses the 'human rights ideology as the ideal of a just society, calling it 
"justicialization" as an attempt to bring the whole of society to justice with juridical 




Clearly, Bhandari and Teubner look at justice differently. Bhandari says that there is a 
certain quality to the definition of justice that is universal- with legitimacy 
(democratic process), validity and enforceability as the ultimate criteria of justice. 
Teubner, on the other hand, says that the idea that there is universal justice is a fallacy 
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for the simple reason that aspiring to a universal idea of justice can create the 
conditions for injustice. Instead, Teubner says it is important to distinguish between 
higher and lower degrees of juridical justice.
248
 But at another level, I believe it is not 
only that. It is important to have an idea of a goal of justice because, from a legal 
praxis sense, that becomes a rallying cry across the board (say against exploitation). 
However, it is also important to realise that this so-called common idea can cause 
problems if, for example, democracy which everyone thinks is that criteria, does not 
provide justice but delivers injustice as in Hitler's regime and in South Africa 
recently.  
 
This leads to another reported divide- that of legality/legitimacy. The question is 
whether legitimacy and legality are in fact the same thing if one is to consider the 
ideas of both Bhandari and Teubner on justice? I think it is important not to lose sight 
of two aspects in any analysis of law and justice: (i) that rules, processes and 
enforceability of the rules are indispensible because society needs to function in an 
orderly way with consistency, clarity and certainty in the application of law; and (ii) 
despite the orderliness of the structures and processes of the law, law is not 
automatically the delivery of justice.  
 
The fact that law and justice do not necessarily coincide was starkly shown in Nazi 
Germany during the height of Hitler's absolute power. The Nazi laws of Nuremberg 
were racist laws properly passed. Hitler was properly appointed Chancellor. Though 
Hitler came second in the elections the Nazi Party had gained the majority of seats in 
the Reichstag by 1933. Nevertheless, Nazi law de-naturalising Jewish nationals was 
discussed in Oppenheimer v Cattermole, where the House of Lords (Lord Chelsea) 
said, ―a law of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the 
courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all‖, though 
Oppenheimer had to pay the tax claimed on his pension by the tax department.
249
 
That statement shows a time when law and justice were considered to be, by the 
House of Lords, inseparable.  
 
It seems, if one sees Teubner's perspective as being useful to expressing the 
relationship between law and justice, the concept of justice will keep the closed 
nature of law sufficiently open in the public interest, or perhaps as a demand from the 
body politic, to balance law's excesses.  
 
                                                          
248
 At 22. 
249
 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249 (HL) at 278. 
59 
 
Given the survey above on the relationship between law and justice and the obvious 
disjunction and conjunction between them, this chapter considers this (vexed) 
relationship in history. It must be acknowledged that discussions of justice cannot be 
confined merely to western contexts. Thus, an important question is whether the term 
'justice' is culturally specific or whether it may be a universal presumptive value of 
humanity despite its contingent positioning. The survey will highlight whether there 
is such a definition that would satisfy even Teubner's notion of a subversive justice 
which reveals the internal paradox in law. 
 
For the sake of convenience the survey of the notion of justice provided in this 
chapter is chronologically presented. However, the account is based on the themes 
expanded by Bhandari and Teubner- that society needs to function according to some 
orderly legal process (Bhandari)  but that the law itself searches for justice which is 
the re-entry of the extra-legal into the legal (Teubner).  
 
Thus, from ancient to modern times, while strict application of law in societies was 
necessary and inevitable, at the same time there were periods when justice could be 
regarded as 'law's contingent formula'. Justice then changed the law. The question is 
whether the definition of justice itself developed in an incremental manner so that 
constitutional writers such as Loughlin can now refer to an "aspirational" constitution 
with a particular definition of justice forming its identity.
250
   
 
For all that Bhandari, Teubner and other writers wrote about the impact of justice as a 
construct of law or as contingent to it, no one has said what its definition might be in 
both time and space, including cultural space. This needs to be traced from its earliest 
reference. 
 
A Concepts of Justice from the Beginning of Organised Society to the 20th 
 Century 
 
1 Sumer, Mesopotamia and India 
 
The very first law that is in evidence, the Code of Urakagina of Lagash (Sumer 2050 
BCE) emphasised one main quality of social organisation and legal relationships, the 
amagi or amargi - liberty.
251
 This was expressed against the background of 
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corruption exhibited by 'unjust priest judges' who conspired to deprive the people of 
their personal property. Urakagina himself claimed his authority to rule from a 
covenant with the god Ningirso justifying his authority to write a Code for 
application to everyone in his society. 
 
The next law in evidence, the Code of Lipit-Ishtar of Isin (1868-1857 BCE),
252
 is the 
first law ever to use the word 'justice' and does so in reference to the King Lipit-
Ishtar. The Code establishes the duty of the King (the wise shepherd) to establish 
"justice in the land", to "banish complaints", to "turn back enmity and rebellion by 
force of arms", to "bring well-being to Sumerians and Akkadians … in accordance 




to procure freedom of the sons and daughters of Nippur, the sons and 
daughters of Ur, the sons and daughters of Isin, the sons and daughters of 
Sumer and Akkad upon whom slaveship had been imposed. 
 
A century later the Code of Hammurabi of Babylonia (1772 BCE), which could be 
identified as the earliest constitution, expresses itself as the "laws of justice which 
Hammurabi, the wise king, established".
254
 In it Hammurabi refers to himself as the 
"salvation-bearing shepherd" who "let the oppressed, who has a case at law, come 
and stand before this my image as king of righteousness".
255
 There are other useful 
clauses in the Code, for example 'presumption of innocence' but, simultaneously, the 
Code establishes the death penalty for transgressions, sophisticated rules for slave 
ownership and rules of marriage, succession and inheritance, indicating that private 
property in both women and slaves was well established by this time.  
 
In 1600 BCE the Hittite Laws introduced a broader group than just a king alone for 
the dispensation of judgment,
256
 namely a Council of Elders. These were appointed to 
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assist the king and were a compilation of customary practice and established 
cooperation rather than strict hierarchy, extending the idea of a group of people acting 





Ancient Egyptian law was similarly complex in its reference to justice. In ―The 
Representation of Justice in Ancient Egypt‖ JG Manning says that prejudice more 
than anything else ensured western disdain for Egyptian ideas of law and justice.
258
 
But, he says, the principles of justice in Egyptian law served as the link between 
Egyptians and others, for example Mesopotamians and Sumerians, and were 
expressed as follows: ―the right to be heard, the dramatic public setting of trials, the 
need for narration and storytelling at trials, the swearing of oaths in giving testimony, 




The Indus Valley Civilisation, represented next due to the fact that ideas of equality 
seem to have entered the justice schema at this time and its survival into modern 
India's legal system, had a 300 year technological advantage over Mesopotamia but 
appeared to have flourished parallel to it. Again there is evidence in the pottery art 
and sculptures of collective responsibility as well as a more equal position for 
women. This civilisation was assaulted, most likely by the Aryan invasion (from 
about 1500 BCE) from steppes of the north, and considered to have been destroyed 
but remnants of the religion appear as early forms of Hinduism. The Aryans brought 
with them a completely different (hierarchical) social structure which would have 
clashed with the Indus Valley people.
260
 Between 1500–500 BCE the Aryans with 
their Vedic culture began to expand all over India and further east. They were a 
warlike people and their war rituals and manoeuvres are known from their scriptures 




The early Vedic period in India saw the development of the socio-legal concept of 
'rita' which expressed the ideas of 'law', 'commandment', 'sacrifice', 'order', 'truth', 
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 This was an imposition of a hierarchical social 
structure justified by religion. Both gods and humans were subject to 'rita' which 
included 'cosmic retribution'. 'Rita' was the principle and 'dharma' was its governance. 
In Vedic terms there was no reference to 'justice', 'liberty', 'freedom' or any such 
concept understood by the early Sumerian and Mesopotamian Codes or hinted at by 
the Indus symbolism. Linked to 'dharma' was the concept of 'agreement' derived from 
village custom and royal edicts. In this situation the ultimate decision maker and 
judge was the King (usually a warrior king) who was assisted by his assemblies of 
Sabha, Samiti, Vidhata and Gana which exercised deliberative, military and religious 




The violence and imperialist tendencies of the early Vedics were mediated by the 
onset of the Mauryan Empre (322-185 BCE) and especially by the reign of King 
Ashoka (269-232 BCE) who gave up violent warfare after a particularly bloody battle 
with the Kalingas in 262 BCE. Though retaining a link between the divine and the 
monarchy Ashoka formulated a set of secular edicts in stone which gave 
responsibility to the king to protect his people and do justice on the basis of 'dharma'. 
His edicts also established what he called 'right behaviour', 'benevolence', 'kindness to 
prisoners' and 'respect for animal life', thus connecting these principles with those that 
had appeared during the earlier civilisations. His Law of Piety prescribed 
righteousness across the board, between people themselves as well as between the 
king and the people. In this way, what was later seen in John Locke also, there was a 





The somewhat egalitarian sentiment that marked Ashoka's reign disappeared at his 
death and the disintegration of his empire. In the vacuum created by its demise and 
the principles upon which it had been based, the power of the priests flourished again. 
Thus emerged strict hierarchies known as 'caste' which were encapsulated by the 
Code of Manu and the return to the Vedas as the source of all knowledge. The Code 
specifies the king as a judge who occupies the throne of justice. It regulates the King's 
behaviour as well as establishing penalties for criminal offences such as theft, inter-
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caste sexual relations, adultery and the specified work of commoners and servants.
265
 
The Code of Manu was, eventually, two thousand years later, trumped by the Indian 
Constitution of 1949, coming into force on 26 January 1950. 
 
It will be seen, therefore, that these early laws or codes emphasised the concept of 
justice but only in relation to the context in which they appeared. Liberty, freedom, 
benevolence and right behaviour were the definitions of justice emerging from the 
earliest times. Justice was not law as such but a method of delivering law or 
adjudicating it. In this way one can find resonance with Teubner's idea of justice as 
being contingent to law. What is obvious is that, as human society becomes more 
complex and larger, the relationship between law and its delivery or practice becomes 
more convoluted and problematic. The epitome of such complexity is revealed mostly 
in the Indian social structure in ancient times. It is the one society whose ancient 
customs and laws are still in existence today and thus provides us with an opportunity 
to understand, to some extent, legal relations in other contemporaneous societies such 
as Sumer, Indus and Mesopotamia that have now disappeared.  
 
2 Moses, Greeks and Romans 
 
In Mosaic law the principles of justice expressed in the early societies mentioned 
above seem to have merged completely not just with law, but with law as command. 
Mosaic Law came in reaction to the extreme and unwieldy polytheism of the Hittites. 
By referencing the 'one God' and monotheism Mosaic Law laid emphasis on the 
divine origin of the commands. It established the requirement to obey divine 
authority expressed through a prophet, namely Moses. The difference between 
Mosaic commands and a 'strong government' and the previous concepts of law and 
justice may have been due to the different modes of production evident in these 
societies.
266
 The Sumerians were commercialised traders whereas the Hebrews, at this 
stage, were desert wanderers trying to find a home. It may be that the Sumerians and 
Mesopotamians relied on different deities for different kinds of protection whereas 
the Hebrews, being pastoral and agricultural as well as travellers, were more 
dependent on authoritarian leadership which required a single deity for their well-
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being. Mosaic Law, later emerging as the 'Judeo-Christian' tradition, remained an 




It was only with the Greeks that the relationship between law and justice becomes 
cause for extended discussion and deliberation which then influenced Europe much 
later in the second millennium CE (Common Era) during the age of Enlightenment. 
The Greeks found a difference between what Greek philosophers deemed 'natural' 
law and what they identified as 'positive' law.  
 
Sir Henry Maine says that the earliest reference to the Greek God Zeus, was as a 
―judge‖ and not a ―lawmaker‖.
268
 He derives this definition from the Homeric words 
'Themis' (gods dispensing judicial awards to kings) and 'Themistis' (term for the 
awards themselves). The Greeks linked laws with statehood and so the idea of the 
state was indispensible from the idea of justice which was identified as law. The 
Greeks investigated the difference between the two, mostly from the 8th century 
BCE. This is reflected in the reaction of Socrates to his death sentence which was to 
choose to die rather than escape which he could easily have done with the help of his 
philosopher friends. The first Greek laws were those of Draco which could only be 
enforced by a court and not kings.
269
 Early Greek law did not have a concept of 'king' 
dispensing laws or justice. Solon, who came after Draco, made Draco's laws less 
harsh. Afterwards, Cleisthenes re-organised the entire social and legal system so that, 
instead of tribes, the 'boule' or council became, as fusion, the supreme administrative 
and deliberative body of Athens. The 'Areopagus' was retained even under 
Cleisthenes' reform as advisors though it lost its power in 412 BCE except for 
presiding over murder trials.  
 
Separate from Athens, Crete had its own law called the Gortyn Code. The Cretian 
Code is mentioned here because it consolidated rights of slaves and women, the right 
to property as well as establishing laws for adultery, rape, marriage, divorce rights, 
and inheritance indicating increasing complexity of social life. The Code also 
established social classes in Greek society, for example slaves, serfs, foreigner and 
free. Aristotle's account of the Greek laws of the past shows that the early legal 
system (between 800-400 BCE) was developing certain principles above ordinary 
laws, though not distinct from them. 
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The three Greek philosophers commonly known for the exploration between law and 
justice are Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Together they founded the idea that 'reasoned 
discourse' rather than religion or other non-rational or belief-based explanations 
provided answers to societal questions and maintained order. Socrates explored the 
difference between ―good‖ and ―evil‖ and is reported by Plato to have thought that 
"moral goodness as the one thing that matters".
270
 Moral goodness was knowledge. In 





In Plato the Socratic goodness is linked to 'the just state' and 'integrity of the social 
order'. Plato defines a just state as one where each citizen should 'perform the task for 
which he is best fitted with an eye to the welfare of the whole- and evil creeps in 
when any part of the state serves its own interest at the cost of the others. He included 




Women must be fully fledged citizens, possessing the same rights and 
duties as men; all doors must be open to them, and their position in the 
social order be determined solely by fitness; for a state in which women 
were outsiders would be a state divided against itself. 
 
He thought that a state that did not measure up to an ideal state was not a state. 
 
In his The Laws, through its dialogic methodology, Plato plans a new city to be built 
along certain constitutional foundations. This was normal at the time as Plato himself 
had been asked to help construct a new constitution for Megalopolis, as well as 
sending his students to a number of other Greek states to assist them to do the same. 
Using the fictive state of 'Magnesia' Plato thus established the principle of 'complete 
goodness' as the highest type of legal/state personality possible. He said the true 
function of law was to direct rather than punish. In his Book III of The Laws he 
introduces the need for a balance of the constitution where power is not concentrated 
in a single person or single body of men, as well as a balance between personal rule 
(monarchy) and popular control (democracy). Taylor says: ―In view of the 
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prominence given to this thesis in Laws III it is not too much to call Plato the author 




The basis of Plato's constitutionalism is "godliness" that is, a supreme and "complete 




Plato's student Aristotle embarked on a constitutional survey which described an ideal 
society through empirical observations and practical concerns. His question was 
"what is the best form of constitutions"?
275
 In answer to this question Aristotle first 
considered the 'state' to be the 'supreme form of human association' thus locating 
western law in the concept of the 'state' rather than tribal or other bodies. He believed 
that "man is a political zoon", an animal that 'naturally lives in a state, polis. It was an 




However, because Aristotle regarded human society as being naturally hierarchical, 
he thought 'justice' was an arrangement of the political association, adding somewhat 
disconcertingly that the description of what is "just" comes from a "sense of justice": 
―The virtue of justice is the feature of a state; for justice is the arrangement of the 




It appears that what Aristotle means by "justice" is 'law' as the distinction between the 
two is blurred. More helpful is his answer to his main question: 'Who rules whom and 
with what justification?' While outlining the faults in the 'idealist' constitutions of 
Plato and the instability (due to lack of funds) in the Lacedaemoninian Constitution, 
and the 'aristocratic bias' in that of the Cretans, he approved of the idea of 'consent' 
exhibited in the latter constitution. He made the important point, of significance to 
modern constitutions, that constitutions remain stable if people in a state all 'desire' to 
keep the constitution. In the Carthaginian Constitution he recognised the concept of 
contentedness in response to a proper arrangement of the constitutional system and 
plurality of constitutional offices. In Book III Aristotle sees a constitution as an 
―organising those living in a state‖.
278
 He goes further to say that ―unjust and false 
                                                          
273
 AE Taylor (translator) Plato The Laws (JM Dent & Sons, London, 1960) at xviii. 
274
 At xxi, xxiii. 
275
 Trevor J Saunders (reviser) TA Sinclair (translator) Aristotle The Politics (Revised ed, Penguin 
Books, London, 1981) at 16. 
276
 Bakewell (ed), above n 270, at xxvi. 
277
 Saunders (reviser), above n 275, at 61. Aristotle distinguishes between ―justice‖ and ―sense of 
justice‖ which can be described in his works as ―virtue‖.  
278
 Sinclair (translator), above n 14, at 102. 
67 
 
mean the same thing‖, but ―when persons exercise their office unjustly, we continue 
to say they rule, though unjustly‖.
279




… those constitutions which aim at the common good are right, as being in 
accord with absolute justice; while those that aim only at the good of the 
rulers are wrong. 
 
He names three "right" constitutions as being based on "kingship, aristocracy and 
polity" and the three "deviated constitutions" as being based on "tyranny, oligarchy 
and democracy". In relation to "democracy" he said it came from "power of the 
people" (demos) that is, rule by a particular class, the numerous poor, in their own 




Aristotle also saw justice as being embedded in the "right constitutions"
282
 as laws 
framed in accordance with one of the right types of constitutions will "inevitably be 
just, but if according to one of the deviations, unjust".
283




… in the state, the good aimed at is justice and that means for the benefit of 
the whole community … whereas without free population and wealth there 
cannot be a state at all, without justice and virtue it cannot be managed 
well.  
 
For him constitutional theory was a 'convening' and not 'ruling' element. 
 
In his Book VI Aristotle links democracy with ―liberty‖: ―A basic principle of the 
democratic constitution is liberty.‖
285
 Moreover, his concepts of justice, equality and 





… let this be our fundamental basis: the life which is best for men, both 
separately as individuals, and in the mass, as states, is the life which has 
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virtue sufficiently supported by material resources to facilitate participation 
in the actions that virtue calls for. 
 
Greek thought on justice as being the foundation of an ideal state which would then 
formulate laws in light of it had far reaching effects, not only on the Roman laws that 
emerged as Greek civilisation began to fade, but also on all western legal systems that 
came afterwards. The ideas of justice as being served well in the "right constitutions" 
the notion of "consent", the idea of sovereignty being a "convening" and not "ruling" 
constitutional principle,
287
 and actions that are valid only in the public interest (which 
Aristotle said democracy did not allow) were part of the developing justice 
jurisprudence of the times.
288
 These are principles that even modern constitutional 
theorists would claim as being relevant and pertinent in the 21st century.  
 
The development of the Romans' idea of justice and law inevitably benefited from 
Rome's proximity to Greece. But the Roman Empire which spread to almost the 
whole of Europe including Britain, and also Egypt, developed a concept of law that 
had very little to do with justice in the way the Mesopotamians and others, as well as 
Greeks, defined it. The Romans' concept of justice was regimented law that subsumed 
ideas of justice within it. It was not until the Emperor Justinian I commanded his 
Corpus Civilis, a compilation of the Pandects, the Codex Justinian and Novellae 
Constitutions that considerations of justice separate from law were articulated.  
 
Sir Henry Maine said that, initially, Roman Law transformed customary law into 
codes, called the Twelve Tables.
289
 The compilation of the codes emerged as a 
consequence of a class war between the ancient aristocracy (the patricians) and the 
plebians (commoners). Buckland says that the Twelve Tables represented mainly 
Latin custom with infusion of Greek law, transforming the original customary law 
(ius) into written law (lex).
290
 The difference between these two terms, ius and lex, is 
quite crucial, though not very clear in the literature. The plainest definition of ius is 
not just customary law but principle of law (on a higher plane), and the definition of 
lex appears to be law that is of particular purpose, for example a marriage law. Thus 
lex is positive law, written down by a higher authority. Ius, on the other hand, though 
also 'law', that is, a 'rule of conduct', is nevertheless derived from the rights that every 
Roman had by virtue of being a citizen. In more common parlance ius is defined as 
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'justice' because it was also used in relation to the appeal of the Romans to their 
courts. 
 
The Twelve Tables, therefore, were more in the nature of codified law as written 
down, though the application of the law was inevitably achieved against the 
framework of ius. This explains the content of the Tables as expressing the range of 
laws from access to courts to marriage laws, to crimes and penalties, ownership and 
possession and so on. In his analysis of the Twelve Tables, Polybius, a Greek 
expatriate in Rome, said they were like the Constitution of Sparta which ensured that 
every Spartan was also a soldier and thus emphasised the command nature of 
government.  
 
Throughout the centuries the Twelve Tables remained constant in substance; any 
amendments were mainly reformist in nature. To assist with interpretation a 
specialised legal group, the jurists, was formed to formulate legal opinions on the law 
and, over time, these opinions also became law. The continuing influence of ius, 
however, was seen in the writings of eminent Roman lawyer Cicero who identified 
the basis of 'true law' as being 'divine' in nature with 'man' being the highest of all 
divine creations. He said the primary purpose of law was to promote the interactions 
of man and to protect the institutions he had created. The preservation of the 'order of 
man' was the single most important reason for law but Cicero borrowed from 
Aristotle and Plato by focussing on the essentially social nature of man to determine 
the content of the law. It is Cicero's work that had far reaching effects on the 
European Enlightenment, as well as on the development of the Latin language for the 




The expansion of the Roman Empire under Octavius (later Augustus) transported 
Roman Laws into other countries, most importantly Britain. Throughout this period 
the character of the Roman Tables retained its persistence even after the millennium 
ended. This is even after Gaius' Institutes was published in 161 CE, initially as an 
interpretive tool but becoming a law in its own right. However there was one 
important difference between the Twelve Tables and the Institutes and that is that, 
unlike the Twelve Tables, Gaius' work harked back to the Greek Stoic's expression of 
a higher law against which positive law had to be measured with the one important 
difference being that Gaius did not believe that a conflict with natural law should 
cancel positive law. Thus, in Gaius's Institutes a conflict with justice would not 
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render the positive law in question invalid.
292
 The four books of Gaius were (i) Book 
I Concerning Civil and Natural Law (the ius of persons); (ii) Book II the Ius of 
Things; (iii) Book III The Estate of Persons (specifically mentioned in relation to the 
Twelve Tables); and (iv) Book IV Concerning Actions (real and personal). 
 




The Civil Law of the Roman people consists of statutes, plebiscites, 
Decrees of the Senate, Constitutions of the Emperors, the Edicts of those 
who have the right to promulgate them, and the opinions of the jurists. 
 
At the start of the First Millennium, Rome's power was clearly waning and the 
Romans were in retreat in Europe, including Britain, by 300 CE. At the same time a 
new religion, Christianity, began its influence over the Roman Empire. The Edict of 
Milan legalized Christianity in 313, and it later became the state religion in 380.  
 
The most significant, though belated, change to Roman law came half way through 
the first millennium CE in the form of the aforementioned Byzantium Justinian 
Corpus. Spanning some 50 volumes the Corpus represented the codification of all 
Roman laws, including those of the Jurists, and was promulgated in 529 CE.
294
 The 
Roman Empire had been divided into two, east and west, between about 200-300 CE; 
the Roman west had collapsed due to a number of different reasons that were 
economic, political, religious and military but the east continued to flourish, 
influenced as it was by Greek culture and Christianity. During the reign of Justinian 1 
(527-565 CE) the eastern empire reached its zenith by colonising the Mediterranean 
coast, Italy, North Africa and even Rome itself. Ultimately the power of the 
Byzantium Empire did not fade until the 15th century. It was during Justinian's time 
that the Corpus was promulgated with a different perspective from the Twelve Tables 
or the Institutes. The Corpus moved Roman law towards considerations of justice 
separate from law. 
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Book I of the Corpus is headed ―Concerning Justice and Law‖. The very first speech 





We have determined, with the help of God, now to make a present, for the 
common good, of what appeared to many past emperors to require 
improvement, but which none of them, in the meantime, ventured to put 
into effect, and to make lawsuits less prolix by abbreviating the many 
constitutions, contained in the three Codes, the Gregorian, the 
Hermogenian, and the Theodosian, as well as those which, after these 
Codes, were issued by Theodosius of blessed memory and other emperors 
after him, as well as those issued by Our Clemency, and by compiling, 
under our auspicious name, one Code, collecting in it the constitutions of 
the three aforesaid Codes, as well as the new constitutions subsequently 
issued. 
 
A second edition of the Justinian Corpus, called the Novellae was published in 534 




It is expedient that the Imperial Majesty not only be distinguished by arms, 
but also be protected by laws, so that government may be justly 
administered in time of both war and peace, and the Roman Sovereign not 
only may emerge victorious from battle with the enemy, but also by 
legitimate measures may defeat the evil designs of wicked men and appear 
as strict in the administration of justice as triumphant over conquered foes. 
… Therefore, after the completion of the fifty books of the Digest or the 
Pandects, in which all the ancient law has been collected … [w]e have 
ordered these Institutes to be divided into the following four books, that 
they may constitute the first elements of the entire science of jurisprudence. 
 
One of the principles referred to in the speech is stated in the first book  
Concerning Justice and Law: ―Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give to 
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He then goes on to describe this further: ―Jurisprudence is the knowledge of matters 








Those who apply themselves to the study of law should know, in the first 
place, from whence the science is derived. The law obtains its name from 
justice; for … law is the art of knowing what is good and just.  
 
The Justinian Corpus influenced Europe and other countries during the Middle Ages 
and the Enlightenment and continues to have far reaching effects on lawyers and law 
students to this day. 
 
3 The notion of justice in post-Roman Britain 
 
The retreat of the Western Roman Empire from Britain from about 200 CE opened a 
vacuum for a unique British formulation of law and justice. While influenced a great 
deal by the Roman Twelve Tables during the height of empire in Britain, the ancient 
Britons had their own versions of justice and law which, in most cases, had been 
driven underground during Roman colonisation.
300
 The law that was delivered in 
ancient Briton was that of the Druids. Both the Greek geographer Pytheas in 330 
BCE and Julius Caesar in his Caesar de Bello Gallico in 58-59 BCE described 
ancient Briton law as being delivered by the Druids who were like a form of 'priest-
judge'.
301
 The Druids possessed both criminal and civil jurisdiction and decided all 
controversies among states and private persons.  
 
A recent reference from the Courts Service of Ireland provides more detail of the 




In many respects Brehon law was quite progressive. It recognised divorce 
and equal rights between the genders and also showed concern for the 
environment. In criminal law, offences and penalties were defined in great 
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detail. Restitution rather than punishment was prescribed for wrongdoing. 
Cases of homicide or bodily injury were punishable by means of the eric 
fine, the exact amount determined by a scale. Capital punishment was not 
among the range of penalties available to the Brehons. The absence of 
either a court system or a police force suggests that people had strong 
respect for the law. 
 
Despite the less regimented practice of Brehon law and some rights that may have 
been restored to Britons after the retreat of the Romans, the Anglo-Saxons who came 
hard on Roman heels became a dominant presence in the legal system until the 
Norman conquest five centuries later. 
 
In The History of England, David Hume says the Anglo Saxon tribes were less 
inclined to be authoritarian, despite the savagery of their invasions, than the 
Romans.
303
 Nevertheless the Ango Saxons had a motley of laws, either generic from 
the ancient Britons or remnants of Roman law in all social relations and institutions 
still in existence. Constantine withdrew the whole Roman army in 409 CE, leaving 
the Britons to themselves at the same time that Anglo Saxons were invading Britain 
in regular forays from the continent.  
 
Rome itself was sacked by the Visigoths in 479 CE so its ability to defend any of its 
territories, especially a troublesome one like Britain which never really accepted 
colonisation, was negligible. The Anglo Saxons' rule was established promptly as the 
Romans had retreated rather rapidly, abandoning their towns, cities and country 
villas. The Anglo Saxons took advantage of the religious vacuum to restore paganism 
to Britain which held sway for about 200 years before Pope Gregory I sent out 
missionaries, having some success over time, especially in King Ethelbert's court.  
 
Meanwhile, the laws of Britain became subsumed by Anglo Saxon laws which were 
codified from the 6th century by Anglo Saxon kings. Originally simply kept, by 890 
CE the legal history of Anglo Saxon Britain was finally compiled during the rule of 
King Alfred of Wessex and called the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles. These laws, in fact, 
harked as far back as 64 BCE, that is, prior to the Roman invasion, but were mostly 
confined to the genealogy of Alfred and included the laws made by his predecessors 
from about the 6th century CE. The Chronicles formed three separate categories: (i) 
laws and collections of laws promulgated by public authority; (ii) statements of 
custom and (iii) private compilations of legal rules and enactments. The first category 
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contained the power, interests and privileges of the kings as Anglo Saxon Britain was 
based on an inherited monarchy. The Visigoth Codes, linked with Canon Law of the 
Catholic Church, became influential and, importantly, the coronation oath of the 
Visigoth kings included an undertaking to protect the interests of their subjects. The 
Codes start with a statement of principle, ―[t]he maker of laws should not practise 




A survey of the laws of the Anglo Saxon/Britons from 560-946 CE shows a 
significant shift in reasoning about justice as opposed to law. The kings during this 
span of centuries were King Athelbert of Kent (560-616), King Hlothhaere and 
Eadric (673-686), King Wihtraed (690-725), King Alfred (871-901), King Edward 
the Elder (901-924) who shared power with Guthrum and Edward the Elder (laws of 
906), King Athelstan (924-939) and King Edmund 1 (939-946). There is no reference 
to justice in King Athelbert's laws which are mainly (set in the Roman method of 
statutory sections) about distribution of property among the church officials and the 
fines imposed and compensation to be given for transgressions of the law. The laws 
of Hlothhaere and Eadric follow the same pattern. However, the laws of King 
Wihtraed (late 5th-early 6th centuries) show a discernible shift towards a different 
kind of document. The principles were phrased around a new collective entity called 
"a deliberative convention of the great men" which included the king and the bishop 
of Rochester as well as the people and they all appear to have agreed that "[l]et the 




The Preamble of King Alfred's Laws just a century later brought into force Mosaic 




The Lord spoke these words to Moses, and thus said: ―I am the Lord your 
God. I led you out of the land of the Egyptians, and of their bondage.‖ 
 
The last single Anglo Saxon Code of the First Millennium, that of King Edward the 
Elder, was added to the Chronicles after King Alfred's reign and appears to be an 
attempt to combine Christian sentiments with developing law without losing sight of 
the command prerogative of the monarchs linked with the Church:
307
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King Edward commands all the reeves: that you judge such just dooms as 
you know to be most righteous, and as in the doom-book stands. Fear not 
on any  account to pronounce folkright; and that every suit have a term 
when it shall be brought forward, that you then may pronounce. 
 
In 871 CE Alfred and his brother Athelred defeated the Danes at the Battle of 
Ashdown in Berkshire. Alfred and Guthrum of the Danes entered a peace treaty in 
884. Since many Danes had settled in Britain by now it was necessary to formulate 
joint legal principles; the Treaty culminated in a combined law to reflect autonomy in 
the areas the Danes claimed.
308
 The Laws provide a Preamble and Law 1, with an 
avowed Christian, and indeed monotheistic, foundation indicating that polytheism 




This is the first which they ordained: that they would love one God and 
zealously renounce every kind of heathendom … 1. And this is then the 
first which they ordained: that the 'church-grith' within the walls, and the 
king's 'hand-grith', stand equally inviolate. 
 
Following swiftly from this development introducing monotheism as part of the 
origin of laws and their foundation were the Laws of King Athelstan (924-939) which 
consolidated the relationship between the king and the church by seeking tithes to 
render to God on pain of sin. Adding: ―I will not that you unjustly anywhere acquire 





The Laws of King Edmund 1 (939-946 CE) were in the same vein except that the 
King ―assembled a great synod at London‖ consolidating the relationship between the 




Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People, written in Latin in 731 discusses 
the institution of the ―Witenagemot‖ a political entity formed before the 7th century 
CE and which lasted well into the 11th century.
312
 It was an assembly of the ruling 
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class whose primary function was to advise the king, including to witness charters 
and grants of land, taxation, jurisprudence and internal and external security, and was 
composed of the most important ecclesiastical and secular aristocracy in England.  
 
Hume's account of the courts of law in existence at the time provides an insight into 




But though the general strain of the Anglo-Saxon government seems to 
have become aristocratical, there were still considerable remnants of the 
ancient  democracy, which were not indeed sufficient to protect the lowest 
of the  people, without the patronage of some great lord, but might give 
security and even some degree of dignity, to the gentry or inferior nobility. 
The administration of justice, in particular, by the courts of the Decennary, 
the Hundred and the County, was well calculated to defend general liberty, 
and to restrain the power of the nobles. 
 




Nevertheless, despite all this legislative activity, England was still 
governed rather by custom than by universal legal principles … [t]he 
principal reason for the absence of common law at this stage was the 
absence of any judicial machinery to require or produce it. 
 
Thus, due to the polyglot of competing forces between remnants of Roman law, 
Anglo Saxon Law, Danish Law and Mosaic law and just prior to the Norman 
invasion of 1066, in all probability, Britain was somewhat vulnerable to yet another 
occupation by foreigners. 
 
In all this First Millennium legal development the concept of justice was referred to 
in many of the codes, but its meaning, though unclear and unevenly developed, was 
being incrementally constructed, brick by brick. Remnants of the early pre-Judaic and 
Christian ideas of justice kept re-surfacing despite positive laws expressed in, for 
example, the Mosaic Ten Commandments or the Twelve Tables or the Anglo Saxon 
Codes post Roman exit from Britain. The real transformation came from Justinian's 
Corpus Juris Civilis when, in 500 CE, it became clear that a new era in the 
                                                          
313
  Hume, above n 300, at ch 2, 789.  
314
  JH Baker An Introduction to English Legal History (2nd ed, Butterworths, London, 1979) at 3–4. 
77 
 
philosophy behind, and method of delivering, law to the people was dawning.
315
 The 
conversion of Emperor Constantine in 312 CE seems to have been a turning point, 
though he used Christianity more as an ideological tool to hold together the 
crumbling Roman empire. The Germanic kings who took over the western Roman 
Empire by 508 CE had also made Christianity their own religion and used the bishops 
as a conduit between the king and people, thus making them very powerful as well as 
highly political. By the time Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Franks by 
Pope Leo III in CE 800 Christianity was being spread through military conquests and 




In terms of the connection between the new religion Christianity and ideas of justice, 
Jan Dengerink says that for Christians justice is expressed from within the concept of 
a divine or created order.
317
 But the State is far from being external to this idea; it is 
considered as part of the created order despite its possible manifestation, at times, as 
tyrannical or oppressive. Dengerink says that Augustine saw:
 318
   
 
Natural justice … as a copy of the eternal idea of justice in the human soul, 
as ―a disposition of the soul, respecting the general welfare, to render to 
each his due according to his station.‖  
 




… the all-embracing term to designate the totality of virtues or moral 
perfection. Whoever gives to each his due (to God what is due him; to 
one's neighbour what is due him) fulfills the sum of moral obligations. In a 
narrower sense, justice is a particular duty besides those of wisdom, 
moderation, and courage. Justice is then the virtue that renders to each his 
due in a strict sense, i.e., what is rightly his. Taken in this sense, justice 
never refers to the act itself, but to others. 
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The ―basic ethical principle‖ of justice is ―[d]o good and avoid evil‖.
320
 He adds that 
in this development positive law is derived from natural law: ―That is, every actual 




In his ―The Influence of Christianity upon the Development of Law‖ Harold J 
Berman says: ―The moral law is … a preparation for Christianity‖.
322
 On the question 
of whether one should obey an immoral law, Berman says there is a duty not to do so 
due to Christianity's own origins as a religion that expressed itself against previous 
law:
 
―Christian worship was itself illegal under Roman law in the first centuries. The 









The Christian emperors of Byzantium considered it their Christian 
responsibility to reform the laws, as they put it, "in the direction of 
humanity"—to eliminate iniquity, to protect the poor and oppressed, to 
infuse justice with mercy. 
 
However this was a Byzantine perspective. In contrast, says Berman, jurists western 
Rome in the same era just wrote down tribal laws and customary laws; their legal 
reforms were merely in family and slave laws and the rights of the clergy.  
 
Berman says the influence of natural law from the ideas of Aristotle, Justinian, 





We cannot reject, however, the contribution which natural-law theory 
made to Christian life at a critical stage in its development. We are heirs to 
that theory; without it we might still be living under barbarian law. 
 
As Christianity, with its own ideas of justice, was developing in the early centuries of 
the First Millennium, there arose in the Middle East, another monotheistic religion, 
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namely Islam, which produced its own concept of justice and law. The links between 
the two religions were obvious but for most of their co-existence they have been at 
war with each other. 
 
4 The concept of justice in Islam 
 
Later known as the Prophet Muhammad, the Arabian tribal leader Muhammad first 
received his politico/religious revelations in 610 CE. In 622 Muhammad was 
requested by warring Jewish and polytheistic communities in Medina, Arabia, to 
arbitrate and settle their differences. He drafted the Constitution of Medina which 
established an alliance or confederation among the eight Medinan tribes and Muslim 
emigrants from Mecca who had followed him.
326
 The Constitution of Medina 
contains 63 articles and should be read in concert with Muhammad's farewell sermon 
before he died in 632. The Constitution was written mainly as a contract or treaty 
which set out principles of governance for the warring tribes and his Muslim 
followers. The first articles are therefore specific to the problem at hand, expressed in 





Equal right of life and protection shall be granted to everyone who has 
been given constitutional shelter 
A person given constitutional shelter shall be granted an equal right of life 
protection as long as he commits no harm and does not act treacherously. 
 
In his Final Sermon, Muhammad asks his followers to ―regard the life and property of 




All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-
Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no 
superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by 
piety and good action. 
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The Quran itself did not set out any legal codes and thus Sharia Law developed in 
response to this vacuum. It was drafted only after Muhammad's death by the caliphs 
who ruled Arabia in light of his teachings. The first caliphs began to conquer lands 
outside Arabia, for example present day Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Persia and Egypt. The 
Ummayad Dynasty caliphs took control in 661 CE and expanded Islam into India, 
Northwest Africa and Spain. Sharia Law was developed more comprehensively from 
750 ACE when the Abbasid Dynasty began.
329
 This dynasty favoured more 
authoritarian rule and perhaps this development can be seen to parallel the 
development of Christianity in its own militaristic phrase at the time. The absolutist 
tendency in Islam took hold over the next 500 years.  
 
In The Concept of Justice in Islam, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan says that Islam 
makes no distinction between a secular and religious state.
330
 The administration of 
justice is at the core of the legal mechanisms: ―The dignity of the judicial office has 
always been fully safeguarded in Islam. Complete independence of the judiciary was 




Thus, unlike Christian law developing contemporaneously in Europe at the time, 
Islamic law introduced two new elements into the legal system- the concept of an 
independent judiciary and the right to equivalence, if not direct or exact equality. The 
idea of justice was framed in terms of these two concepts. 
 
Islam would not have been an important subject for a discussion of justice in this  
thesis had it not been for the clash between two main ideologies for territory that the 
Crusades represented. The Crusades coincided with the most important legal change 
in Britain since the Roman invasion- the Norman Conquest. David Hume describes 
the conquest in graphic terms as England's inability to resist the Duke of Normandy's 
invasion mainly because of its vulnerability due to the invasions of the past and the 
relentless onslaught by the Danes. He said that the English soon succumbed to 
William and offered him the throne.  
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5 The Normans, and justice in English law and society 
 
William's rule facilitated a major transformation of both the political and legal system 
in England. First of all he took advantage of the ancient system of taxation, the 
danegeld, based on the value of landholdings, and which could be collected at any 





He introduced into England that strict execution of justice, for which his 
administration had been much celebrated in Normandy … He confirmed 
the liberties and immunities of London and the other cities of England … 
 





… the king took care to place all real power in the hands of his Normans, 
and still to keep possession of the sword, to which, he was sensible, he had 
owed his advancement to sovereign authority. He disarmed the city of 
London and other places, which appeared most warlike and populous; and 
building citadels in that capital, as well as in Winchester, Hereford and the 
cities best situated for commanding the kingdom, he quartered Norman 
soldiers in all of them, and left no where any power able to resist or oppose 
him. 
 
Hume also describes the adoption, through legal means, of feudal laws and,
334
 it can 
be said, that a feudal mode of production, which was already in existence in a nascent 
form previously began to emerge strongly in Britain.
335
 William introduced feudal 
laws, divided all the lands into baronies which, in turn, shared them out to knights or 
vassals, thus creating a new pyramid-type social structure with layers of duties and 
obligations. Most, if not all, of the baronies were Norman.  
 
William also minted coins as a royal prerogative and adopted the English kings' 
practice of issuing writs to their officials. He authorised the Domesday Survey, 
mainly for taxation, to identify landholdings of the previous owners as well as the 
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new tenants-in-chief. Large areas of land for royal hunting were also set aside. Land 
was now held and re-distributed according to a new system. Within this system 
taxation did not just represent revenue for the crown's usual expenditure, it was also 
the source of funding for the Crusades to which the Normans were utterly devoted as 
a rite of passage for young men in the cause of Christianity against the new 
imperialist religion, Islam.  
 
In this situation justice was converted into law yet again. Attempts were made to pay 
heed to some of the laws of the Anglo Saxons kings represented by the Chronicles. 
Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland in The History of English Law before the 
time of Edward I said the law of Normandy was uncertain before the invasion, unlike 
those of England.
336




In good times, however, the duke's justice was powerful throughout his 
duchy. It is as supreme judge hearing and deciding the causes of all his 
subjects, the guardian of the weak against the mighty, the stern punisher of 
all violence, that his courtly chroniclers love to paint him, and we may 
doubt whether in his own country the Conqueror had ever admitted that 
feudal arrangements made by his men could set limits to his jurisdiction. 
 
But there was no record of any kind of Norman jurisprudence, say Pollock and 
Maitland: ―The Normans then had no written law to bring with them to England, and 




There was one Lanfranc, a lawyer, who had opened a school in Normandy and was 





The Norman Conquest takes place just at a moment when in the general 
history of law in Europe new forces are coming into play. Roman law is 
being studied, for men are mastering the Institutes at Pavia and will soon 
be expounding the Digest at Bologna; Canon law is being evolved, and 
both claim a cosmopolitan dominion. 
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The language of the law remained English for some time after the conquest but in the 
midst of the struggle between English and French in the form of the law, came Latin. 
Latin was common ground for both the English and French literati. Yet King William 




… the two languages which William used for his laws, his charters and his 
writs were Latin and English. Again, there were good reasons why the 
technical terms of the old English law should be preserved if the king could 
preserve them. 
 
It was not until 1731 that English fully replaced Latin as the language of law. But 





During the whole Norman period there was little legislation. We have 
spoken of the Conqueror's laws. It seems probable that Rufus set the 
example of granting charters of liberties to the people at large. 
 
Pollock and Maitland show that the jurisprudence that developed after conquest was 




The jurisprudence of his court, if we may use so grand a phrase, was of 
necessity a flexible, occasional jurisprudence, dealing with an 
unprecedented state of affairs, meeting new facts by new expedients, 
wavering as wavered the balance of power between him and his barons, 
capable of receiving impressions from without, influenced by the growth of 
canon law, influenced perhaps by Lombard learning, modern in the midst 
of antique surroundings. 
 
Much of the slow development of new law or one that defined justice as anything 
other than law during this period was possibly due to the constant absence of the 
kings, from William to those who succeeded him. The Crusades loomed large as in 
1095, just 29 years after the conquest, the Byzantine Emperor Alexius Comnenus 
asked Pope Urban II for help in reconquering territories in Asia Minor that he had 
lost to the Turks. The Pope sent out a call to Christians all over Europe to help restore 
the holy sites in and near Jerusalem, phrasing it as 'the infidels' attack on the holy 
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Roman Empire'. Between 60-100,000 people responded to the call, surprising even 
the Pope himself.
343
 Between 1098 and 1320 a number of wars between the 
Christians and Muslims took place under the name 'crusades' and during this period, 
when kings and nobles of England were usually gone for years at a time, no 
jurisprudence seems to have developed in England to make a distinction between law 
and justice. In the war economy which prevailed at the time, law, particularly black 
letter law or command type laws, rather than justice, would make more practical 
sense to governance.  
 
Despite the lack of any significant new law being developed clearly old English law 
still held fascination for the Normans. In 1118 the Leges Henrici Primi, written by an 
unknown author at court, was published. However it did not contain any new 
definition of justice but merely set out, in a disorganised form, the laws that appeared 
to the author to have existed in England before the conquest. More significant is the 
work of Sir Ranulf de Glanvill titled The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the 
Kingdom of England which was written to help Henry II (1154-1189 CE) resolve his 
legal dilemmas.
344
 The Treatise was based on Justinian's Institutes with 
modifications. The Preface attempts to set forth a principle of royal governance, not 




The Regal Power should not merely be decorated with Arms to restrain 
Rebels and Nations making head against it and its realm, but ought 
likewise to be adorned with Laws for the peaceful governing of its Subjects 
and its People. With such felicity may our Most Illustrious King conduct 
himself, in periods both of Peace and of War, by the force of his right hand, 
crushing the insolence of the violent and intractable and, with the sceptre 
of Equity, moderating his Justice towards the humble and obedient, that as 
he may be always victorious in subduing his Enemies, so may he on all 
occasions show himself impartially just in the government of his Subjects. 
 
CP Sherman says that Glanvill's Treatise defined the previous customs of England, 
and identified the law as being derived ultimately from the king's authority.
346
 It was 
by this method that common law and its institutions emerged in 12th century 
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 Under Henry II a central royal court called 'The Bench' began to sit 
regularly at Westminster.
348
 Other judges went on circuit but they had the same status 
as those at Westminster. In these developments dispensing law meant dispensing 
justice.  
 
Feudalism involved a new type of class relations and its effect on the law and vice 
versa cannot be disputed. Its most obvious impact was on the type of relationship 
demanded by people, initially only the Norman barons, from the king. This was, at 
first, strongly expressed in the rebellion leading up to the drafting of the Magna 
Carta. The Carta was the most significant politico/legal agreement in the history of 
the English legal system in the Second Millennium and formed the basis of rights 
claims much later in the 1628 Petition of Right and the 1689 Bill of Rights. It also 
formed the foundation of the American Revolution and the Constitution in 1791. Its 
impact is felt to this day. 
 
The Magna Carta of 1215 was a grant which represented an undertaking by King 
John of England to his barons. It signified the resolution of a two century struggle 




Hardly have Normans and Englishmen been brought into contact, before 
Norman barons rebel against their Norman lord, and the divergence 
between the interests of the king and the interests of the nobles becomes as 
potent a cause of legal phenomena as any old English or old Frankish 
traditions can be. 
 
The Carta's genesis lay in an earlier document called the Charter of Liberties which 
was a proclamation by Henry 1 in 1100 and was a pacifying instrument for the barons 
on the part of Henry to ameliorate the abuses of his late brother William II and to 
garner support for his claim to the throne against his older brother Robert.
350
 The 
Charter of Liberties was itself based on an earlier charter issued by William II in 
1093, in the same century after the Norman invasion, indicating that the relationship 
between the former dukes of Normandy, now kings of England, was fraught with 
difficulty from the beginning. But Henry's Charter was important as it represented for 
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the first time a monarch's willingness to be bound to the laws. One of the interesting 
aspects of the Henry Charter was its reference to and approval of the law of King 
Edward, the last Anglo Saxon king. The Charter of Liberties was the first document 
to set out three new principles: (i) an agreement between the monarch and barons 
who ruled the ordinary people thus locking them into the relationship; (ii) 'justice' 
expressed as elimination of "bad customs by which the kingdom of England was 
unjustly oppressed";
351
 and (iii) restoration of some Anglo Saxon political institutions 




The Charter of Liberties did not last long as Henry I ignored it. Since it did not 
contain any enforcement provisions it had very little effect and he extended his 
powers well beyond those he had promised. After Stephen of Blois seized the throne 
in 1135 he issued his own Charter in 1136 based on the one Henry had signed in 
1100. One of the clauses stated that ―I promise that I shall keep the peace and do 
justice in all things, and maintain them as far as I am able.‖
353
 In this sense, justice 
was emphasised as an element of the law.  
 
However the Magna Carta was much more vigorously fought over by the barons. By 
this time John had inherited the throne and, like some of his predecessors, was not 
popular with the barons for implementing taxation and other forms of raising cash for 
himself.
354
 From about 1209 until 1215 King John was pursued relentlessly by the 
barons. He attempted to maintain his power by making an agreement with the church 
to surrender sovereignty and then receiving it back in a kind of vassal relationship for 




Subsequently, the barons renounced their feudal ties to him and appointed an 'army of 
God' against him in an attempted coup. It was inevitable that John would try to make 
peace just to keep his own position as monarch secure. At Runnymede near Windsor 
Castle King John began to negotiate peace with Archbishop Langton as mediator. 
Clause 40 of the Carta states: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or 
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delay, right or justice."
356
 The Charter ensured the freedom of the church (clause 1), 
and that "men in our kingdom shall have and keep all these previously determined 
liberties, rights and concessions, well and in peace, freely and quietly, in their fullness 
and  integrity" (clause 63).
357




An oath has been sworn, on the one hand by us and on the other by the 
barons, that all the aforesaid provisions shall be observed in good faith and 
without evil intent. 
 
The language of the Carta reveals the movement away from the command structure of 
governance to that of mutual obligation. It shows the beginnings of 'rights talk' 
without taking away from it the agreement foundation of the document. However, 
even this Carta was on shaky ground, leading to the First Barons War which was 
eventually won by John. Over the next few years until the end of that century there 
were four or five more charters issued; all amendments of the 1215 Magna Carta. 
These amendments reflected not only the never-ending struggles between the 
monarch and the aristocrats but also the need for the Carta to reflect a rapidly 
changing society marked by mercantilism, the influence of the church, entrenchment 
of feudalism, the slow but steady progress in technology and diminishing populations 
due to the black death.  
 
As time went on the Normans, now firmly entrenched as the new English, moved 
towards consolidating their constitutional position. For example, in 1258 the 
Provisions of Oxford, which many regard as the first English Constitution 
notwithstanding the Magna Carta, were forced upon the King by his barons and, a 
year later, the Provisions of Westminster were designed to consolidate Oxford.
359
 The 
significance of the Provisions was that they formed the first parameters of a 
parliament. While King Edward later annulled the clauses in the Provisions that 
limited his own powers, they were later confirmed in the Statute of Marlborough in 
1267 and were still in existence until recently.  
 
The first parliament of Edward I met in 1275. Its purpose was to raise taxes to help 
pay for Edward's Crusade from 1268-74 but also to issue the discriminatory Statute of 
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the Jewry which allowed Edward to extort money from Jewish people. Thus the first 
English parliament had an unjust purpose if modern standards of injustice are to be 
applied. From this point on the King issued the writs for summoning parliament as a 
prerogative of the Crown. Associated with the new parliament were institutions such 
as the curia regis (similar to the Anglo Saxon witenamagot) which was composed of 
tenants-in-chief of the king, the senior officers of the court, as well as the bishops 
whose areas included the king's lands. It exercised all functions-legislative, judicial 
and diplomatic. Also what became the future Privy Council was the Concilium 





By 1275 the Statute of Westminster had been passed codifying all laws, many from 
the Magna Carta. The struggle between the king and the aristocrats was expressed in 
emergence of institutions such as parliament which provided space for what might be 
called 'agreed mutual obligations'. Command had given way to 'consent'. Justice 
became a rallying cry for the transformation of one to the other. The peasant revolt of 
1381 marked the violent end of serfdom when even the Archbishop of Canterbury 
was not spared in the assault against the legal system as every lawyer in London came 
under attack. In particular, the legislators who had enacted the Statute of the 
Labourers were singled-out since this was considered an unjust law.  
 
There is no doubt that the Magna Carta initially represented a kingly grant of 
privileges. However, over the following four centuries, the word 'rights' as an element 
of justice was fashioned out of the foundations of the Carta. The Petition of Right in 
1628 and the Bill of Rights of 1689 represented this shift. Significantly, the advent of 
a new mode of production, emerging from the remnants of the old feudal mode, 
cannot be under-emphasised in the transformation of 'privileges' to 'rights'. Capitalism 
was the new mode, initially triggered by mercantile and banking activity during the 
Crusades, fortified by the technological revolutions in agriculture, for example, the 
plough and the mill, the movement of people from country to towns in search of 
waged work, the scientific advancements represented by steam power, and by the 
voyages to the far corners of the earth which instigated international trade and 
accumulated riches for Europe plundered from Asia, South America and Africa. It 
was inevitable that the ferociousness with which the new mode took hold would have 
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the effect of sweeping aside all vestiges of the previous feudal mode except where 
this could serve the advancement of capitalism, for example slavery.  
 
6 Capitalism, enlightenment and justice: the social contract 
 
The advent of capitalism undoubtedly had its effects on law and the conceptualisation 
of justice. This initially had its impetus in the move to the idea of contract as a new 
social relationship not present in the relationship of status indicated in feudalism.
361
 
While contracts had existed in human society since ancient times (in the form of early 
handshakes, promises and undertakings for as diverse social relations as marriage, 
trade and exchange, international treaties and pacts), as a legal term it had never been 
unified as a single concept as it always took the form of the mode of production in 
which it functioned.  
 
Roman contract was called nexum which indicated a 'bond' or 'chain'. Nexum later 
became associated with 'obligation' so a contract was a pact plus an obligation. 
Obligation signified rights as well as duties- for example the right to have a debt paid 
and the duty of paying it. The first contracts did not have the element of 
consideration.
362
 During feudal times contracts became somewhat more sophisticated 
due to merchant activity. An example of this was Lex Mercatoria, a law of merchants 
that both reflected the onset of early mercantilism as well as influenced it. Other 
feudal contracts were for labour services among peasants and serfs and, as 
landholdings took on a more capitalist form from around the 12th century, the idea of 
contract moved from protecting and facilitating feudal relations towards agreements 
based on explicit and free consent.  
 





… even a villein received his yard-land or ox-gang from the steward of a 
lord after swearing an oath of fealty and in the form of an "admittance" by 
the staff, of which a record was kept in the rolls of a manorial court: hence 
the copyhold tenure of English law. … This view was readily extended 
from the notion of a breach of agreement between the lord and his tenants 
to a conception of infringement of laws in general. In this way the feudal 
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view could be made a starting-point for the development of a constitutional 
doctrine. We may notice this in the case of Bracton. 
 
By the 15th century, the notion of 'freedom to contract' or 'freedom to enter into legal 
relations' was replacing 'obligations' exemplified in feudalism. The choice and free 
will aspect of the capitalist contract was absent in the feudal contract. Nevertheless 
feudal aspects of legal relations of the previous millennia were not totally abandoned 
in this transformation. The concept of 'justice' as an obligation of the monarch 
towards his or her subjects became 'justice' as part of the negotiated and agreed social 
relationship, identified as a 'social contract' between the two. It introduced the 
concept of 'equality' not present in the previous modes. 
 
Also in the new legal arrangements were the concepts of 'liberty' of the subject which 
had been a feature of the Magna Carta, founded on the Charter of Liberties. The 
transformation in social relations in the 13th century inevitably made an impact on 
the absolutist tendencies of the monarchy in England. Justice may have been defined 
narrowly as 'law' but what the people were seeking was justice in the delivery of law. 
No longer were they satisfied with a king or his judges dispensing law and pretending 
that it was also justice. There was a discernible shift in the people's minds and claims 
from law to justice differently defined. The traditional calls for justice, though loosely 
defined in various protests and peasant revolts, were nevertheless articulated as the 
obverse of law.  
 
The combination of active mercantilism, opening up of the new worlds, the onset of 
African slavery, transformation of technology, amendments to the Magna Carta, the 
emergence of parliament alongside the authority of the monarch, the remnants of the 
crusades in religion and the rapid wealth accumulation by the churches, as well as the 
changing social structures, eventually resulted in what is termed 'the Enlightenment'.  
 
The Enlightenment was in reality about the emergence of Europe from the Dark Ages 
into the light with scientific innovations being at the forefront, but the philosophical 
activity accompanying it radicalised the people not only on the European continent 
but also in the new British colony of America. Freedom to contract in economic 
relations was extended to governance and the political sphere through invention of 
the term the 'social contract'.  
 
It is at this point in the history of humanity that 'natural law', invented as an idea in 
pre-Christian Greek times, came back to life in completely different circumstances to 
stand in contrast with another perspective based in the scientific methodology of 
91 
 
positivism. What seemed to be analysed together as both justice and law at the time 
of Aristotle now diverged into two different ways of seeing the social world. The two 
were worlds apart in perspective until now and, yet, it was in the subject of 
developing law and the legal system that attempts were first made to find ways to 
allow communication between the two while keeping them separate. The 'autopoietic' 
nature of the relationship is first revealed at this time. 
 
The autopoietic connection between justice and law comes to light in thoughts of the 
philosophers, theologians and jurists of the 13th-17th centuries. The writings of 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), for example, became available to jurists of the 13th 
century, in particular his treatise on four kinds of law: eternal, natural, human and 
divine'. 'Natural law' was human participation in the eternal law to be discovered by 




… this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and 
evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based on this 
… 
 
The concept of 'reason' was being developed incrementally at this time but it was not 
until the work of renaissance Spanish philosopher and jurist Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483-1546) that the relationship between reason and law was made. This emerged in 
connection with advice sought by Charles V the Holy Roman Emperor and King of 
Spain on whether the native people found by Spanish conquistadors in the new world 
possessed 'reason'. Vitoria advised that they did because their customs appeared to be 
complex and sophisticated irrespective of their religion.
365
 A century later, Grotius 
(1583-1645), influenced by Vitoria, said people were sui juris (under their own 
jurisdiction or sovereign in their own right) and had rights as human beings and any 




By the 18th century a link was being made between 'reason' and 'happiness', as well 
as a 'social contract' which took the discussion towards a decidedly legal/contractual 
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direction. Emerich de Vattel (1714-67), for example, strongly influenced by Vitoria, 
Grotius and Gootfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1715), defined 'mutual law' as 'a social 
contract' for respect for the betterment of mankind. In his Law of Nations; or, 





Since the object of the natural society established between all mankind is 
— that they should lend each other mutual assistance, in order to attain 
perfection themselves, and to render their condition as perfect as possible, 
— and since nations, considered as so many free persons living together in 
a state of nature, are bound to cultivate human society with each other, — 
the object of the great society established by nature between all nations is 
also the interchange of mutual assistance for their own improvement, and 
that of their condition. 
 
It will be noted for later reference that Vattel's work found its way into the legal 
development of pre-colonial Fiji through the writings of a Frenchman, Charles St 
Julian, who was Fiji's first Chief Justice in the pre-Cession King Cakobau's 
government.  
 
What these philosophers of the 13th–17th centuries were doing was setting the scene 
for the Enlightenment when ideas about obligations and duties (and 'justice') as an 
agreement were beginning to be considered as an element of governance in terms of 
'humanity' rather than any specific nation state. Vattel, for example, referred to justice 




All nations are therefore under a strict obligation to cultivate justice 
towards each other, to observe it scrupulously, and carefully to abstain 
from everything that may violate it. Each ought to render to the others what 
belongs to them, to respect their rights, and to leave them in the peaceable 
enjoyment of them. 
 
The key factor was use of 'reason' to deduce binding rules of law and morality. This 
perspective took the ideas back full circle to the Stoics of classical Greece. Similar to 
classical Greece, 17th century English law used the term 'law of nature' 
synonymously with the notion of 'reason'. The more well-known of the 
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Enlightenment thinkers, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
developed their ideas from these foundations. Two connected ideas, both grounded in 
classical Greek thought, were being promoted in a novel way at the time of the 
renaissance: the first was that 'happiness is the natural condition of mankind' and the 
second was that everyone should act 'mutually' to further or maximise each other's 
happiness. For Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau the idea of 'mutual' relations in society 
pre-determined the concept of the social contract in constitutional matters.  
 
The kernel of the notion of justice, by this time, was being extracted from the idea of 
'reason' in the sphere of law. Herein lay the connection between natural law and 
justice. What added to the mix and made it more philosophically interesting was the 
type of legal contract developing within capitalism as the new mode of production. 
Joseph H. Kary says the from the middle of the 14th century to the end of the 16th 
century the tort of assumpsit became significant to the operation of contracts as one 
could sue for the enforcement of a promise which gradually transformed into a 
general remedy for breach of contractual performance, leading to a specialised claim 
for the recovery of money owing under a contract.
369
 In Slade's Case, the turning 
point, assumpsit moved from being a residual category, applying only to agreements 
which did not fit the standard categories of common law, to becoming a general 
remedy for breach of agreements.
370
 This shift meant that a 'promise' became central 
to the making of a contract. Kary further says that when Hobbes' Leviathan was first 
published, the application of the new contract law principles to constitutional law was 
a current debate. According to Kary, Hobbes combined contract as a 'mutual 
agreement' and 'voluntary act of will' with the additional element of the 'choice to be 
bound'. Hobbes also linked his idea of contract, firstly, with the 'state of nature'; he 
said the law of nature was self-interest, that everyone was at war with each other. 
Secondly, Hobbes said everyone should enter into a 'social contract'. The social 
contract was an agreement to create a sovereign.
371
 Sir Ernest Barker says in his 
Introduction to Social Contract-Locke-Hume-Rousseau that the idea of the social 
contract encompassed two ideas- both connected and distinguished- the contract of 
government (pacte de gouvernement, the Herrschaftsvertrag) and the contract of 
society (pacte d'association, the Gesellschftsvertrag).
372
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Locke, instead, developed the idea of a social contract a little further and from a 
different perspective. Hobbes had written Leviathan practically in exile, at the time of 
the English Civil War; Locke on the other hand was influenced first-hand by 
revolutions in England at the time, bringing the notion of the social contract closer to 
his idea of justice. His Two Treatises of Government was published 40 years after 
Leviathan and in it he said that men had a responsibility to keep their promises: ―the 
beginning of Politick Society depends on the consent of individuals‖.
373
 He said the 
social contract had some essential elements: (i) established laws made known to the 
people; (ii) impartial judges to apply the laws, and (iii) the government to employ 
force only according to the laws.
374
 What is made clear in Locke is that the 
relationship between the government and the people is not a straight out contractual 
one; it also has an element of trust. Sir Ernest Barker says Locke's social contract 
created a trustee (government) by the people (trustor). The trustor/trustee relationship 
is a contractual one that creates rights in the beneficiary as against obligations in the 




In this arena of thought, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1721-1778) introduced the idea of 
'general will'. His Du Contrat Social ou Principles du Droit Politique, published in 
1762, had 'natural law' foundations, just like Locke, but was more closely attuned to 
Plato's Republic: the state being "a progressive force which lifts man gradually 






The need for self-preservation dictated a contract, formed by the free will 
of all; and the society so created resulted in the establishment of justice and 
the attainment of a higher … morality.  
 





The philosophers noted above were not writing or expressing innovative ideas in a 
vacuum. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were conceptualising the different causes and 
justifications of revolutions in Europe and the United States. In his ―The Nature of 
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Rights in American Politics: A Comparison of Three Revolutions‖ Charles R. Kesler 
says the three respective revolutions of England, France and America differed in their 
'very characters'. In England, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was disguised as a 
'succession crisis' and the 1688 English Bill of Rights spoke, not of the natural rights 
of man, but of the 'ancient rights and liberties' of the lords Spiritual and Temporal and 
Commons'. The American and French Revolutions, on the other hand, were creedal in 




… rhetorical shots meant to be heard around the world … the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man was meant to announce and solemnize 
the rights of man, not to announce the independence of one people from 
another as the American Declaration of Independence was intended to do. 
 
The question is why these revolutions took place at all. They were violent and 
decisive but, for the people involved in them, inevitable. England, America and 
France obviously were at the stage of political, legal and social development which 
deemed these revolutions necessary. In England King Charles I was executed and his 
son Charles II spent most of his youth in exile. James II was deposed in 1688. At the 
time of William and Mary the Bill of Rights became non-negotiable and established 
parliament as the supreme authority of England; the main clauses were based on the 
1628 Petition of Right. The Magna Carta, the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights 
in combination currently remain as the constitutional law of Britain. Injustice was 
defined as non-representation of the people (parliament) and breach of the social 
contract as a trust between the monarch, the aristocracy and the 'commons'.  
 
The American Revolution demanded the right of American settlers to equality with 
their British counterparts in political representation in the face of high taxation and 
having to provide goods for the British market. It was expected that since the 
American colony had been initiated as a royal charter it would supply goods and 
services to Britain as a 'privilege' as established by Norman monarchs for English 
merchants to settle outside England and facilitate international trade. From 1619 
when the first representative assembly in America was convened in Jamestown, 
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Virginia, to "'establish one equal and uniform government over all Virginia'"
380
 until 




We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. –That to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed,–That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government … 
 
the Magna Carta was seen by the various assemblies formed during this time as the 
standard against executive arbitrariness in the new world colony.  
 
This sense of outrage at British arbitrariness did not extend to the Americans 
considering African slavery in the same light. Justice in the American context was 
only demanded against arbitrary government and inequality between the British and 
the Americans. This demand, not satisfied through negotiations or appeals for 





But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the 
same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it 
is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government … . The history 
of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute 
Tyranny over these States.  
 
Again, in the American sense, tyranny was injustice. Representation, equality (of 
whites with whites) and lack of arbitrariness in government was 'justice'. Thomas 
Jefferson, as one of the architects of the Declaration, thought that John Locke was 
"one of the three greatest men that have ever lived"
383
 and, as Carl L. Becker said, 
"most Americans absorbed Locke's work as a kind of political gospel and the 
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Declaration was similar to the phraseology of the Second Treatise on 
Government".
384
 The Bill of Rights established freedoms and rights as a separate 
entity from the new American Constitution. 
 
The American Revolution influenced the revolution of France against the 
monarchy.
385
 The French Revolution was also instigated by what the people 
perceived as unfair taxation, arbitrary government as well as uneven wealth 
distribution.
386
 Added to this was the lack of freedom of speech promoted by the 
Roman Catholic Church as well as demand for land reform. The King of France 
attempted to negotiate his way out of the demands, even by agreeing to grant a 
constitution as a royal favour, culminating in the 1789 publication of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen; however, eventually, he was imprisoned and 
executed. In 1793 the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was 
enacted by popular referendum with additional clauses in it such as the right of 
rebellion as a "sacred" right and most "indispensable of duties"
387
 alongside 
acknowledgment of popular sovereignty over national sovereignty, social and 
economic equality, and the abolishment of slavery.  
 
Kesler says that French accommodation of the social contract in France accords to 
some extent with the Rousseauian perspective, and can be distinguished from the 
American model. In the French model the reference to 'general will' signalled the 
collective nature of the principles whereas in the American model the government 




In all three revolutions noted above, the call for 'justice' was a cry for meaningful 
representation in government (government by consent), equality, freedoms and rights. 
The absence of these was considered to be injustice instigating the right or duty to 
rebel. By the 20th century these rights and freedoms, stemming from their natural law 
origins, became encapsulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)
389
 which was established as the world standard in response to the injustice 
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faced by victims of Nazi Germany. Each nation state was obliged to affirm the 
contents of the UDHR if it wished to belong to the family of independent nations at 
all. However there was no 'right to rebel' in the UDHR; it was assumed that states 
who affirmed the provisions would then actively respect them. That idea proved not 
to be true as events post-UDHR affirmation showed, for example Bosnia and Rwanda 
as just two examples where genocide occurred in the same century.  
 
The survey in this chapter of the developing and contingent notion of justice from 
time immemorial shows a very important extension of Teubner's point, and that is 
that 'justice' keeps law philosophically 'clean'. At the same time justice's vague nature 
allows it to be fashioned into a vehicle for transformation of the law if required. 
While not possessing a single definition, justice nevertheless shows an identifying 
core of behaviour and perspective- following it will literally lead to the greatest good 
for the greatest number in human society.  
 
The definitions of justice that seem variously common to all societies and cultures 
over time and un-contradicted by any appear to be the following: right to be heard, 
equality, collective responsibility, agreement and consent, fair and independent 
delivery of law, rights, moral goodness, integrity of the social order, welfare of the 
whole society or common good, complete goodness, liberty and freedoms, social 
entitlement, divine order, wisdom, virtue, mercy, peaceful governance, mutual 
obligations and social contract, happiness, general good and representation of people 
in governance.  
 
A social order, in light of these definitions of justice, would be legitimate.  
 
The next chapter takes these definitions into the Fijian context. Fiji was colonised by 
Great Britain in 1874, though the influence of Enlightenment philosophies were 
present in Fiji sometime before then. The constitutions that were written in Fiji from 




IV Chapter 3 
Legitimacy of the Fijian Constitutional Framework 
 
The two questions posed in the introduction of the thesis were (i) What makes 
constitutions legitimate and (ii) is the 2013 Constitution of Fiji legitimate? 
 
The first question was answered in the previous chapter. A constitution (or 
constitutional order) is legitimate when justice is its invariant core feature, that is, 
when justice forms its very identity or the basic structure. I defined justice in all its 
manifestations in the previous chapter so that the quality and historical resonance of 
this attribute may not be in doubt.  
 
With this in mind, the next question that needs to be answered in as comprehensive a 
way as possible is in relation to a specific constitution, namely the Fijian 
Constitution. Is the Fijian 2013 Constitution of Fiji legitimate?  
 
The 2013 Constitution of Fiji was not devised in a vacuum. It came at the end of a 
series of formal written constitutions in Fiji which began in 1865. In total Fiji has 
promulgated, decreed or enacted seven (7) supreme and entrenched constitutions. 
Unlike the American constitution which used the format of amendments to keep the 
constitutional relationship between the state and the people current, Fiji tended to 
start afresh with each new document. Whether justice was the core invariant feature 
in any or all of its constitutions as the basic structure or identity, or was it merely law, 
is the subject of this chapter.  
 
A Early Fijian (Pre-Colonial) Polity 
 
Prior to European contact Fijian tribal polity was complex and, indeed, has remained 
so to the present day. Land was the basis of the social unit and was defended with 
ferocious capability. Each tribe was a 'state' in its own right and there was not yet a 
concept of Fijian 'statehood' encompassing all tribes, though allegiances through 
marriage were common.  
 
In 1858 Wesleyan missionary Thomas Williams in his book Fiji and the Fijians
390
 
established from his interviews with indigenous Fijians that the character of the rule  
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The will of the King is, in most cases, law, and hence the nature of the 
government varies according to his personal character. The people have no 
choice in the state; nevertheless utmost respect is paid to ancient divisions 
of landed property, of family rank and official rights … Men of rank and 
official importance are generally about the person of the Sovereign forming 
his council, and serving to check the exercise of his power. … The head of 
each government is the Tui or Turaga Levu, a King of absolute power, who 
is, however, not unfrequently surrounded by those who exert an actual 
influence higher than his own, and whom, consequently, he is most careful 
not to offend. The person of high rank King … is sacred. In some instances 
these Monarchs claim a divine origin, and, with a pride worthy of more 
classical examples, assert the rights of deity, and demand from their 
subjects respect for those claims. The Chiefs profess to derive their 
arbitrary power from the gods. 
 
Williams uses the term 'justice' to describe the law of the land though it is clear from 
his descriptions that he was describing criminal penalties for offences such as murder, 
petty larceny, abduction, witchcraft, infringement of a tabu (taboo) disrespect to a 
chief, incendiarism and treason. The penalties for these offences were gruesome and 
included being clubbed to death, or being deprived of one's wife or land; a person was 
often judged in his absence and executed before he was aware that sentence had been 




Williams knew that Fijian society was also changing as Fijians came in contact with 
Europeans. But he described the class structure prevailing at the time in some detail. 
He said it was strictly hierarchical with a stratified series of obligations and duties in 
a pyramid structure: Kings and Queens; Chiefs of large islands or districts; chiefs of 
towns, priests and 'mata-ni-vanuas (spokespersons and advisors of the chiefs); 
distinguished warriors of low birth and chiefs of the carpenters and turtle fishers, 
common people; and slaves. Williams described rank as being hereditary, descending 
through female (this is not invariant) with polygamy being widely practised by the 
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Williams did not have the benefit of modern archaeological methods to identify the 
origins of the indigenous Fijians or i-taukei as they are called now, but we do know 
that they first arrived in Fiji about 3500 years ago from East Asia. Prior to these 
settlers the Lapita people were already resident in Fiji but what happened to them is 
unclear as there was only pottery but no written records left behind such as in Sumer 
and Mesopotamia or Indus. We can surmise, though, that the early Fijians then, as 




In his Leadership in Fiji, RR Nayacakalou, writing about the modern indigenous 
(20th century) Fijian,
395
 says that traditional leadership remains a powerful force and 
traditional leaders wield great influence and power.
396
 The indigenous social 
structure, which is of longstanding origins, emanates from the village mainly of 
between 150–300 people as the primary unit of organisation, with a unitary authority 
structure at the top of which is the senior chief of the dominant lineage. The village 
has primary divisions (mataqali) and further sub-divisions called tokatoka. No village 
grouping could grow so large as to question the authority of the chief and create an 
imbalance; when that happened a new village would be formed.
397
 This explains the 
constant warfare that riddled Fiji prior to European arrival as the population expanded 
and new land for settlement became more scarce. Cannibalism was an important part 
of the rituals of both war and peace in traditional indigenous society.  
 
The chiefly office conferred upon the chief a definite right, subject to some 
conditions, to make decisions on all matters affecting the group as a group. A chiefly 
title was normally inherited but there were circumstances when a warrior chief, 
though not a senior chief, could make a grab for it. One such chief was Cakobau who 
later became King of Fiji and was instrumental in negotiating a deed of cession with 
the British.  
 
In the traditional Fijian system the practice of justice was through law. What was law 
was also just, that is, there was no separation. The social structure with its strict 
hierarchy determined the delivery of command type laws, quite often exercised 
arbitrarily, as Williams' account shows, and can be considered in light of Maine's 
observations that status was the foundation on which the law was based.  
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Traditional Fijian society was never static. Transformations in the social schema were 
taking place all the time due to Fiji's proximity with other islands such as Tonga and  
Samoa as apparently a lucrative trade was conducted by these peoples with one 
another prior to European arrival. Furthermore, Christianity, through Tonga, had also 
reached Fiji in the mid 1800s, though the clash that this contact involved was 
inclusive of both social and religious differences in world view. The missionaries 





By 1847 Fiji exhibited a conglomeration of old indigenous values and laws, nascent 
Christian sentiments, and civil regulations for minimal law and order to satisfy the 
activities of the whalers, sailors, adventurers and others who had washed up on Fiji's 
shores one way or another. In this mix was a powerful Tongan chief, Enele Ma'afu 
who claimed sovereignty over the southern parts of the Fiji group on behalf of close 
neighbour Tonga. Ma'afu formed his own Constitution of the Tovata Federation and 
introduced a code of laws that had been drafted in Tonga in 1857. He appointed a 
Tongan magistrate in each principle village under his control to act as judges. An 
important clause of the code was s III (I) which declared equality in status between 




In addition, the new laws made land sales more effective for Europeans who wished 
to establish plantations and purchase bech-de-mer and the highly prized sandalwood. 
The early laws, in code-like form, were more or less rules for management, to make 
life more stable and lucrative for chiefs, who stood to gain financially by the new 
arrangements with the newcomers, and for the Europeans also. It was the arrival of 
the Europeans who assisted and consolidated chiefly power that had the most impact 
on transforming the legal system in Fiji as both interests coincided for mutual benefit.  
 
B Contact with Europeans 
 
The first European to have sighted Fiji was Abel Tasman in 1647, though he could 
not make landfall due to bad weather. By 1788, when "New Holland" became a penal 
colony, regular contact between Fijians and Europeans was inevitable, though it did 
not immediately have much impact on the legal structure of Fiji. The year 1808, 
however, seems to be the decisive point for transformation when the ship Eliza 
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wrecked on one of Fiji's reefs. A survivor, Charles Savage, rescued Eliza's muskets 
and demonstrated their effectiveness in warfare to the chief Naulivou of Bau Island 
which was already a considerable powerhouse in Fijian polity.
400
 With the use of 
muskets Bau took advantage and ensured its supremacy over the rest of the Fijian 
tribes or small states as were developing at the same time.  
 
By the mid 19th century Ratu Seru Cakobau had inherited the title of King of Bau 
and later, somewhat unilaterally, declared himself the King of Fiji which was resisted 
by some tribes, for example from those that had pled allegiance to Ma'afu, but was 
generally accepted by others who paid tribute to Bau.
401
 By all accounts Ratu Seru 
Cakobau was a special character. He was full of personality and was a reputable 
warrior having won many wars over his rivals and having grabbed the chiefly title of 
Bau by sheer force rather than direct inheritance. His attitude towards the Europeans 
was also somewhat different. Their ideas were interesting to him and he converted to 
Christianity in 1854 renouncing cannibalism. Aided by the Europeans he developed 
his own legal system.  
 
By the mid 19th century a significant number of Europeans had settled in Fiji or were 
periodic residents, arriving on occasion from Australia and New Zealand, and 
sometimes further afield, putting pressure on their respective governments to protect 
their interests through consulates which eventually became influential with the chiefs 
and powerful in their own right. Trading posts were established all over Fiji. Often 
successful traders were appointed consuls of their countries.
402
 The burning down of 
the settler and American consulate J.B. Williams' trading store in 1849 was a decisive 
point for Fiji's transformation from an independent, though unstable, state to a British 
colony in 1874. Since Cakobau had declared himself Fiji's king many of the 
compensation claims by Europeans for various indigenous transgressions were made 
against him personally. The destruction of J.B. Williams property and looting by 
indigenous people who were under the authority of Cakobau translated into a claim 
against him by the American government. In addition, Cakobau had ordered a frigate 
from the Americans which he could not pay for and, in the end, the accumulation of 
claims for compensation, though exaggerated as a later congressional inquiry found, 
and the debt owed to the Americans for the ship, made him consider creative ways to 
extricate himself and Fiji out of his problems.
403
 Initially he made an offer to the 
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Melbourne Polynesian Company to transfer to them large tracts of land in return for 
payment of the debt. The Company partially paid the debt and acquired land as had 




The person most responsible for ensuring that Fiji would be attractive for Britain to 
acquire as another of its colonies was J.B. Thurston. Initially he was appointed Acting 
British Consul. In this he had to negotiate delicately between traditional Fijian loyalty 
to their own laws and structures which were robust and Europeans who had settled, in 
some cases for generations. These Europeans considered Fijians to be still primitive 
and simple and thus easily persuaded to permanently part with their assets, mainly 
land, at a fraction of its value. This attracted violence from the Fijians when they 
realised their land had been alienated forever. The two groups in Fiji were uneasily 
co-habiting but the laws that could have mediated the relationship were missing.  
 
C Establishing Constitutional Law in Fiji Pre-Cession 
 
By the 1860s Cakobau and his European advisors were already looking at ways to 
expand Bau's influence across the whole of Fiji. One of these ways was to draft a set 
of laws that would apply to both indigenous Fijians and Europeans. As soon as his 
kingly authority was recognised by the Europeans Cakobau seems to have become a 
'constitutionalist'.
405
 In particular, he seems to have become aware of, and partial to, 




The 1860s idea of constitutionalism in Fiji was inevitably affected by the events all 
over the world especially Europe and America. In particular the 1850s 
constitutionalism was based on the French, American and English rights documents 
with which the Europeans in Fiji were familiar. Since both Europeans and indigenous 
Fijian chiefs such as Cakobau wanted centralised government for settlement, trade, 
law and order they began to plan for the formation of a new state-wide entity called 
the Fijian Confederation of 1865. The British representative in Fiji at the time, 
Colonel Smythe, had suggested that the best form of government for the time being 
would be a ―native government aided by the counsels of respectable Europeans‖.
407
 
The Fijian Confederation symbolised that relationship. By the 1860s most Fijian 
chiefs had European secretaries/interpreters. The very first constitutional document 
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for the Confederation was organised by the British Consul Henry Michael Jones in 
1865. On January 1st by circular he invited the chiefs of seven matanitu (large 
groupings of tribes or 'statehoods') to a meeting in the then capital Levuka. Initially 
this was called a 'Confederation of Chiefs' (a wholly European idea says France)
408
 
which called itself the central government of all Fiji. At the meeting the chiefs agreed 
to meet annually thereafter and pass laws which would apply to the whole of the 
islands. Cakobau was elected the first President of the Confederation and a flag 
adopted.  
 
Not all chiefs were included in the Confederation; Ma'afu did not arrive until the 
discussions were almost over and, apparently, some western chiefs were not present. 
Nevertheless, a public announcement of the resolutions of the meeting was made in 





The undersigned chiefs of Fiji, having assembled together on the 8th and 
9th of May1865, unanimously agreed to the following resolutions: 
 
That the present condition of Fiji is such as to require a stronger and firmer 
form of government than it at present possesses- in order that the cause of 
union, justice and progress may be promoted.  
 
That this object can be best effected by modelling a constitution adapted to 
the wants of the people and to the forms of the government hitherto in use 
among them. 
 
The rest of the resolutions were about how the chiefs would foster the welfare of the 
people of Fiji, the annual election of President who would have command over the 
other chiefs, adopting a code of laws for all of Fiji, allowing indigenous law to 
prevail in the hands of individual chiefs, the tribal boundaries to be defined, the 
creation of independent states with autonomous taxation under individual traditional 
chiefs, and a declaration of peace and not war, with traitors to 'this Constitution' to be 
punished by the chiefs united. 
 
The first constitutional document, though not yet a formal constitution, was the basis 
for forthcoming documents. Between 1865 and 1867 Cakobau thought to consolidate 
Bau's power by devising a supreme Constitution expressed as a "Bauan Declaration 
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of Rights". Thus the first Fijian Constitution was called the "Declaration of Rights for 
the Kingdom of Bau" and promulgated on 2nd May 1867. It was drafted by 
Cakobau's European Secretary, Samuel St John and was modelled on the Hawai'ian 
Constitution of 1864 which itself was modelled on the American Constitution of 
1787. The articles of the Magna Carta had formed the basis of the constitutions and 
bills of rights of France, America and Britain and these, through the Europeans in Fiji 
and also the influence of the King Kamehameha of Hawai'i and his constitution of 
1864, became the source of constitutionalism in Fiji creating its grundnorm.  
 
The core features of the Confederation of the Kingdom of Bau were identical to the 
Hawai'ian Constitution except for the right to liberty contained in the Hawai'ian 
Constitution but missing from the Bauan document. Other rights that the Bauan 
Constitution did contain were right to life property and happiness, freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech, right to petition the king for redress, habeas corpus, trial 
by jury for rights breaches, right to due process, freedom from slavery, right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure, conduct of the government for the purpose 
of welfare of the people, the military to be subject to the laws of the land, and making 




The provisions on government included naming the Kingdom of Bau a constitutional 
monarchy and stating that the supreme power was vested in the King for his lifetime. 
Subsequent paragraphs on the executive included provisions regarding the power of 
executive government (in the King) in relation to the army, convening chiefly 
meetings for the public good, appointment of ambassadors and consuls, and 
regulating currency. Other provisions determined the number and duties of ministers 
and his cabinet, as well as governors for the districts and islands under Bauan 
command. Provisions on the judiciary included references to having judges and 
magistrates guided by English or American laws and precedents or the "customs 
applicable to the particular case under adjudication".
411
 The final provision dealt with 
procedures for amendment to the constitution.  
 
The Bauan Constitution was not the only one in existence at the time. In 1867, 
probably to off-set the power of the Bauan Constitution, Ma'afu from Tonga/Lau and 
two other chiefs from different parts of Fiji met to form a confederation and draft a 
constitution based on an earlier document dated 1865. However this measure 
collapsed due to lack of support by other chiefs and it was not until 1869 that another 
                                                          
410
 Bauan Declaration of Rights 1867 (Fiji). 
411
 Article LII.  
107 
 
one was drafted with more support. At the end of that decade both Bauan and Lauan 





By 1871 King Cakobau had decided to open land up for leasing to Europeans. But the 
ineffectiveness of the 1867 Constitution and government of Bau was apparent in the 
instability across Fiji created by clashes between Europeans and Fijians. After 
meetings of, and discussions between, a wide selection of delegates including those 
from the west, a new constitution was agreed. The Constitution Act of Fiji received 
Royal Assent (King Cakobau) on 18 August 1871 and the first meeting of the new 
Legislative Assembly was held in November 1871. The new constitution introduced 
in 1871 involved Ba, Nadroga, Nadi, the Yasawa group, and Rakiraki/Tavua as well 
as eastern Fiji. Many of the leading chiefs, including Ma'afu, had tendered their 
allegiance to the new government members. Ma'afu may have hoped that the 
government would fail and that he would be asked to take over the administration of 
all Fiji. This apparent consensus boded well for the new government in 1871, and 




The new 1871 Constitution of Fiji was formulated in a much more definitive way to 




Whereas it is expedient for the Good Government of the White and Native 
Population of the Fiji Group of Islands to Establish a Constitution and 
Legislative House of Representatives therein; and whereas Delegates from 
amongst the White residents have been called together for that purpose: Be 
it therefore, Enacted by the King and the Delegates in Council now 
Assembled, as follows: 
 
II God hath endowed all men with certain inalienable 
rights; among which are life, liberty, and the right of 
owning, acquiring, possessing  and protecting property, 
and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. 
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The 1871 Constitution also delivered a more sophisticated structure of government; 
the Legislative Council and Privy Council were both established with representation 
from Fijian provinces as well as white settlers. 
 
The 1873 Constitution was similarly premised upon certain principles of natural law 
established in Europe at the onset of the Enlightenment. By now the first Chief 
Justice of Fiji in the Cakobau Government, Charles St Julian, originally French, had 
been appointed. St Julian was influenced by the ideas of Vattel. In 1872 he had 
published his The International Status of Fiji: Political Rights, Liabilities, Duties and 
Privileges of British Subjects and Other Foreigners Residing in the Fijian 
Archipelago.
415
 In it St Julian said:
 
―M. De Vattel is perhaps of all ‗writers on 




In his text, applying Vattel's principles, St Julian said that the laws of Fiji should also 
apply to foreigners, relating this to the concept of 'sovereignty'. 
 
In all three constitutions of Fiji pre-cession the obligation of the King to conduct his 
government "for the common good" was evident and provided by way of either a 




Established wisdom suggests that the early constitutions were drafted by Europeans 
for them; however this is too simplistic an analysis in my view. Without Cakobau 
there would have been no government and his ability to draw in chiefs from all over 
Fiji in an alliance, even including Ma'a'fu, shows the stature of this high chief, later 
King. There was never any opposition to his kingship from other chiefs as he was 
already regarded as a warrior chief. Despite all the obstacles, including age catching 
up with him, Cakobau managed to place the constitutional government of Fiji on a 
solid footing pre-cession by incorporating all the elements of justice derived from 
constitutions as far away from Fiji as possible, indicating that the protections 
provided to the people within constitutions is not in any sense culturally specific. In a 
remote corner of the world a high chief, formally a cannibal and fierce warrior, found 
sufficient similarity between his version of justice and that expressed in the 
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constitutions of England, France and America to be able to establish a grundnorm that 
continues to re-surface in the Fijian constitutions, in varying degrees, to this day. The 
question to be answered later is whether the 2013 Constitution of Fiji complies with 




Despite good intentions on both sides pursuant to the 1873 Constitution, Europeans 
and Cakobau equally felt the time was right to cede Fiji to a world power. It was not 
immediately apparent that this would be Britain though all the signs pointed to it 
being the obvious choice. In negotiations with Britain for cession Cakobau wished to 
retain as much autonomy as possible for himself; however Britain required 




4. That the absolute proprietorship of all lands not shown to be now 
alienated so as to have become bona fide the property of Europeans or 
other foreigners or not now in the actual use or occupation of some Chief 
or tribe or not actually required for the probable future support and 
maintenance of some chief or tribe shall be and is hereby declared to be 
vested in Her said Majesty her heirs and successors. 
 
The emphasis indicates the difference between the Deed of Cession and other 
documents, for example the Treaty of Waitangi. This clause prevented any further 
alienation of Fijian land after Cession, thereby retaining 80 per cent of it in 
indigenous Fijian hands. 
 
After Cession the constitutional law of Britain prevailed in Fiji, including the Magna 
Carta and the Bill of Rights of 1688. Justice was then understood in the same terms as 
expressed in the previous chapter. Fiji became as much a part of the history of 
western thoughts regarding justice, with one major difference, and that is that the 
people who were expected to abide by these notions were a different ethnic group 
with different social structures and politics than Europeans. But there was no obvious 
disparity between the understanding of the Europeans and the Fijians as to what was 
required for the delivery of the law. However, this notion of justice was disrupted by 
an economic decision to import Indian labourers to Fiji to help develop the new sugar 
industry that was being proposed by Fiji's first substantive governor, Sir Arthur 
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 Due to the events taking place in India against British colonisation, of 
which indenture was a consequence, the purportedly common understanding of what 
was just and unjust was subjected to severe stress in the industrial and political arena 
post cession.  
 
E Indian Indenture 
 
Contrary to common understanding and contrary to the situation in French and other 
British colonies, Indian indenture to Fiji was not a European innovation. As far back 
as 1871 Cakobau had petitioned the Indian (British) government directly to send 
Indian labourers, knowing that the blackbird trade in labour was diminishing and the 
European demand for labour for cotton was affecting the traditional Fijian labour 
structure. On 14th September 1872 (a full two years before cession) Thurston the 
English Consul, stating he was making enquiries on behalf of the Cakobau 




And there is no doubt whatever but that it would be quite competent for 
this Government to introduce and fully to enforce the provisions of any law 
which might be deemed necessary for the importation, the protection while 
in this Country, the proper payment and due return to India of Immigrant 
Coolie labourers.  
 
The British Government refused to entertain the idea on the grounds that Fiji was not 
a British colony and that, so far, Indians were only being sent to Britain's colonies: ―I 
am directed … in reply to say that the Governor-General in Council regrets that he is 




Indians were allowed to provide labour in Fiji only after cession. Gordon had wanted 
to attract investment from the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Australia (CSR) 
and sought a regular supply of labour for it. But by 1875 strict rules about importing 
Indian labour and their conditions of work, as well as their settlement or return to 
India had been imposed. Two years before the first arrival of Indians to Fiji the Indian 
(British) Government had established a policy that the Indian labourers' return 
passages to India would be commuted if they would accept a bounty or land grant and 
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 In reality neither a land grant or bounty was ever given to Indians 
who chose to settle in Fiji and this, for Fiji Indians, represents the real disjunction 
between justice and law in regards to their status in Fiji.  
 
Indians were encouraged instead to enter into long term leases to grow sugar cane and 
over the years the insecurity of tenure in land instigated their political platforms, with 
the rallying cry of justice at its core, particularly through the National Federation 
Party which demanded equality for Indians in Fiji throughout the 20th century. The 
lack of security of tenure and Indians' precarious constitutional position can be 
described as a breach of the indenture contract with possible implications in future for 




F Independence and Constitutional Developments from 1970 to 1987 
 
Between 1875 and 1970 under British law only the Magna Carta and the Bill of 
Rights of 1688 would have been relevant as constitutional documents for Fiji. Both 
were documents that were founded on calls for justice at the time but their effects in 
Fiji were negligible. Fiji was described as a ―three-legged stool‖ by eminent chief 
Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna with the three legs representing Fijian land, Indian labour and 
European government, supposedly in balance but rarely so in practical terms.
424
 In 
reality the Indians resented the discriminatory European government and also 
constantly sought better arrangements and longer terms for land leases with the 
indigenous Fijians.  
 
PG McHugh describes the 'legalism' that shaped the Crown's engagement with non-
Christian societies as far back as the Tudor period. He said the common theme was 
"sovereign authority" (imperium) which was established and maintained through 
military force and legalism.
425
 It was designed to bolster expansion of the empire, 
including by use of Vattel's theory of international relations as being that of 
"independent and equal state sovereignty".
426
 Once this was accepted English 
attitudes towards non-Christian people changed. This was visible in Fiji. During most 
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of British rule it was this sentiment of protection and trusteeship of the indigenous 
people that prevailed, including in discussions of independence in 1965. 
 
It was not until the 1960s that legal principles other than those developed for law and 
order and the ordinary functioning of government were once again meaningfully 
discussed in Fiji after a hiatus of almost a century. By despatch dated 15th August 





… when the future relationship between Fiji and Britain should be clarified 
and codified, and will be glad, in consultation with representatives of the 
people of Fiji, to work out a constitutional framework which will preserve 
a continuing link with Britain and within which further progress can be 
made in the direction of internal self-government.  
 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies proposed a Fiji Constitutional Conference to 
be held in 1965 so as to establish as wide an area of agreement as possible to the 





… to build on foundations already laid, to move towards a greater degree 
of internal self-governing than at present exists in Fiji … to consider the 
development of the membership system: a strengthening and broadening of 
the elected element in the Legislative Council; and matters affecting the 
franchise. The Conference will no doubt wish to consider the adoption of 
certain generally accepted provisions designed to safeguard human rights, 
the public service and the judiciary. 
 
The reference to safeguarding "human rights‖ was perhaps the most important 
element in this outline, signalling that the new constitution of Fiji was to be of a 
certain type including not just structural elements such as the functioning of 
government but also philosophical (natural law) principles.  
 
The Conference was held at Marlborough House, London, from 26th July to 9th 
August 1965. Those attending the conference from Fiji were chosen to represent the 
different ethnic groups though not the Chinese or 'Part-European' communities. Six 
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representatives of the European community, and six each of indigenous Fijians and 
Indians were selected. The Europeans were over-represented at the Conference as 
their population proportion did not justify the number chosen. 
 
The Conference established two main constitutional precepts- the electoral system 
and the Bill of Rights. All participants agreed that the Bill of Rights would be 
superior to other laws and that laws inconsistent with it would be rendered void. 
Some issues were debated hotly but in the end consensus was reached on the main 
principles.  
 
On 23rd September, by proclamation of the Acting Governor, the first 20th century 
Fijian Constitution came into effect. The very first chapter was titled ―Protection of 





1. Whereas every person in Fiji is entitled to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, 
place of origin, political opinions, colour creed or sex, but subject to 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, 
to each and all of the following, namely- 
 
(a) Life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law 
(b) Freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and 
association; and 
(c) Protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from 
deprivation of property without compensation, 
 
The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of 
affording protection to those rights and freedoms subject to such 
limitations of that protection as are contained in these provisions, being 
limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and 
freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of 
others and the public interest. 
 
Following the preamble 16 clauses established specific rights and their limitations. It 
will be clear that these clauses resembled that universal natural law document drafted 
in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was the answer to calls of 
justice made immediately after World War II atrocities had been revealed and in 
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which both law, in the form of a firm formal structure of rights and obligations, as 
well as principles of the minimum standards of justice were contained. For the first 
time in Fiji's history the principles in a constitutional document were reinforced by 
enforcement provisions as constitutional redress to the Supreme Court was provided 
by law.  
 
The 1966 Constitutional principles were very similar to the 18th century constitutions 
of King Cakobau, and so the grundnorm that had been established pre-Cession in Fiji 
resurfaced in its next document proclaimed in 1966. The one exception was the right 
to equality. The 1966 Constitution contained a saving clause on discrimination due to 
the fact that access to land was not based on the right to equality.
430
 Indigenous land 
was exclusively held by indigenous people as per Art 4 of the Deed of Cession and  
not available or accessible to all equally. 
 
The 1966 Constitution was designed to establish Fijian self-governance as a gentle 
pathway to full independence. It served its purpose as the people prepared for full 
independence from Britain. Five years later another constitutional conference was 
held, once again at Marlborough House. This conference revealed something 
different; the main representatives were negotiating from a political party platform. 
To be sure the political parties were ethnic based- with the National Federation Party 
headed by lawyer Siddiq Koya (already Leader of Opposition in the transition 
arrangements) and the Alliance Party headed by Oxford educated high chief Ratu 
Kamisese Mara (already Chief Minister) but the two quickly agreed to a consensus on 
all main points. The agreement was that the lower house of parliament would contain 
an equal number of Indians and Fijians (12 each) for the common roll franchise and 
for the national roll franchise (10 each) and that the General franchise (Europeans, 
part-Europeans and others) would be allocated three seats under the common roll and 
five seats under the national roll.
431
 Though the proportion of European population 
did not justify the number of seats allocated to it, such allocation revealed the extent 
of the power they were designed to wield, with the support of Britain, even in an 
independent Fiji.  
 
The new Constitution also contained a strong Bill of Rights chapter. Signifying its 
importance, the ―Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual‖ was the very 
first substantive chapter of the Constitution and placed immediately after two short 
declaratory chapters identifying the State of Fiji and establishing the supremacy of 
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the Constitution (chs I and II). As with all modern constitutions the positioning of the 
Bill of Rights chapter became quite crucial to its significance. It also signified the 
sentiment at the time held by influential constitutional theorists such as Professor SA 
de Smith, that the new commonwealth nations required a supreme Bill of Rights in 
their post-independence constitutional mechanisms to be able to balance the rights 
and responsibilities of diverse populations, previously managed by the colonial 
enterprise, for the avoidance of crises.  
 





[Constitutional bills of rights] can arrest a piecemeal erosion of basic 
freedoms. It can be used as a means of educating public opinion- and not 
only sophisticated opinion, but the body of opinion that is shaped in the 
schools  and the villages- to respect the constitution and the values it 
enshrines. … Clearly, then, there is a close correlation between allegiance 
to the general principles of constitutionalism and readiness to accept and 
abide by a justiciable constitutional bill of rights. 
 
Professor de Smith wrote this just a year or so before the Fiji Conference. Its impact 
among British officials would not have been negligible since all new commonwealth 
states for the most part enacted supreme and entrenched Bills of Rights along with 
their Constitutions. The exceptions were the Dominions.  
 
From independence to 1987 the Constitution of Fiji with its Bill of Rights was the 
'higher law' against which all other laws were measured. These rights were rarely 
used, though they were justiciable, and very few were tested in court except in 
criminal cases, though even this was unusual. This stability, though uneasy at times, 
especially during elections which continued to be fought along ethnic lines, remained 
in place until 1987. 
 
G The Coup d' État of 1987 and the Attempt at Forging a New Grundnorm in 
 1990 
 
Until 1987 the ethnic majority party that had dominated parliament (since 1965) was 
the indigenous Fijian Alliance Party, with high chief Ratu Mara at its head. However 
in 1987 this dramatically changed when a new party, the Fiji Labour Party, was 
                                                          
432




elected to power in April, claiming 28 of the 52 seats in the lower house. In just over 
two weeks, on May 14 a previously unknown military officer, Colonel Sitiveni 
Rabuka, accompanied by his balaclava-clad soldiers, walked into parliament and 
physically removed the newly elected (Bavadra) Labour Government from the seats. 
In press statements that followed, Rabuka and his supporters (one of whom was 
Indian politician and former academic Ahmed Ali) said they had removed the 
government because it was 'Indian dominated', deliberately overlooking the fact that 
the Labour Prime Minister, Timoci Bavadra, was indigenous Fijian and that, 
previously, the government had been indigenous Fijian dominated under Ratu Mara. 
Soon after, Ratu Mara was installed as caretaker Prime Minister, lending credence to 
the popular belief that the Alliance Party could not stomach its loss at the 1987 
elections and had used the military backed by an insidious racist stance to provide 
justification for their reinstatement.  
 
Whether the May 14 removal of government was an actual 'coup d'état' is an 
important legal question. A 'coup d'état' is translated as a 'hit at the state'
433
 and, thus, 
removal of a government which leaves the constitution and head of state intact is not 
technically a coup. Initially the Governor General as representative of the head of 
state, the Queen, remained in place and there were pertinent observations that he, also 
a high chief, was part of the conspiracy to remove the Labour Government.
434
 
However a few months later, on 26th September, the head of state was also removed 
and Fiji became a Republic. A court challenge by Bavadra to have his government 
restored did not get past the preliminaries as judges were sacked or resigned.  
 
Due to the fact that the coup used the subterfuge of indigenous rights to mask its 
outright racism, few countries, themselves reeling from the shock of various rightful 
indigenous claims over lost or confiscated land, felt they could intervene even 
through diplomatic channels. David Lange, Prime Minister of New Zealand at the 
time, himself a competent constitutional lawyer, was the one exception. He remarked 
on the widespread racial abuse of Indians both physically and in employment and 
social life but his was a lone voice in the international void. It was interesting that 
most outside support focused on the loss of democracy rather than the persecution of 
Indians that prevailed at the time. The injustice of this perspective did not fail to alert 
Indians to the precise nature of the problem, namely tyranny of the majority. The 
abuses that befell them were in direct contravention of the protections guaranteed by 
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the 1970 Constitution which was a document derived from consensus between the 
major ethnic groups in Fiji, as well as international human rights law, which no one 
seemed to be able to invoke in the ten whole years between 1987 and 1997. Post 
1987,  'justice' once more became a demand by the Indians despite the threats to their 
lives this attracted. For them none of the elements of justice identified in the previous 
chapter of this thesis was evident post-1987.  
 
A new Constitution for Fiji was subsequently proposed by the Rabuka Government 
which installed itself soon after. It wanted to constitutionally entrench what it called 
'indigenous rights', a pseudonym for 'indigenous supremacy'. The photograph at the 
end of this thesis is an example of the graffiti adorning the walls of Suva during this 
unsavoury period in Fiji's history.
435
 For Indians the lack of justice in the indenture 
period, as well as post-indenture in the denial of a grant of land despite Lord 
Salisbury's promise, was consolidated after the 1987 coup.  
 
A draft constitution was circulated, presumably as an attempt at reaching consensus 
in the different ethnic groups but the final document was revised at the military 
barracks where it was discussed and approved only by the 70 member indigenous 
Great Council of Chiefs (GCC).
436
 The Indian community leaders were not part of 
this discussion and the great secrecy with which the final drafts were written shows 
that not too many of the other communities might have been consulted either. The 
GCC sent the approved draft to the cabinet and President for promulgation. On July 
25 1990 Fiji had a new constitution.  
 
The 1990 Constitution severely and unequivocally eroded the 1970 constitutional 
equal rights provisions of the non-indigenous communities. Indians (by now calling 
themselves Indo-Fijians) began to migrate in numbers to avoid the violence and 
structural discrimination, thus reducing their population in Fiji (the rapid population 
growth of Indians from the 1930s to 1960s had been a 'problem' over which the 
Europeans and indigenous chiefs had previously expressed concern). They became a 
minority population soon after. The racist policies in schools and the economy, 
permitted by the 1990 Constitution, affected the education of children, business 
applications and licenses, employment opportunities and promotions, political 
representation and all other spheres of public and private life.  
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The 1990 Constitution made no pretence at being a consensual document. The 





And whereas the events of 1987 were occasioned by a widespread belief 
that the 1970 Constitution was inadequate to give protection to the interests 
of the indigenous Fijian people, their values, traditions, customs, way of 
life, and economic well-being; 
 
And whereas attempts to reach a consensus among all the people of Fiji as 
to the method whereby the said interests are to be protected have been 
protracted and difficult … 
 
Rights were generally the same as in the 1970 Constitution but the important right to 
equality and non-discrimination was severely limited. In particular Chapter III of the 
1990 Constitution titled ―Protection and Enhancement of Fijian and Rotuman 
Interests‖ was an overt affirmative action provision which masked constitutional 
discrimination expressed as a specific limitation of the Fundamental Rights and 




21 (1)  Notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter II of this 
Constitution Parliament shall, with the object of promoting and 
safeguarding the economic, social, educational, cultural, traditional 
and other interests of the Fijian and Rotuman people, enact laws 
for those objects and shall direct the Government to adopt any 
programme or activity for the attainment of the said objects and the 
Government shall duly comply with such directions. 
     (2)  In carrying out any direction given under subsection (1) of this 
section, the Government through the Cabinet may - 
(a) give directions to any department of Government, 
Commission or authority for the reservation of such 
proportions as it may deem reasonable of scholarships, 
training privileges or other special facilities provided by 
Government; 
                                                          
437
 Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji (Promulgation) Decree 1990, Preamble. 
Indo-Fijians were being asked to agree to become second-class citizens; it is no wonder that attempts 
to reach consensus on this point were ―protracted and difficult‖. 
438
 Chapter III, ss 21(1)–21(3). ―Bose Levu Vakaturaga‖ was previously the Great Council of Chiefs 
which was not a constitutional body in the 1970 Constitution. 
119 
 
(b)  when any permit or licence for the operation of any trade 
or business is required by law, give such direction as may 
be required for the purpose of assisting Fijians and 
Rotumans to venture into business; and  
(c) may give directions to any department of Government, 
Commission or authority for the purpose of the attainment 
of any of the objects specified under subsection (1) of this 
section; 
and the department or the Commission or the authority to which 
any direction under paragraph (a), (b) or (c ) of this subsection is 
given shall comply with such directions 
    (3)  In the exercise of its functions under this section, the Cabinet shall 
act in consultation with the Bose Levu Vakaturaga or the Council 
of Rotuma, as the circumstances may require. 
 
Aside from these racist provisions three others were added: (i) only ethnic Fijians 
could be prime minister and the President could only be appointed by the Great 
Council of Chiefs (s 83) (2); (ii) not less than 40 per cent of all civil service positions 
were to be reserved for indigenous Fijians and Rotumans (s 127(11)), and (iii) thirty 
seven of the seventy parliamentary seats were to be reserved for ethnic Fijians and 
only twenty seven for Indo-Fijians (ss 41(3) and (4)). 
 
Fortunately the 1990 Constitution also mandated a review within seven years and 
soon after its promulgation, the two main opposition parties, the Fiji Labour Party 
and the National Federation Party, as well as several non-governmental organisations, 
began to lobby for a constitutional review. Former New Zealand Governor General 
(the late) Sir Paul Reeves, Militoni Leweniqila and Dr Brij Lal (the latter two were 
locals, representing the two main ethnic groups) were appointed as the constitutional 
commissioners to review the 1990 Constitution. They obtained public views from 
1995 for a period of two years. After extensive consultations they formulated what 
was eventually enacted as the 1997 Constitution.  
 
H The 1997 Constitution: A Document of Consensus 
 
The 1997 Constitution was accepted by the people as a document that had been 
decided after proper consultation. The careful checks and balances drafted into the 
document were designed to represent once again equal justice as in the 1970 
Constitution but with some modifications to encourage more political and ethnic 
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bargaining. The most significant provision was the Bill of Rights,
439
 again 
dominating the core provisions of the Constitution and was central to its functioning. 
The Bill of Rights bound parliament as well as the judiciary and all institutions of 
government both local and national, an improvement on the 1970 Constitution. It 
formed a supreme chapter within the supreme Constitution. Supplementing the Bill of 
Rights was an important additional chapter entitled Chapter II Compact which 





The people of the Fiji Islands recognise that, within the framework of this 
Constitution and the other laws of the State, the conduct of government is 
based on the following principles: 
 
(a) The rights of all individuals, communities and groups are fully 
respected … 
 
The 1997 Constitution was seen to return to the original Fijian grundnorm based on 
three principles: supreme and justiciable rights and freedoms, free and full 
participation in the political sphere (even though some of the provisions on cabinet 
bargaining between the government and opposition could only have occurred in a 
more sincere environment and was considered to be a bit ambitious), and a 
parliamentary system based on consent.  
 
On the occasion of the enactment of the 1997 Constitution by Parliament, Prime 
Minister Sitiveni Rabuka referred to it as ―an expression of confidence and hope in 
our collective future … a truly home grown Constitution which reflects "he dreams 








Let us not forget that what will give legitimacy to our Constitution is the 
principle that it has been developed with the free and full participation of 
everyone, including all of us here as elected representatives of the people 
and that it provides for a system of Parliamentary Government based on the 
consent of the people … Rather than just focussing on removing those 
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aspects of the 1990 Constitution that have created and  exacerbated 
divisions, misgivings and mistrust among our different ethnic 
communities, we have all agreed to develop it into a positive instrument of 
nation-building. 
 
For three years after its enactment there was a period of relative calm in Fiji until, 
once again, the Fiji Labour Party won the elections, this time in 1999. The country 
was still getting used to dealing with a new party with a different perspective when 
on May 19 a civilian, George Speight, in a copycat move, took over parliament while 
one of the parliamentarians, Dr Tupeni Baba, was on his feet speaking, ironically, on 
the Social Justice Bill.
443
 Speight's attempted coup was again an outright racist action 
and there were some questions about who exactly was behind the take-over as, apart 
from Speight, no one claimed responsibility.  
 
I The Chandrika Prasad Case and Restoring the 1997 Constitution 
 
Nevertheless Speight first announced that he had abrogated the 1997 Constitution as 
not giving sufficient priority to indigenous matters. His group began publishing and 
'gazetting' new decrees including on abrogation, new laws and even a bill of rights. 
Speight ran his government from parliament house with most of the parliamentarians 
held hostage at the same time (the hostage situation lasted 56 days).  
 
However, the army commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama, in what looked like 
a puzzling move at the time, announced on May 30th, after unsuccessful attempts at 
negotiating the release of the hostages, that he was abrogating the 1997 Constitution. 
How this related to Speight's purported abrogation earlier was not entirely clear. By 
this time lawlessness was prevalent, curfew was on all the time and most people felt 
powerless to do anything in case it would trigger a killing spree in parliament house 
as was forewarned with one or two close calls when the Prime Minister Mahendra 
Chaudhry was taken out to the front lawn of parliament house on the assumption that 
he would be executed.  
 
During this saga, and because of it, a small Indian rural community on the banks of 
one of the tributaries of the Rewa River close to Suva was being assaulted nightly by 
marauding indigenous villagers, their neighbours in fact, who grown up side by side 
with them, but racism recalled no such relationship. Children were harmed, old men 
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assaulted; no one was spared.
444
 They were rescued by a group of urban Indian 
professionals who saw the need, and taken to an Internal Displaced Peoples' Camp. 
Chandrika Prasad was the representative of that community who was nominated to 
challenge the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution which, as he said, had protected his 
rights as a citizen of Fiji irrespective of his ethnicity and which Speight's and 
Bainimarama's constitutional abrogations were denying him. The Prasad case was 
won in the High Court and, backed by huge numbers of citizens by way of 
affidavits,
445
 also succeeded in the Court of Appeal. The 1997 Constitution was back 
through judicial activism initially of Gates J and then of a strong Court of Appeal 
Bench which included all overseas judges (from New Zealand, Australia, Papua New 
Guinea and Tonga). Fresh elections were held after Chaudhry requested it; however, 
Qarase returned as Prime Minister, in a slight majority government, from a new 
ethnic supremacist political party whose manifesto was not obvious until much later. 
  
Between 2001 and 2009 the 1997 Constitution's Bill of Rights was used extensively 
by the Fiji Human Rights Commission on behalf of complainants or as amicus curiae 
to bring sweeping changes, based on justice expressed in the Bill, to the regime of 
law in Fiji.
446
 Justice became law's contingent attribute in the Teubner sense. Under it 
the Death Penalty was abolished as a cruel and degrading punishment, the crime of 
sodomy in the Penal Code was invalidated by the courts on the grounds that sexual 
orientation was protected by the Constitution, the right to a lawyer was affirmed, 
prisoners' rights to decent prison conditions were declared, forced evictions stopped 
and disability rights affirmed. In addition, the Commission entered into a compact 
with the Disciplined Services (Military, Police and Prisons) for it to respect all human 
rights enshrined in the Constitution and in international law since the Constitution 
had made international law mandatory for the courts to consider in human rights 
cases. The Commission also found a justiciable 'right to environment' in the 
Constitution and established a partnership with the Tuvaluan Government to move 




However, while the Constitution was solidly in favour of social justice and rights, the 
government was not. The Qarase Government, which had won an interim position 
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under Bainimarama after Speight had been arrested, and later won elections, began a 
campaign of persecution of people other than indigenous Fijians. The targets, in fact, 
were once again, mainly Indians. Three of the initiatives were (i) the Blueprint which 
shamelessly promoted indigenous supremacy again in breach of the Constitution;
448
 
and (ii) the Qoliqoli Bill which, along with (iii) the Indigenous Claims Bill, would 
have the effect of removing constitutionally protected property rights of at least 50 





The Human Rights Commission, the Fiji Law Society and opposition political parties 
all made submissions against these Bills before Parliament and programmes, to no 
avail. The parliamentary majority that the government held was likely to ensure their 
passing and adoption as law. In the meantime, the Military Commander and the 
Prime Minister fell out, some say over corruption, others say over the proposed bills 
which had security implications. The Human Rights Commission was asked to advise 
the Commander on the implications of the proposals for national security, and thus 
breaches of human rights.  
 
In the escalating tension between the army and Qarase's government, Qarase 
attempted to invoke the Biketawa Agreement,
450
 and in anticipation, somewhat 
prematurely, a naval vessel was despatched to Fiji by the Australian Government. It 
was found waiting within Fijian waters by the Australian media which had hired a 
local pilot to find it. It was only found when a helicopter fell off the deck in deep 
water killing the pilots on board. As soon as the vessel's presence was publicised in 
Fiji, the President of Fiji, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, asked Prime Minister Qarase to advise 
him about its presence but the Prime Minister did not do so. Yet, the 1997 
Constitution required the Prime Minister to keep the President informed on all 
matters affecting the State. The President told the army commander that the Prime 
Minister had not come to see him as requested. The army commander told the 
President that the Prime Minister needed to be removed. The President agreed and the 
Prime Minister and his government were removed the next day, on 6th December 
2006. The President was also temporarily removed in order to effect the removal of 
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government by Bainimarama who said he was "'stepping into the shoes' of … the 
president" to do so.
451
 An interim government was formed in early January and 
Bainimarama was made interim Prime Minister but no parliament was to be held for 
another seven years.  
 
J The 2006–2009 Constitutional Events 
 
Between 2006 and 2009 the Constitution of 1997 and the Head of State remained in 
place. All actions and promulgations of the Interim Government were carried out 
pursuant to the Constitution. At the same time the disposed Prime Minister Laisenia 
Qarase and his government mounted a constitutional challenge to their removal. 
While the court matter proceeded the Interim Government began holding 
consultations for a review of the 1997 Constitution. It convened a broad consultative 
forum called the National Council for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) for the 
purposes of drafting a Charter, consistent with the 1997 Constitution, to be 
determined by a broad cross-section of the community.  
 
The first meeting of the NCBBF was held in January 2008 and, in August, its product, 
The People's Charter for Change, Peace and Progress was released.
452
 It was a 
consensus document agreed by a wide range of stakeholders in Fiji including political 
parties, civil society groups, public officers including the military and traditional 
leaders. While not explicitly stating that the Constitution would be amended in 
accordance with the principles of the People's Charter, the recommendations pointed 
to that aim. The fact that Laisenia Qarase lost his government's application to be 
restored as Prime Minister in the High Court in 2008 fortified the Interim 
Government's position that some significant amendments to the 1997 Constitution 
could be made in line with the People's Charter for a new path to a non-racial, less 
corrupt Fiji.  
 
In the Qarase matter the High Court had ruled that the President of Fiji had 
prerogative power to dismiss a Prime Minister. Qarase appealed to the Court of 
Appeal and in April 2009 the Court (mainly an Australian bench) decided that the 
President of Fiji did not have the constitutional power to remove the Prime Minister 
and the government.
453
 The Court of Appeal also refused leave to the Interim 
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Government to appeal to the Supreme Court. The very next day the President 
announced that he had abrogated the 1997 Constitution and was appointing an 




Which of the two events, the 2006 removal of government or the 2009 removal of the 
Constitution was a ―coup d'état‖ is an interesting question for constitutional lawyers. 
Brookfield says that the definition of a ―coup d'état‖, derived from Luttwak's Coup 
d'état: A Practical Handbook is ―the infiltration of a small but significant segment of 
the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of 
the remainder‖.
455
 In light of this definition, written by an academic with a military 
background in Britain, France and United States, the 2006 removal of government in 
Fiji could not have been a coup. On the other hand, the abrogation of the Constitution 
in April 2009 could be regarded as a coup as that is when the 'small but significant 
segment of state apparatus', namely the Constitution, was removed. The Head of 
State, though, remained the same after his abrogation of the Constitution. 
 
In my view, expressed at the time, there was a very important legal difference 
between the President's power to remove a government and his power to remove a 
constitution. The Constitution of 1997 had made provision for amending or reviewing 
a Constitution and the President had no role in it. The fact that a President could not 
remove a Constitution was fortified by the constitutional Preamble: ―We, the People 




No one appeared to have the power to remove the Constitution apart from the people 
themselves through the mechanisms provided by the Constitution. This was also the 
principle established by the Prasad cases in 2000/2001. Removal of an unjust 
government may have been possible through constitutional prerogative power; 
however removal of the constitution itself was unlawful as there was no constitutional 
power given to the President to remove a constitution even in an emergency. This 
could have been challenged once again through the courts. 
 
However there was no opportunity to make an application to challenge the abrogation 
since the courts were ousted from jurisdiction to hear any such challenge. Very 
quickly the Attorney General's Office began drafting decrees which forestalled any 
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attempt to seek restoration of the constitution in the courts. The main Decree which 
ousted the court's jurisdiction on constitutional challenges present and future was the 




Notwithstanding anything contained in this Decree or any other law, no 
Court shall have the jurisdiction to accept, hear and determine any 
challenges whatsoever (including any application for judicial review) by 
any person to the Fiji Constitution Amendment Act 1997 Revocation 
Decree 2009 (Decree No 1) and such other Decrees made or as may be 
made by the President.  
 
Such a Decree represented an arbitrary exercise of power and interfered with the 
court's ability to adjudicate pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine. From the 
perspective of Lord Cooke's dictum, it removed the right of citizens to resort to the 
ordinary courts for the determination of their rights as a fundamental right that not 
even a parliament could remove. Pursuant to this principle, neither the President of 
Fiji nor anyone else could claim any lawful power to prohibit a challenge to the 
abrogation of the 1997 Constitution. 
 
K The 2013 Constitution 
 
From 2009 until 2012 many decrees, without the consent of the people, were 
promulgated. In 2012 a Constitutional Commission was appointed to draft a new 
constitution.
458
 Over a nine month period, the five constitutional commissioners 
consulted widely, though whether their final product was the result of these 
consultations is not clear. In any event, the Bainimarama government rejected the 
Commission‘s draft.  The main bone of contention appeared to be the Commission‘s 
proposal to constitutionally establish a non-elected National People‘s Assembly to 




Consequently, the Constitutional Commission was terminated before it could deliver 
its final product.  Instead, another draft constitution was produced, although the 
composition of the drafting committee was a secret. This draft was released for 
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comments in early 2013, with the final version being released in August of the same 
year. The Fiji Constitution of 2013 apparently had some consultation with the people 
of Fiji but there is not much evidence that these were robustly carried out or that the 
people‘s views were incorporated.  
 
 At this point it is appropriate to be reminded of Professor Brookfield‘s definition of 




I think one must accept that the test of success and effectiveness, 
necessarily a limited test, is generally sufficient for revolutionary legality. 
Success and effectiveness will, it is likely, also provide a minimal measure 
of legitimacy, in that some justice according to law will be done. But 
‗considerations of morality and justice‘ may still deny full legitimacy to a 
regime that is judicially recognized as legal because it passes that limited 
but sufficient test. 
 
Then it remains possible that, in some extreme circumstances in a 
particular legal order, considerations of morality and justice may provide a 
basis for a legal challenge to the validity of particular laws of an oppressive 
regime, whether the regime is long-established or is the creation of a more 
or less recent revolution that satisfies the test of success and effectiveness. 
But in relation to the status of a regime of the latter sort, and the order of 
which it is part, the consideration of morality and justice generally go to its 
legitimacy rather than its legality. 
 
It is worth re-visiting the Grenada case of Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions 
to point to the relationship between ‗rights‘ and ‗legitimacy‘ in a constitutional 
order.
461
 Haynes, P, in laying down the requisite principles of legitimacy of a new 





In light of these principles, I now pose two questions in relation to the events of 2009 
and 2013:  
 
(i) whether the 2009 abrogation of the 1997 Constitution qualifies as 
impairment of just rights, and  
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(ii)  whether the promulgation of the new 2013 Constitution similarly 
qualifies as impairment of just rights. 
 
In his Prasad (High Court) decision, Justice Gates said, in relation to the military 




Nor was it necessary to seek to dilute rights in the Constitution granted to 
its inhabitants by the people‘s democratically elected representatives. Any 
decree in which it was sought to do so, would be unlawful at least to that 
extent, such as for example section 19(7)(g) of the Interim Military 
Government Decree No. 7 the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Decree 
2000  purporting to narrow the meaning of equality in section 38 of the 
Constitution. 
 
In light of this ratio in the Prasad case, the answer to my question (i) above is that the 
2009 abrogation of the 1997 Constitution of Fiji did indeed have the effect of 
impairing just rights not merely by the act of abrogation but also by the subsequent 
Decrees diluting and/or removing the rights provided in the Constitution. The new 
laws promulgated after the abrogation did not uphold the 1997 constitutional rights.  
Furthermore, the new Human Rights Commission Decree No 10 of 2009 narrowed 





… ―human rights" means the rights embodied in those United Nations Covenants and 
Conventions on Human Rights which are ratified by the State of Fiji, and the rights 
and freedoms as may be prescribed by the President by Decree …  
 
This definition is quite different from that provided in the original Human Rights 
Commission Act of 1999 which was also abrogated along with the Constitution: 
―human rights‘ means the rights embodied in the United Nations Covenants and 





Thus the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution as well as the new Decree on Human 
Rights do qualify as impairment of just rights provided by those enactments. 
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My next question (ii) above asks whether the 2013 Constitution impairs just rights. 
This can be answered by considering the relative importance given to rights in the 
interpretation ss of the 1997 and 2013 Constitutions respectively. Section 43(2) of the 




In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter, the courts must promote the 
values that underlie a democratic society based on freedom and equality 
and must, if relevant, have regard to public international law applicable to 
the protection of the rights set in this chapter. 
 




… when interpreting and applying this Chapter, a court, tribunal or other 
authority … may, if relevant, consider international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights and freedoms in this Chapter. 
 
No evidence is provided that such fundamental alteration to the ambit of human 
rights protection was agreed by the people of Fiji. Obviously, such an amendment to 
the definition of rights, against all international law,
468
 in the new decrees and 
constitutional documents is an impairment of people‘s just rights.  
 
Furthermore, ‗just rights‘ must be complemented by ‗fair adjudication‘. To assert that 
there is ‗justice‘ without its adjunct, ‗fair adjudication‘, is merely a hollow mantra.  
Lord Cooke had expressed it well by "doubting the power of Parliament 'to take away 
the rights of citizens to resort to the ordinary Courts of law for the determination of 
their rights'".
469
 The concept of ‗fair adjudication‘ is linked not only to access to 
justice but also to that important constitutional principle, independence of the 
mechanism/s of adjudication. In this regard, independence of the mechanisms of 
adjudication is associated with the ‗doctrine of separation of powers‘.  
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The separation of powers doctrine grew out of centuries of political and 
philosophical development. Its origins can be traced to the fourth century 
B.C. when Aristotle, in his treatise entitled Politics, described three 
agencies of government: the general assembly, the public officials, and the 
judiciary. In republican Rome, there was a somewhat similar system 
consisting of public assemblies, the senate, and the public officials, all 
operating on a principle of checks and balances. Following the fall of the 
Roman Empire, Europe became fragmented into nation-states, and from 
the end of the Middle Ages until the eighteenth century the dominant 
governmental structure consisted of a concentrated power residing in 
hereditary rulers, the sole exception being the development of the English 
Parliament in the seventeenth century. With the birth of Parliament, the 
theory of three branches of government reappeared, this time embodied in 
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1689), where these three 
powers were defined as "legislative," "executive," and "federative." 
 





When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or 
body, there can be no liberty, because apprehension might arise lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner.  
 
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separate from the 
legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and 
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge 
would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the 
judge might behave with violence and oppression. 
 
How does Ervin‘s account of the origins, definition and significance of the separation 
of powers doctrine assist with consideration of whether ‗fair adjudication‘ is 
protected in the 2013 Fijian Constitution? A reading of s 173(5) of the 2013 
Constitution shows that s 5 of the Administration of Justice Decree 2009, which 
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prohibited the courts from entertaining any challenge to the abrogation of the 1997 
Constitution, remains in force despite the repeal of the Decree itself.  
 
Such interference with the principle of ‗fair adjudication‘ has not gone unnoticed by 
others outside of the Fijian state. On 31
st
 October 2014, pursuant to the Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) of Fiji conducted by the UN Human Rights Council, the 




101.31 Amend the legislative and constitutional framework to maintain the 
separation of powers and cease any executive interference with the 
independence of the judiciary and lawyers, and ensure that the processes 
governing the qualification and discipline of lawyers and judges are free 
from political interference …  
 
In its March 2015 response, the Fiji Government said that it did not accept this 
recommendation due to the fact that the doctrine of separation of powers was 
enshrined in the new Constitution.
473
 But of course s 173(5) of the Constitution 
vividly shows that it is not.  
 
Thus, based on the Prasad High Court decision, the 2013 Constitution itself, the 2015 
Human Rights Council Report and other authorities noted above, clearly, ‗just rights‘ 
and ‗fair adjudication‘ have not been protected in Fiji since 2009. 
 
The next question is whether the people of Fiji might have agreed to have their Bill of 
Rights ‗diluted‘, their ‗just rights‘ impaired or their access to ‗fair adjudication‘ 
removed. This would point to whether there is consensus or general will exhibited in 
favour of the 2013 Constitution. Again, the Fiji UPR process is relevant. The Human 




101.10 Establish a Constitutional Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the 2013 Constitution and carry out 
national consultations to ensure that the Constitution is reflective 
of the will of the people … 
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It is to be noted that this recommendation by the UPR Working Group on Fiji was 
made just over six weeks after the 2014 election results in which Bainimarama‘s 
party won the majority 32 out of 50 seats in parliament.
475
 It shows that, despite the 
success of the drafters of the 2013 Constitution in the elections, it may have been 
obvious to the UPR Working Group that there is a consensus (‗will of the people‘) 
deficit in respect of the Constitution under which the elections were held.  
 
In opposition to this point of view, it can be claimed that success for the Bainimarama 
Government in the 2014 elections pursuant to the 2013 Constitution makes the new 
constitutional order legal, if not legitimate. However, as I have shown in the previous 
chapter, there is no law without justice, no legality without legitimacy. Moreover, 
research shows that majority voting in certain situations, while presuming legality, 
may indicate a different type of problem- voter manipulation. In an interesting essay 
titled "Beat Me if You Can: The Fairness of Elections in Dictatorship", Masaaki 
Higashijima says that while different types of election fraud, namely, "rigging 
elections through vote stuffing, violent repression, and the manipulation of election 
rules and institutions"
476
 are well-known, claims to success in elections must be 




Instead of resorting to electoral fraud, dictators with rich resources can 
mobilize voters through large-scale economic distribution implementing 
expansionary economic policies. Loosening fiscal policies and 
strengthening pork barrel politics, authoritarian leaders can create public 
employment, adopt tax exemption for party supporters and the poor, 
provide bonus for public employees, construct infrastructure and 
implement other forms of public goods provision, all of which are not 






Importantly, relying more on manipulation of economic policy instruments, 
dictators can increase the credibility of election results, which helps them 
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send a clear signal of regime invincibility. … the mere existence of free 
and fair elections does not necessarily lead to further democratization in 
dictatorial countries. 
 
The Multinational Observer Group which monitored Fiji‘s 2014 elections found no 
evidence of fraud,
479
 and clearly, it would have been difficult to stuff ballot boxes 
during the one-day election. That is not to say, however, that manipulation of votes 
did not take place through the "manipulation of economic policy instruments". In its 
election campaign, the Bainimarama government claimed that it had improved the 
lives of the people of Fiji during its term in office. As early as 2013 in his Budget 





We have made government services more readily available to more people 
than ever before. We have reformed social welfare to give more help to the 
neediest while creating opportunities for them. We have established 
partnerships with the private sector and are reforming state owned 
enterprises. We have revitalised the sugar industry, created a sustainable 
mahogany industry, and made our ports efficient. We have embarked on an 
ambitious program to correct the deplorable condition of our roads. We 
have begun reforming the civil service to make it more professional, 
accountable, and results-oriented. 
 





Gone are the days in Fiji when Government came to look at what you 
needed, pretended to listen and then went away and did nothing. My 
Government is here to serve, to improve the quality of your lives and 
provide opportunities for you and your families. 
 
We cared that you didn‘t have access to power, that many of you couldn‘t 
afford generators, that your evenings were filled with dim lights from 
candlepower and kerosene. We cared that some of you couldn‘t afford to 
send your children to school, so we got rid of the fees and are opening up 
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new schools to provide every Fijian with education and the opportunities 
that come with it.  
 
We cared that your road was a rough track that became a mud track in wet 
weather, that your children had to walk through to go to school, that it took 
you too long to get medical help, too long to get to Labasa, too long to get 
to Nabouwalu. 
 
We cared, we acted and we‘ve delivered. And I am humbled by the number 
of people who have come up to thank me and have told me how much that 
commitment has meant to them. In turn, I want to pay tribute to the Board, 
management and workers of the FEA, and its contractors, who have made 
this project possible. You have done us all proud and we thank you for 
your service. 
 
With the 24-million dollars set aside in this year‘s budget to continue our 
electrification program, we look forward to soon strengthening the supply 
to the Tavua-Korovou corridor. This will allows rural communities and 
businesses in Ra and Tailevu to enjoy the same benefits that have now 
come to Seaqaqa, Batiri and Dreketi. 
 
Fiji has also signed an agreement with the People‘s Republic of China to 
construct a 700 kilowatt Mini Hydro Power Plant in Taveuni. 
 
Both these speeches show that Bainimarama‘s government could be seen to fit within 
the second of Higashijima‘s categories- that of "manipulation of economic policy 
instruments" prior to elections to gain votes that were purportedly voluntarily given in 
favour of the 2013 Constitution. While election promises and resort to so-called 
evidence of past social service provisions are normal in all contexts, Fiji's unique 
historical conditions between 2009 and 2013 allows us a measure of scepticism.  
 
It was therefore appropriate that, despite the 2014 election results, the UPR Working 
Group would recommend that Fiji should review whether the Constitution is 
reflective of the ‗will of the people‘ since, as Higashijima noted, "the mere existence 
of free and fair elections does not necessarily lead to further democratization in 
dictatorial countries".
482
 The Fiji Government did not accept this recommendation 
and stated ironically  that a change in the Constitution can only be done according to 
its own mechanisms. 
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In this chapter on Fiji I have considered whether justice was an element of the Fijian 
legal landscape from earliest times to the present. Not much remains from early 
accounts of Fiji to suggest that justice and law were two distinct attributes of pre-
European society. The command-type authoritarian rule inflicted on village people by 
the chiefs would have been considered to be 'just' in the sentiment of the times. 
Colonial European society introduced another type of justice, no less distinct from 
law, though the sentiments of the English Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights were 
the subtle sub-text of colonial rule. Colonial rule would have proceeded on the basis 
of the Hobbesian idea of society rather than that of John Locke. At the same time, the 
Deed of Cession  illustrated consent of the indigenous chiefs to cession.  
 
After 1960 when constitutional talks for independence became imminent, the Bill of 
Rights, representing all elements of justice in the international legal arena was 
established as a core supreme and entrenched law for the people of Fiji. This was 
aborted in 1987 when a coup d'état removed the guarantees of justice and, in 1990 
imposed an unjust (and therefore illegal and illegitimate) constitution.  
 
The 1997 Constitution restored justice in the constitution by consent of the people by 
a careful balance of the rights of the people and the obligations of the government as 
a matter of trust. The Social Compact chapter also illustrated a contractual 
relationship between the state and the people. The 2000 attempted coup purported to 
remove it once again but it was restored by the Prasad case. In 2009 justice was once 
again removed by the Administration of Justice Decree, illustrating that the use of the 
word 'justice' can sometimes be used to refer to its very opposite. In 2013 the quality 
of justice to which people had felt entitled, by way of the 1997 Constitution, was 
missing from a document that also did not appear to have the consent of the people. 
Subsequent elections did not bring about legitimacy since the document, purportedly 
the Constitution, that permitted these elections to take place was enacted without 
consent. The process of drafting the Constitution was itself unjust and therefore 
unlawful. It is important to question whether the ' right to rebel' looms large in such a 
situation.  
 
In the next chapter, given the perspectives explored in previous chapters, I consider 
how one could, possibly, draft a hypothetical constitution for Fiji within which the 
core invariant feature, or the identity of 'justice' is embedded through the 
methodology of 'autopoiesis' outlined in the first chapter of the thesis. The consent of 
the people would be essential to provide legitimacy/legality in any such document; 
the point is to draft a document in such a way that it would attract that consent.  
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V Chapter 4 
Drafting a Legitimate Fijian Constitution 
 
In his speech in preparation for the 2018 national elections Sitiveni Rabuka said that 
the 2013 Constitution had an "impressive array of rights" but also an impressive list 
of limitations to those rights.
483
 As the architect of the 1997 Constitution Rabuka was 
able to make this statement. He promised to review the 2013 Constitution if his party, 
SODELPA (Social Democratic Liberal Party), won the elections. It would have been 
interesting to see to what extent the 1997 Constitution would have been considered in 
any such review. SODELPA lost the elections with a smaller margin than anticipated. 
 
In the previous chapter I showed that there were serious limitations to the rights 
provided in the 2013 Constitution which were not present in the 1997 Constitution. 
The rest of the Constitutional provisions (some new) on governance, structure of the 
government, voting mechanisms, the role of the military in state affairs, social, 
cultural and economic rights, and environmental rights do not mean much if some of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights are not as justiciable as they were under the previous 
consensus-based Constitution.  
 
Should another review take place, the 1997 Constitution would be a good place to 
start, with the new elements from the 2013 Constitution used to expand the rights 
chapter of the 1997 Constitution but not to undermine it, as is the case currently. In 
this review it would be best to keep in mind the statement of Thomas Jefferson in a 
letter written to the Republicans of Washington County, Maryland on 31 March 
1809: "[T]he care of human life & happiness, & not their destruction, is the first & 




This was the foundational philosophy of the American Declaration of Independence 
on which, subsequently, the American Constitution was based. Respect for human 
life and happiness remains the core value of Justice, as defined since time 
immemorial by human society. The care of human life and happiness is certainly not 
the core identifier of injustice as that would constitute a philosophical contradiction.  
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Crafting a Constitution that identifies, with integrity, "the care of human life and 
happiness and not their destruction" requires close attention to be paid by drafters to 
two matters: (i) Content and (ii) Structure. A Justice-identified Constitution would 
include the elements of justice defined by human society in its variety of legal texts 
and which were set out at the end of Chapter 2 of the thesis, namely: right to be 
heard, equality, collective responsibility, agreement and consent, fair and 
independent delivery of law, rights, moral goodness, integrity of the social order, 
welfare of the whole society or common good, complete goodness, liberty and 
freedoms, social entitlement, divine order, wisdom, virtue, mercy, peaceful 
governance, mutual obligations and social contract, happiness, general good and 
representation of people in governance. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
under the 2013 Constitution, the 'right to be heard' and 'fair and independent delivery 
of law' (access to courts), 'agreement and consent', 'mutual obligations and social 
contract' (called 'Compact' which was Chapter 2 of the 1997 Constitution) are all 
missing. The Compact chapter had spelt out the 'conduct of government' as an 
undertaking. Also missing is the Social Justice Chapter 5 of the 1997 Constitution. 
The expanded Bill of Rights in the 2013 Constitution does not compensate for these 
two omitted chapters.  
 
This gap throws into question and undermines the rights given in the balance. Unlike 
the 1997 Constitution which treated rights as god-given (roots in the 'divine' as the 
natural law thinkers saw them) and an aspect of the human condition, the 2013 
Constitution defines rights as those that are "ratified by the State of Fiji" or are 
"prescribed by the President by Decree".
485
 Section 7(1)(b) of the Constitution which 
provides the courts with the discretion to decide what international laws are 
applicable to the Fiji context (unlike the 1997 Constitution which made it mandatory 
for them to do so) is another obstacle to seeing the 2013 Constitution identified by 
justice. Thus the content and scope of just rights in a Constitution goes to the 
legitimacy of that Constitution and the legitimacy of the order which will prevail after 
the Constitution is adopted. 
 
However, content and scope are not the only attributes of a legitimate constitution. 
Decisions about the placement of provisions, the extent and quality of limitations, the 
positioning of rights and existence and placing of social compact provisions within 
the overall structure and, in general, the extent of embeddedness of justice in all the 
provisions and in the 'basic structure' of the constitution, is what defines a legitimate 
constitution from a purely legal one, irrespective of how it was enacted. As in the 
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case of South Africa recently, and reminding ourselves of Brookfield's caution that 
"democratic majoritarianism in Fiji, as in New Zealand and elsewhere, does not 
provide the sole criterion for legitimacy",
486
 we know that a parliament can pass a 
non-legitimate constitution but that process does not necessarily make it legitimate. In 
my view it does not even make it legal if the core value of a constitution is injustice, 
as in the 1990 Constitution of Fiji, and as the House of Lords showed in Openheimer 
v Cattermole. 
 
It will be noted that the grundnorm established in Fiji even prior to Cession was 
defined by rights. The early Constitutions of King Cakobau's Government and the 
Confederation that came afterwards included the core value of justice as was defined 
at the time by the English, American and French constitutional documents. It was a 
new grundnorm, replacing the arbitrary law of tribal social life, and was adopted as a 
voluntary sentiment by a far-sighted Fijian king who had the wisdom to realise that 
times were changing, making a concerted effort to embrace those changes for the 
common good. Afterwards, in the newly independent Fiji, the Constitution of 1970 
was built on the foundation of the early constitutions by making rights current, based 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This constitution placed the rights 
chapter at the very front of that Constitution indicating the significance and centrality 
of justice, defined as respect for 'rights' in the supreme law of Fiji. While the 1990 
Constitution attempted to eradicate justice from the law this did not last long and the 
1997 Constitution restored it even more robustly, not only in content but also in 
structure since the Bill of Rights chapter of the Constitution, with its specific 
wording, trumped other chapters. As such the 1997 Constitution was closer to the 
pre-Cession Cakobau constitutions and the 1970 Constitution.  
 
At this juncture it is appropriate to return to Teubner and his remarks about the 
connection between justice and law- that justice is law's contingent side or, as I think, 
that justice keeps law philosophically clean. Teubner said that: "Justice is confronted 
with the primary closure of law" (ratio, recursive chains of court judgments, 
legislative and contractual acts) which "itself [can become] a major source of 
injustice".
487
 However, justice and law do not operate mutually exclusively when it 
comes to legitimacy. Justice is embedded in a legitimate constitution structurally as 
well as in content. The Systems methodology of autopoiesis, allows us not only to 
understand how this can be done, but also to make it practically possible. 
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Teubner has said that the value of autopoiesis to legal theory lies in what it reveals 
about the conditions, mechanisms and consequences of mutual interference between 
law and other social domains outside of the law. He says that the "quality of the 
legalization process may change if the legal system becomes aware of the autopoietic 
character of its surrounding social systems and adapts its normative structures to 
it".
488
 However, the mechanics of how this is to be done is more clearly defined by 
physicist Hugo Urrestarazu whose work shows that there are ways of sustaining a 
system's lifespan without the external features of it unpredictably disrupting its basic 
structure. He shows the technique of achieving stability by searching for "a 
describable feature of the dynamic system that remains invariant throughout".
489
 This 
evokes the Indian Supreme Court's decision in the Kesavananda case
490
 about the 
effects of an amendment to the constitution on its basic structure- that the Indian 
Constitution's basic structure cannot be disrupted even by a parliament. It is also 
reminiscent of Sir Robin Cooke's dictum that some common law rights lie so deep 
that not even parliament can remove them. By using Urrestarazu's formulation a 
constitutional 'frontier' can be devised as a 'shield' or compensating mechanism so 
that the basic structure or dynamic of a system withstands disruption.  
 
Justice, for me, as defined above, is the core invariant feature that can act as a shield, 
a frontier, or a compensating mechanism in a constitution. That is what gives a 
constitution and a constitutional order legitimacy. In the case of Fiji, the 1997 
Constitution contained the following elements indicating irrevocable legitimacy: (i) it 
was formulated by consent; (ii) it had a robust set of rights embedded as the core 
value which made it supreme even within the Constitution; (iii) it contained an open 
right to redress not only to the courts, including by petition, but also to international 
human rights mechanisms through the courts which judges, between 2001 and 2009, 
actively applied; (iv) it had a compact chapter which spelled out the respective duties 
and obligations not only between the state and the people as a matter of trust but also 
those between the people themselves as a social contract; (v) it had a social justice 
and affirmative action chapter giving privileges for a period of time to those 
disadvantaged in society, and (vi) it had a set of reasonable limitations for the 
common good which reflected the broad Article 29 UDHR limitation which was 
expressed as the phrase "in the interests of national security, public safety, public 
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order, public morality or public health", as long as those limitations were "reasonable 
and justifiable in a free and democratic society".
491
   
 
The 1997 Constitution did not, however, include the right to rebel, nor was there any 
mechanism installed for constitutional survival in the face of external perturbations in 
the form of abrogations by a head of state, the military or a civilian. Chandrika 
Prasad, though, had shown that it was not that easy to abrogate the 1997 
Constitution. Yet it was indeed (purportedly) abrogated in April 2009, illustrating that 
the invariant core mechanisms in the 1997 Constitution were not sufficiently strong to 
withstand its professed removal (I use the words 'purported' and 'professed' here 
because unless the courts have been allowed to address the Constitution's actual 
removal it is not clear that it has been removed, irrespective of the promulgation of 
the 2013 Constitution as, even in the Kelsen formulation, this constitution's 
'effectiveness' or 'success', and therefore 'legitimacy', were never legally tested or 
determined).  
 
The Methodology chapter of the thesis pointed to a number of theoretical foundations 
that were thought to be useful for the construction of a legitimate constitution. These 
were (i) Legal Praxis; (ii) Natural Law as the foundation of a constitutional 
document; (iii) Positivist rules about effectiveness of a constitutional order; and (iv)  
autopoiesis methodology derived from Systems Theory to make it possible for a 
closed system such as law to be responsive to its contingent side, justice, so that in 
the event that law becomes strained, it can communicate through its open side with 
justice to restore balance in itself. The combination of the above in crafting a new 
constitution requires what Loughlin called "constitutional imagination" which allows 
for less constitutional hierarchy and the intervention of more deliberative dialogue, to 
obtain consent, in the interest of public service.  
 
The question is whether there is anything new in this approach which would make a 
constitution stronger and less susceptible to abrogations and therefore carry less risk 
of interference by maleficent forces acting against the public interest. It should be 
noted that two of the three abrogations of the Fijian Constitution (in the year 2000 a 
purported abrogation, the court said) were justified on the normally acceptable 
sentiments of indigenous rights. Yet beneath the indigenous rights cries, though 
masked by calls for 'justice', was racial prejudice which would become discrimination 
had the mechanisms of the state been given full authority to give effect to that 
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prejudice. This had happened with the 1990 Constitution as pointed out in the 
previous chapter. The related question is whether indigenous supremacy, within the 
international legal mechanisms provided for indigenous rights,
492
 can even be 
advocated as being 'just'.  
 
No will ever be able to justify any kind of racial or ethnic supremacy on the basis of 
international human rights documents. This is especially if such ideas of supremacy 
are accompanied by violence against a targeted group. It would be too reminiscent of 
Nazi Germany, Bosnia and Rwanda in the 20th century. This perspective is obviously 
different from a situation which triggers the 'right to rebel' obligation as expressed by 
John Locke and the relevant provisions in the French and American constitutions (in 
the latter case the Declaration of Independence) which are justified on the grounds of 
freedom from oppression and does not give licence or freedom to oppress. 
Furthermore, stemming from Weber's idea that the state has the monopoly on the use 
of force,
493
 a state is required under international law to have control over the 
legitimate use of force. The key word is 'legitimate' in the use of force.  
 
One could say that since a legitimate constitution or constitutional order is derived 
from consent of the people to it that should be sufficient to hold it safe from 
interference or abrogation. The problem here is the notion of 'consent'. If consent is 
derived from the majoritarianism principle there will always be pockets of civilians or 
others from the minorities which have not consented. Democratic consent does not 
mean universal consent. In such cases the minorities may well object to 'tyranny of 
the majority' which gives them reason, or the right, to rebel. But the robustness of the 
American and French Constitutions (or the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen in it) despite the over three centuries of their functioning shows that a 
Constitution can stand the test of time for both minority and majority populations. It 
pays to consider what makes them so sustainable over time and irrespective of 
realities such as slavery which, as in the American Constitution, relates to the three-
fifths clause (art I, s 2, of the United States Constitution of 1787). The sustainability in the 
American Constitution comes from the ability to make consensual amendments to it. 
Thus the three-fifths clause was nullified by Amendments XIII, IV and V after the 
American Civil War. The process of introducing amendments to the American 
Constitution is based on obtaining a supermajority vote in a joint resolution of the 
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Congress and the Senate, as well as obtaining agreement of the legislators of three 
fourths of the states. The possibility of calling state conventions to obtain ratification 
of an amendment is an alternative.  
 
The imperishability of the American and French Constitutions in rights terms should 
be considered for an enquiry into whether both the content and structure of a 
constitution, as well as the kind of consent required for its approval or ratification, are 
needed to ensure not only its sustainability and relevance over time but also its 
survival.  
 
In any Constitution, for its legitimacy to be without question, a number of different 
ingredients need to be mixed cohesively together for effectiveness and success. The 
first is the history of the formation of the state to which that Constitution refers. In the 
American constitutional origins this is the Declaration of Independence which is a 
statement of natural law. The Constitution itself is a statement of positive law, 
defining the structures of government, but the expectation is that the positivist 
constitution would rely on the natural law Declaration for its validity and 
sustainability. The Preamble of the French Constitution of 1958 states that: "The 
French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the 
principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789".
494
 The 1997 
Fijian Constitution in its Preamble sought the blessing of God and then stated the 
history of the Fijian people through its constitutional milestones, including the 1987 
abrogation of the 1970 Constitution and recognition of all who had made their home 
in Fiji. Thus the 1997 Constitution was founded on natural law principles. The 2013 
Constitution is more of a positivist document which merely 'recognises' the various 
groups living in Fiji and their commitment to inter alia human rights, justice, and 
national sovereignty.  
 
The second ingredient for a legitimate Constitution is the state's expressed 
commitment to its people through various means, for example a justiciable compact 
chapter and bill of rights which bind the state and all its agencies such as the 
judiciary, the executive and parliament. A social compact chapter ('social contract in 
the Enlightenment thinkers' sense) and a bill of rights with supremacy within a 
Constitution (all state agencies and other laws and constitutional provisions are bound 
by it) which may otherwise be a positivist one indicates a move towards a document 
that is defined by justice since this, along with 'morality' defined as 'rights', is the core 
value in constitutions emanating from the Natural Law perspective.  
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The third ingredient is appropriate structure of the Constitution. The placing of the 
social compact and bill of rights chapters shows their relative priority in the 1997 
Constitution. Section 21(2) of the 1997 Constitution placed limitations on the Bill of 
Rights only pursuant to laws of general application permitted by the Bill of Rights 
chapter and to derogations permitted by emergency powers in Chapter 14. This clause 
gave the Bill of Rights chapter its supremacy in relation not only to ordinary laws but 
to other provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand the 2013 Constitution's 
Chapter 2 Bill of Rights at ss 6(5)(a), (b) and (c) make it possible for other provisions 
in the Constitution, as well as other ordinary laws or actions taken under other laws, 
to limit the Bill of Rights. These limitations place the Bill of Rights in the 2013 
Constitution precariously at a lower level than was the case in the 1997 Constitution. 
Rights have been demoted in the 2013 Constitution, as is also indicated by the 
discretion given to the courts not to refer to international human rights law in cases 
before them. 
 
The fourth ingredient is consent. When the phrase 'We the People' is used, it needs to 
demonstrably show that it includes all the people. The last document that had the 
agreement of all the people, due to the fact that anyone who wished to be represented 
in the discussion of it could be, was the People's Charter drafted by the National 
Council for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF). There is no mention of this body or this 
Charter in the 2013 Constitution. Thus consent is the missing component of the 2013 
Constitution. 
 
If all the above four ingredients are present in a Constitution of Fiji, given its history, 
one could safely say that it would be a legitimate Constitution. However, there is 
more to it than content and widespread consent. Irrespective of consent there needs to 
be protection of the Constitution from abrogation by anyone with a cause or reason to 
do so. Protection of a Constitution can be obtained by two means- (i) the ability of a 
drafter to use a certain methodology to draft the necessary ingredients into every 
chapter of the constitution to facilitate an appropriate and agreed content, and (ii) the 
ability of the people to protect their constitution, physically if need be, pursuant to a 
lawful 'right to rebel' clause. They will only do the latter if (i) they are a part of the 
constitutional drafting mechanisms and thus include the duty to rebel in case of 
threats to the Constitution, and (ii) they use a certain foundational word or phrase to 
ground the Constitution into something that makes sense to them, as individuals, as 
part of their community, and as part of the national agenda in which they have a 
stake. In this particular sense the compact between the state and its people becomes 
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vital. There has to be an expressed appreciation of the social contract and just nature 
of governance.  
 
In terms of the both the first items above, the concept of autopoiesis becomes 
important to illustrate that a constitution will have woven into it the specific content 
and double entrenchment of the required clauses. In terms of both the second, the 
word 'justice' in all its manifestations would be the key concept that needs to be 
woven into the Constitution and the removal of it would trigger the duty to rebel. The 
'right to rebel' clause would be provided at the Preamble stage to indicate protection 
by the people of their constitution which they have helped formulate with consent. 
 
I have drafted such a Constitution for Fiji (Constitution 20XX) which cannot be 
reproduced in this thesis as it needs more space than currently possible. The core 
methodological device is autopoiesis which is used to craft the concept of 'justice' as 
defined in chapter 2 into the Constitution. The brackets refer to specific provisions. 
 
A Drafting a Fijian Constitution through Autopoiesis 
 
Any document that has 'justice' drafted into it autopoietically would show that it: 
 
(i) is dynamic (is a living document amenable to amendments for justice similar 
to the American Constitution but not amenable to any assault, even by 
parliament, to its basic structure); 
 
(ii) is self-defining, self-referencing, self-producing, self-healing, self-maintaining 
(preservative) and self-controlling in the face of external perturbations so that 
the constitution itself is not deleted (the basic structure remains robust as 
indicated in the Indian Kesavananda case). Related to this is that it will have 
structures favourable to itself which can survive through the passage of time 
and counteract perturbations that would otherwise lead to disintegration; 
 
(iii)  has structure-determined self-organization (there is a reason for clauses 
appearing in certain places in the Constitution), and has self-sustained 
structure-determined mechanisms available to mitigate threats; 
 
(iv)  is able to provide multiplicity of solutions to mitigate disintegration despite 
chaos (for example an independent judiciary, a supreme Bill of Rights which 




(v) has survival knowledge (right to rebel to threats to the Constitution - in the 
Preamble); 
 
(vi) uses its own information to enhance its survival (Preamble paragraphs on 
history of the constitutional development); 
 
(vii)  has organizational variance, accommodating structural change by 
maintenance of conservative properties and has the ability to search for a 
feature that remains invariant throughout any transitions affecting its 
components (despite other changes the concept of 'justice' remains intact; 
Parliament; unimpaired just rights; and justiciable social contract and Bill of 
Rights as the fundamental base); 
 
(viii) has boundaries which are protective and can limit perturbations so that their 
effect is minor; boundaries can also act as a mediating structure, by 
interacting, absorbing or transmitting information to limit disintegration (a 
closed system which relies on precedents and constitutional history; 
Preamble; reference to international human rights law); 
 
(ix) reacts instantaneously to environmental changes so that they have minimal 
effect (the right to remedy and petition to the courts in case of threat; role of 
the military to protect the Constitution; President's prerogative power as head 
of state to protect the Constitution with the aid of the military and police) 
 
(x) whose ultimate aim is conservation of the entire autopoietic constitutional 
system as a ‗global steady state‘, despite the possibility of fragmentation 
(Interpretation; Enforcement); 
 
(xi)   Can change its structure, component membership and medium objects but the 
 organisation is preserved as long as a compensating mechanism is available 
 after each encounter (Enforcement, right to rebel clause) 
 
Thus Constitution 20XX specifically can be drafted as follows: 
 
(a) Constitution 20XX: content 
 





(ii) the last consensual principles developed by a cross-section of the 
Fijian community, represented by the People’s Charter for Change, 
Peace and Progress (2008) which itself took the 1997 Constitution as 
its reference point (Preamble (f)) 
 
(iii) the basis of earliest consensual (‗legitimate‘) constitutions of Fiji 
which were agreed pre-Cession, namely the Constitutions of 1867, 
1871 and 1873 (Recalling paragraph) 
 
(iv) the historically developed notion of ‗consensus‘, in the social contract 
sense of the people contracting with each other to respect ‗unimpaired 
just rights‘ and, subsequently, creating a fiduciary duty in the state to 
protect, without abuse of trust, this relationship of the people to each 
other, as also expressed in the Social Compact provisions of the 1997 
Constitution (Recognising paragraph; preamble of section 20; section 




 century evolution of justice and ‗unimpaired just rights‘ in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which Fiji is a party 
through the Vienna Declaration of Human Rights of June 1993 
(Committing and Reaffirming paragraphs) and referencing the 
principles of the Mitchell v DPP case of Grenada. 
 
(vi) the Bill of Rights chapter which recalls protection and promotion of all 
international human rights law (Chapter 2) 
 
(vii) the core nature of the human rights chapter for the constitutional 
system (Emphasising..Preamble of chapter 2) 
 
(viii) the social contract basis of rights (Committing … Preamble of Chapter 
2) 
 
(ix) the supreme and entrenched nature of the Constitution and the 
supreme and entrenched nature of the Bill of Rights chapter 2 (section 
2(1) and (2; chapter 3)) 
 
(x) the head of state with the help of the military as protector of the 




(xi) the boundaries of the international and national constitutional spaces 
(section 3 Interpretation; section 5 application). 
 
(xii) the right to social justice (and development) (section 33) 
 
(xiii) separation of powers (section 40; section 44; chapter 9; chapter 12) 
 
(b) Constitution 20XX: dynamic structure 
 
The structure of Constitution 20XX is constructed autopoietically as follows: 
 
(i) Each chapter is prefaced by the justice/rights principle pertaining to 
the contents of that chapter 
 
(ii) Each chapter, though autonomous in its subject matter, has an 
interactive relationship to other chapters in the expression of the 
fundamental principles of the constitution which is the subject of 
chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
 
(iii) The application and enforcement mechanisms for breach provided in 
the constitution are as relevant for each of the chapters as for the 
Constitution as a whole. Right to rebel clause. 
 
(iv) Enforcement provisions can be optimally enforced through the 
principle of separation of powers as provided. 
 
(v) The autopoietic core of the constitution, identified as 'justice' is 
revealed in (i) preambular paragraphs which set out the social contract 
aspect of the entire constitution, (ii) Chapter 2 Bill of Rights, (iii) 
preambles of each chapter, (iv) Chapter 9 The Judiciary, and (v) 
Chapter 12 Accountability. 
 
The schema over the next three pages illustrates the properties of autopoiesis linked 




An Autopoietic Constitutional System Constitution 20XX 
Is dynamic 
 
Links to previous legitimate 
constitutions in preamble (living 
document) 
 
Is self-defining, self-referencing, self-
producing, self-healing, self-maintaining and 
self-controlling despite external 
perturbations. 
 
Section 2 (1) supreme Constitution, (2) 
inconsistent law invalid to the extent of 
the inconsistency; Preamble Bill of 
Rights Chapter 2  
 
Has structure-determined self-organisation 
 
Core rights expressed as preamble of 
each chapter (new) 
 
Has favourable structures which can survive 
through the passage of time and counteract 
perturbations that would otherwise lead to 
disintegration 
 
Chapter 14 Amendment of the 
Constitution restricted except by 
informed consent. 
 
Has preservative qualities despite 
fragmentation brought about through 
(re)production of the system 
 
Section 5 Application of the 
Constitution: Justice and rights as its 
core. 
 
Has self-sustained structure- determined 
mechanisms available to mitigate threats 
 
Separation of powers: chapter 9 
independence of the judiciary 
 
Is able to provide multiplicity of solutions to 
mitigate disintegration despite chaos 
 
Section 44 Constitutional Court; section 
45 Human Rights Commission; chapter 
4 Executive Authority of the President; 
section 112 Republic of the Military 
Forces; chapter 8 Councils of Influence; 
chapter 9 Judiciary; chapter 12 Part 2 





Has survival knowledge 
 
Preamble: ‗As God is our Witness we 
give ourselves this Constitution’; 
Preamble. 
 





Has organizational variance: accommodates 
structural change by maintenance of 
conservative properties 
Chapter 3 Parliament; Unimpaired Just 
Rights (Bill of Rights) 
Has the ability to search for a feature that 
remains invariant throughout any transitions 
affecting its components 
 
Justiciable social contract as 
fundamental basis of a constitution 
Preamble and section 33. 
 
Has boundaries which are protective and can 
limit perturbations so that their effect is 
minor; or are mediating structures which 
interact, absorb or transmit information to 
limit disintegration 
 
Preamble last paragraph; section 3 






It will be seen from the schema above that an autopoietic constitution can be drafted 
to withstand perturbations (as much as possible) which may arise from the internal or 
external environments.  
 
What is also to be added to Constitution 20XX is the 'right to rebel'. The Federal 
German Republic included the right to rebel as follows: "All Germans shall have the 





Thus, Constitution 20XX should be able to consolidate, through constitutional 
imagination, the following key attributes: (a) justice as the core invariant element 
woven, following the Croatian example, autopoietically into its very fabric; (b) 
acknowledgement of the trust and social contract nature of the state/people, 
people/people  relationships which therefore would be both vertical and horizontal in 
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Reacts instantaneously to environmental 
changes so they have minimal effect 
 
Section 112 Republic of the Fiji 
Military Forces; Section 86 President‘s 
prerogative power  
 
Is repeatedly available for compensation for 
disruptions 
 
Chapter 13 Emergency Powers 
 
Whose ultimate aim is conservation of the 
entire autopoietic system as a ‗global steady 
state‘ 
 
Section 3 Interpretation of the 




Can change its structure, component 
membership and medium objects but the 
organization is preserved as long as a 
compensating mechanism is available after 
each encounter 
Section 44 Enforcement 
                  Right to rebel clause 
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the constitutional structure; and (c) Praxis (including legal praxis) namely the 'right to 
rebel'.  
 
To express it unequivocally in relation to the Fijian experience, a Constitution 
enacted by the people with the core presumptive values and ‗lineage‘ of ‗justice‘, fair 
adjudication‘ and ‗consensus/general will‘ as its invariant features could withstand 
any internal or external threat to its existence. The people, as representatives of the 
‗general will‘, would form the ‗structure determined compensating mechanism‘ to 































This thesis has several different strands which draws upon discrete areas of legal 
analysis to find the answers to the questions raised in it from the perspective of 
feminist methodology in scholarship. It began with the principal question: 'what 
makes Constitutions Legitimate?' It attempted to find the answer to this main question 
by providing a legal analysis of constitutions and legitimacy through the example of 
the Fijian context. Thus my initial inquiry was approached from the general to the 
specific, using the deductive method of legal reasoning. The early reference and 
influence of Frederick Brookfield in this inquiry was obvious from his observation, 
quoted on the very first page of the introduction to the thesis, that in a regime and the 
order of which it is a part, considerations of morality and justice generally go to its 
legitimacy rather than legality. For significant jurists like Brookfield, who relied on 
leading decisions on constitutional law from the early Pakistani cases to the most 
recent Fijian High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in Prasad v the Republic of 
Fiji /The Republic of Fiji v Prasad for his observations about the difference between 
legality and legitimacy of a legal order, legitimacy and legality are two different 
things, though overlapping.  
 
However, more recent jurisprudence suggests that the purported difference between 
legality and legitimacy, though important to investigate and closely scrutinize for its 
properties, may be less relevant for those who wish to employ the tactic of legal 
praxis to bring about social change in the pursuit of justice. Or, if relevant at all, it 
would be only to bring the two concepts of legality and legitimacy together as 
seamlessly as possible to ensure that lack of legitimacy also indicates lack of legality 
thus triggering the right to rebel as stated in John Locke's Two Treatises of 
Government. Indeed the end result of this initial scrutiny from both the legal and 
political sense was that a new perspective ought to be, referencing Thornhill and 
Ashenden, that no coercive laws are likely to be perceived as legitimate, meaning that 
there is no distinction between legality and legitimacy. Once this conclusion was 
reached the next questions that arose as a consequence of this finding could be 
addressed. 
 
If, therefore, lack of justice (and morality, as Brookfield said) indicated the absence 
of both legality and legitimacy, the question of what might constitute these two 
concepts became critical to analysing whether there was legitimacy or legality in the 
contemporary Fijian context. First, morality. Morality, in the non-religious sense, is 
determined in the recent literature as rights. Rights are defined specifically by the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are thus less problematic to investigate. 
The fact that human rights are considered to be god-given, and removed or limited 
reasonably and justifiably by the state or government in only a very specific set of 
circumstances (such as emergency), is an indication that morality's roots in the divine 
continue to be accepted even in the otherwise secular concept of rights.  
 
Justice, on the other hand, is a highly contentious and contradictory concept. There is 
no exact legal definition of justice. Teubner, himself a precise legal theorist, has said 
that his articles on justice more than any other made him suffer most from self-doubts 
and were his most painful pieces of work. If justice is a core value of legitimacy and 
legality how does any constitutional theorist ensure that he or she has an explicit 
definition of it? Moreover, another question also arises: is there a common definition 
of justice that would serve the purpose of constitutional legality and legitimacy both? 
And, how have law and justice related to each other in time and space? 
 
Thus began my historical inquiry into the expressions of justice since the beginning 
of written legal history, in Chapter 2 of the thesis. Investigations showed that the term 
justice was as relevant in the past in all societies as it is today. However, while law 
was often delivered as justice, the absence of justice in the law, on the occasions 
when this became obvious, inevitably had disastrous consequences for those who 
pretended law and justice were the same thing. Revolutions were motivated by the 
absence or even the perception of absence of justice in law and governance. These 
revolutions, in turn, spawned rights talk, thus linking justice with morality. In 
combination these concepts initially determined legitimacy in both the literature and 
legal decisions and later determined legality in the literature, though not yet fully in 
the courts.  
 
The survey of the jurisprudence of justice in Chapter 2 showed that, eventually, the 
definitions of justice in some combination (not all) were developed as follows: right 
to be heard, equality (defined at times as equivalence), collective responsibility, 
agreement and consent, fair and independent delivery of law, rights, moral goodness, 
integrity of the social order, welfare of the whole society or common good, complete 
goodness, liberty and freedoms, social entitlement, divine order, wisdom, virtue, 
mercy, peaceful governance, mutual obligations and social contract, happiness, 
general good and representation of people in governance. From this array of qualities 
of justice, which were not always available uniformly to everyone all the time, there 
had to be something, a single core value, that everyone could agree with despite the 
varieties of social formations in which these ideas arose. It seemed to me that fair 
adjudication (free and independent delivery of law) was a non-controversial quality of 
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justice, as lack of it would be injustice. But above that is the court's ability to deliver 
justice or declare what the law is. Access to the mechanisms of justice in whatever 
form (courts, monarchs, councils) rises above all the other definitions of justice. Not 
even democracy or representation could trump this quality of justice. In countries 
with written and supreme constitutions the courts would be entitled to find a piece of 
legislation invalid despite it being passed by parliament. Even in countries without 
written constitutions access to courts would be a core value of justice. Lack of justice 
would trigger the right to rebel clause in a constitution if it had been included or a 
revolution. Legal Praxis or guerilla lawyering would be one of the ways in which this 
demand for justice could be expressed.  
 
Having defined justice as having a range of qualities with emphasis on the common 
good value of access to the courts and fair and independent adjudication once courts 
were reached, my attention then turned to the Fijian context in Chapter 3. Fiji has 
enacted, promulgated and decreed seven constitutions from 1865 until 2013`. Each of 
them contained a Bill of Rights though the extent of justiciability of these rights were 
never an issue until the 2013 Constitution. The epitome of justiciability of the Bill of 
Rights was found in the post independence 1970 Constitution and in the 1997 
Constitution. While the 1990 Constitution diminished the rights of Indians and other 
ethnic minorities, access to the courts for determination of the rights was never an 
issue. Thus, under the 1990 Constitution, while fair and independent delivery of law 
was in question since the constitution itself was racist and the courts could only 
interpret it within those limited confines, any litigant or petitioner could apply to the 
courts for the declaration of his or her rights at any time. Courts were then able to 
have the opportunity to find a way around the limitations. There were no ouster 
clauses except for the immunity provisions protecting those who had taken part in the 
1987 coup d'état.  
 
The justiciability situation in the 2013 Constitution is remarkably different. Section 
174 denies access to the courts in any constitutional challenges whatsoever. It 
constitutionally entrenches the Administration of Justice Decree 2009 though the 
Decree itself has been repealed. Section 174 limits access to the courts in such wide 
terms that justice itself and the fair and independent delivery of law are denied 
constitutionally; thus both legality and legitimacy of the 2013 Constitution of Fiji are 
compromised. In the Lockean sense, the right to rebel would be triggered by the 
existence of such a clause in the Constitution.  
 
Chapter 4 then addresses how a Fijian Constitution with justice as its core invariant 
value could be drafted. At the beginning of this chapter I had noted that the thesis had 
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different strands with discrete bodies of  legal analysis that had bearing on the subject 
matter. In Chapter 1 I had addressed one of them, Systems Theory and, through it, 
autopoiesis as a methodology of drafting. It may not be entirely clear how autopoiesis 
can be more relevant to drafting a constitution when normal drafting techniques will 
do. However the emphasis for me is not merely the method of drafting but the 
methodology of drafting. Drafting a piece of legislation requires perspective and not 
just technical skill. This becomes clear when one sees the structure of a piece of law 
which contains objectives and purpose. This point is particularly crucial to understand 
for constitutional drafting because courts invariably utilize the purposive approach to 
constitutional interpretation and often refer to the intention of the legislature or other 
entity in their decisions. The value of autopoiesis lies in showing how a system 
survives despite perturbations and assaults against its very core structure or its 
integrity. Until now autopoiesis has merely been described in the literature. Its 
usefulness as a methodology of drafting law has not yet been tested. Drafting a 
constitution with justice, including full and free access to the mechanisms of justice, 
can only be achieved with that aim in mind. If justice is to be a core value of a Fijian 
Constitution the way in which autopoiesis functions to ensure survival of an element 
will ensure that justice is not only the core value but that its qualities are emphasized 
and protected in every clause. What this may look like in real terms is the subject of 
Chapter 4. The emphasis is on drafting a new (constitutional) grundnorm that would 
imbue the entire society with the qualities of justice defined throughout the centuries 
of human existence. And in case of any threat to it, free and unfettered access to the 
courts would ensure that the integrity of the core value remains intact.  
 
In summary this thesis, which asks the question: what makes a Constitution 
Legitimate? states that justice and rights make a constitution not only legitimate but 
also legal. In reference to Fiji I state that out of all the Constitutions of Fiji, from 
1865 to the present, only the 2013 Constitution has delivered (and protected) injustice 
and is therefore unlawful despite its supposed extensive range of social, political and 
economic rights, effectiveness, purported success or, indeed, the established 
structures of governance which is the conventional indication of every constitutional 
purpose. There has been no access to the courts to test its legality, legitimacy, success 
and efficacy. If there is no access to the mechanisms of justice to test it, expressions 
of disenchantment with it and opposition to it have much validity. In such 
circumstances the agreement of the body politic in the People's Charter has greater 




In view of this tempestuous situation, it is only a matter of time before the right to 
rebel is triggered in the public's minds with its obvious consequences for violence on 
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